Johannes Althusius: Politica - Hubertlerch.com - HubertLerch.com

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rights can, however, be lawfully delegated, so that in their administration someone other than their owner may perform the
duties of a supreme magistrate.
[§ 20] Bodin disagrees with our judgment by which supreme power is attributed to the realm or universal association. He says
that the right of sovereignty, which we have called the right of the realm, is a supreme and perpetual power limited neither by
law ( lex) nor by time.
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I recognize neither of these two attributes of the right of sovereignty, in the sense Bodin intends them,
as genuine. For this right of sovereignty is not the supreme power; neither is it perpetual or above law. [§ 21] It is not
supreme because all human power acknowledges divine and natural law ( lex divina et naturalis) as superior. Note the argument
of Romans 13: the minister of God is for your good. If he is the minister of God, he can do nothing contrary to the
commandment given by his Lord.
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Indeed, an absolute and supreme power standing above all laws is called tyrannical. Bartolus
says, “great is Caesar, but greater is the truth.”
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Augustine says, “when justice is taken away, what are realms except great
bands of robbers?”
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On this point, however, not even Bodin disagrees with us. For he does not release the power he calls
supreme from the imperium of divine and natural law ( jus divinum et naturale ).
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Our question, therefore, concerns civil law and right ( civilis lex et jus). Should he who is said to have supreme power subordinate
his imperium and high office to civil law as well? Bodin says no, and many others agree with him. In the judgment of these men
there is supreme power above civil law and not limited by it. This is a judgment I would not hold. To liberate power from civil
law is to release it to a certain degree from the bonds of natural and divine law ( lex naturalis et divina). For there is no civil law,
nor can there be any, in which something of natural and divine immutable equity has not been mixed. If it departs entirely from
the judgment of natural and divine law ( jus naturale et divinum), it is not to be called law ( lex). It is entirely unworthy of this
name, and can obligate no one against natural and divine equity. Therefore, if a general civil law enacted by a prince is fair and
just, who can free him from the obligations of this very law? On the contrary, it should be the judgment of the supreme legislator
that whatever we wish men to do to us, we should do those things to them.
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But insofar as this civil law departs in certain
respects from natural equity, I will grant that he who has supreme power, and does not recognize any superior except God,
together with natural equity and justice, is not bound by this law, especially in applying punishment to himself.
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[§ 22] If law ( lex), and freedom from law by a supreme power, are accepted in this sense, I concede to the judgment of Bodin,
Petrus Gregorius, Cujas, Doneau, Duaren, and other jurists. But by no means can this supreme power be attributed to a king or
optimates, as Bodin most ardently endeavors to defend. Rather it is to be attributed rightfully only to the body of a universal
association, namely, to a commonwealth or realm, and as belonging to it. From this body, after God, every legitimate power
flows to those we call kings or optimates. Therefore, the king, prince, and optimates recognize this associated body as their
superior, by which they are constituted, removed, exiled, and deprived of authority. … [§ 23] For however great is the power
that is conceded to another, it is always less than the power of the one who makes the concession, and in it the pre-eminence
and superiority of the conceded is understood to be reserved. Whence it is shown that the king does not have a supreme and
perpetual power above the law, and consequently neither are the rights of sovereignty his own property, although he may have
the administration and exercise of them by concession from the associated body. And only so far are the rights of sovereignty
ceded and handed over to another that they never become his own property.
[§ 24] Bodin defends the opposite position by distinguishing between the sovereignty of the realm and of the ruler.
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But if
sovereignty is therefore twofold, of the realm and of the king, as Bodin says, I ask which is greater and superior to the other? It
cannot be denied that the greater is that which constitutes the other and is immortal in its foundation, and that this is the people.
Nor can it be denied that the lesser is that which appears as one person, and dies with him. The king represents the people not
the people the king, as we explain later.
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And greater is the power and strength of many than of one. Whence the supreme
monarch is required to give an account of his administration, is not permitted for his own pleasure to alienate or diminish the
provinces, cities, or towns of his realm, and can even be deposed. …
[§ 25] We must now define this supreme power. We attribute it by right of sovereignty to the associated political body, which
claims it for itself alone. In our judgment, it is derived from the purpose and scope of the universal association, namely, from
the utility and necessity of human social life. According to this position, therefore, the nature and character of imperium and
power will be that they regard and care for the genuine utility and advantage of subjects. Vásquez demonstrates this when he
says that there is no power for evil, but only for good, none for doing harm or for ruling in the interest of pleasure or selfaggrandizement,
but only for considering and supporting the genuine utility of subjects.
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Whence Augustine says that to rule is
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