Dividing Ireland: World War I and Partition

THE EASTER RISING AND AFTERMATH 133
According to Plunkett, Ireland was an ideal country for creating
tactical problems: there were wild mountains north, south, east
and west, with even the central plain of the midlands being no
plain at all in the military sense. Large stretches of bog-lands were
practically impregnable to an army, even in the summer, while in
other seasons they could be counted on as obstacles. Meath and
the surrounding counties were cut up by hedges, ditches and
stone walls every few hundred metres. Cavalry was thus of very
little use for operations in Ireland. The country was entirely
suitable for a kind of guerrilla or irregular warfare. The training of
the Irish Volunteers had been directed to that end, to producing a
high degree of mobility and developing individual initiative,
together with accurate shooting. Plunkett looked back to the 1798
Irish rebellion to illustrate the potential for military success. Had
the French commander of the invasion force, General Humbert,
arrived with 12,000 instead of 1200 men, and with a supply of
arms and ammunition for the men ready to join him, he could have
held the greater part of Ireland and established a provisional
government. While English rule was more efficient in 1915,
Plunkett claimed that the population was still opposed to that rule.
If 12,000 German troops with armaments could be landed in the
west of Ireland, it was ‘certain’ that their success would be far
more remarkable than that of the French General’s, who had twice
defeated superior British forces.
Plunkett believed that a victory over the British army in Ireland
would have a great impact on the course of military operations in
the general theatre of war, on public opinion in the world at large,
and on the morale of the British Government. In 1798 what had
happened in Ireland was entirely withheld from the outside world;
but, in 1915, a diversion of even a minor kind would shock British
pride throughout the world. If the landing forces were sufficiently
strong the task of expelling and overcoming them would tax the
military and moral resources of Britain to the utmost. 40
The IRB proceeded with its plans for rebellion despite the limited
German response. Joseph Plunkett’s father, Count Plunkett, had
been asked by his son to travel to Rome to deliver a message to
the German Embassy in Berne. This message, dated 5 April 1916,
was addressed to Casement:
1 The Insurrection is fixed for the evening of next Easter Sunday.
2 The large consignment of arms to be brought into Tralee Bay
must arrive there not later than dawn of Easter Sunday.
3 German officers will be necessary for the Irish Volunteer
forces. This is imperative.