Johannes Althusius: Politica - Hubertlerch.com - HubertLerch.com

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[§ 65] The second duty of the ephors is that they contain the supreme magistrate and general administrator that they have
constituted within the prescribed and accepted limits of his universal administration. They do this in order that the commonwealth
or universal association may not suffer anything detrimental, and that its rights and even those of the king or supreme
magistrate, are not violated or diminished, but may always remain unharmed, well ordered, and well protected. Peter Heige says
that for this reason requests for the alleviation of oppressions, and complaints concerning violation of the imperial rights ( jus
imperii), are frequently brought to the ephors.
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Nothing is as apt for conserving the imperial right ( jus imperii) 35 as constraint
of power brought about by others, by which such power is contained within its boundaries. For great power cannot contain itself
within boundaries without some coercion and constraint entrusted to others.
[§ 66] For this purpose the ephors have the power of helping the general and supreme magistrate by counsel and aid, and of
admonishing and correcting him when he violates the Decalogue of divine law, or the sovereign rights and laws of the realm.
Therefore, they have received the right of the sword ( jus gladii) for the sake of discharging this required responsibility. …
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[§ 68] Whence it is said to be the duty of the ephors to oppose unjust decrees of the supreme magistrate, to mitigate them by
their counsels, and to impede them when they are contrary to the common welfare and laws of the universal association. Without
the ephors’ approval, an enactment or general decree of the supreme magistrate is not valid. So great is the authority and power
of these ephors in the French realm that the official letters of the king have no authority unless they are countersigned by the
secretary of the realm, nor his rescripts unless they are signed and sealed by the chancellor of the realm. Other matters
concerning the realm take effect only when the ephors or optimates of the realm have been consulted and approve.
[§ 69] Whence it is evident that Jean Bodin greatly errs in attributing absolute and all-encompassing power to the king of
France, and in hardly recognizing the optimates.
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He thinks that when optimates have power, the sovereignty and power of the
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king are either destroyed or shared with colleagues. Peter Heige calls attention to this error. Indeed, jurists state that a prince
who harms his subjects, and who does not maintain them inviolate, is not maintained by his contract with them.
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Even should the king or emperor concede kingly functions to dukes and counts of the imperium, or to the vassals and optimates
of the realm, imperial superiority and pre-eminence are understood to be reserved to him. [§ 70] Whence it is that such
optimates can by no means be considered colleagues of the king, or of equal power with him.
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For only special and restricted
power and administration have been given to these optimates. Indeed, the king or supreme magistrate has general power,
sovereignty, and pre-eminence over individual optimates, and everything else depends upon his power and administration.
However great may be the imperium that is assigned to another, it is always less than what the conceder has reserved to
himself, as is the common judgment of the jurists. [§ 71] The supreme ruler cannot constitute an equal to himself.
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The whole
has greater power than one man, and whatever anyone has more than other men, he has received it from the whole. Nor can the
power of the king be said to be diminished because ephors and optimates exercise some power, as the hand is not weaker
because it has been divided into fingers, but is more agile in action. [§ 72] So power is more useful when deployed among a
large number, and the affairs of the commonwealth are more readily expedited when communicated among many.
[§ 73] Moreover, these ephors as a whole are superior to the supreme magistrate to the extent that, representing the people,
they collectively do something in its name; individually and separately, however, they are inferiors of this magistrate.
[§ 74] The supreme prince is bound by oath to the commonwealth as an officer of it, and is less than the entire commonwealth
or realm itself. Julius Caesar bears witness that the ruling arrangements of the kings of France in his time were such that the
people when rightly convoked had no less authority over the king than the king had over the people.
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So the synod is superior
to its bishop, the council to a pope, the chapter to its agent, and the community ( universitas ) to its syndic. [§ 75] To these
ephors, rather than to the supreme magistrate, the supreme power of the commonwealth has first been entrusted by the people.
Therefore, because the power was first conferred upon such ephors, it could not afterwards be given by the people to any
magistrate. …
[§ 83] We see in the power and authority conceded to these few ephors for defending the rights of the people or universal
association that the people has not transferred these rights to the supreme magistrate, but has reserved them to itself. For the
universal association entrusted to its ephors the care and defense of these rights against all violators, disturbers, and plunderers,
even against the supreme magistrate himself. The Dutch Wars of Independence offer examples of this care and defense by
ephors during forty years of conflict against the King of Spain. [§ 84] Whence the office of these ephors is not only to judge
whether the supreme magistrate has performed his responsibility or not, but also to resist and impede the tyranny of a supreme
magistrate who abuses the rights of sovereignty, and violates or wishes to take away the authority ( jus) of the body of the
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