Dividing Ireland: World War I and Partition

60 IRELAND IN 1914
However, some Southern Unionists, such as J.Mackay Wilson, urged
the IUA policy of caution. Wilson based his argument upon the
superficial nature of Irish Party loyalty. ‘Even if we give Mr.
Redmond full credit for his somewhat belated effort of loyalty to
the Empire’, he argued:
Can Mr. Redmond speak for the great bulk of the Volunteers?
If France were England’s enemy, would we have a similar call
to arms by Irish Nationalists? Surely, if the National
Volunteers are to be recruited as guardians of these shores,
some oath of allegiance to the King or some other test of
loyalty will have to be administered? Once equipped with
arms, Mr. Redmond would naturally (and who would blame
him) use their extra power as a lever to carry a Home Rule
Bill.
All I suggest is that Irish Unionists wait a little. There are
many ways we can help the cause of Empire, to which we have
always been so devoted, and even be well-wishers of the
National Volunteer movement without being too closely
identified with it. Every Irish Unionist will hold out the hand of
fellowship…provided always it is not called on for any terms
or conditions, and that all controversial political differences
be sunk for the time being in the face of the grave dangers
we are suffering from. 75
Within Nationalist Ireland there were also dissenting voices. The
most vocal opposition to Redmond’s home defence policy came
from the Sinn Fein movement. Arthur Griffith warned Nationalists
that an England victorious in the war would be more powerful than
at any time since the middle of the nineteenth century, and would
treat Ireland’s claim to nationhood dismissively. On the other hand,
he feared that if England lost, and Ireland was identified with her
cause, Ireland would share in her punishment. 76 The analysis of
Eoin MacNeill was that the Home Rule Bill was to be placed on the
Statute Book ‘under a distinct understanding that the enemies of
Home Rule will have a further and full opportunity to defeat the
measures, altogether’. Only when the Bill was on the Statute Book
would the decisive stage of the campaign be reached, and the
defence of Ireland would begin. ‘There is not much likelihood of a
German invasion of our shores’, he pointed out, ‘But there is every
certainty of an English invasion of our rights and liberties’. 77 Once
signed, claimed Griffith, the Bill could see the calling of an Irish
executive within forty-eight hours, and this would be a test as to
whether the Bill, though signed, was intended to be