Johannes Althusius: Politica - Hubertlerch.com - HubertLerch.com

Althusius_0002
9/10/05 4:09 PM
others bring against him, as the Golden Bull of Charles IV teaches. The king of France is under the judgment of the Parliament of
Paris, and the princes of the German imperium are under the judgments of other princes, of counts, or even of
their counselors.
62
Bartolus asserts that a king also can be subjected to someone less than himself or to his equal.
63
Therefore,
these persons— Caesar, king, and prince—are over ( praeesse) in one relationship and are under ( subesse) in another, but not
over and under in the same relationship; they are, nevertheless, over and under at the same time and with reference to the
same interpretation. [§ 99] The king is over and rules in those things for which he receives the power of ruling and governing,
not in those things that have been reserved to the power and judgment of the ephors. He is over when he governs and
administers lawfully, justly, and piously; that is, he ceases to be the administrator when he does not care what happens, but
loses, squanders, and destroys, and ceases to be a living law, just as a pastor ceases to be a pastor who flays, divides, and loses
his sheep.
Barclay continues by developing his argument from examples. Thus he says cardinals constitute a pope above them, priests a
bishop above them, and monks an abbot above them. Whence the former are inferior in power and authority, and the latter are
superior. The former are devoid of the imperium and power that the latter have. [§ 100] But I say that such persons—the pope,
bishop, abbot, or anyone else—can be removed for just reasons by those who constituted them, and can be deprived of their
power. For what if such a pope, bishop, or abbot should become a heretic, or in any manner become unfit or untrustworthy in
office? Canonical laws ( jura canonica) pronounce such persons to be restrained from the authority and administration of the office
entrusted to them.
64
And often such persons have been deprived of their office, as history bears witness and practical experience
teaches. [§ 101] For who, to the detriment of the church and to the damage and loss of man’s salvation, would long endure
such unfit men, heretics, schismatics, sorcerers, incapacitated persons, those who live a shameful life and provide not at all for
the functions of their office, or those who do not tend their sheep but flay them? If they lose their mind or develop another
disorder of soul or body, so that henceforth they become altogether unfit or incapacitated, will not the church be committed to
the government of other ministers? Or does the church so fall into their power, care, and protection that while they are living its
government never can be committed to another? Or in emergencies is the order, authority, and power of one man—of a pope,
bishop, or abbot—greater and stronger than that of the church, the cardinals, or the monks? Or is the power of one greater than
the power of many? No one will maintain this. Or in these emergencies is the right of one pope, bishop, or abbot greater,
stronger, and in better condition than that of all the cardinals and monks of the entire church? Nor will anyone affirm this. For
whatever the right, power, and authority such ecclesiastical overseers have, it is not their property, nor do they derive it from
themselves. Rather they have received it from the church, the collegium of cardinals, and the chapter of monks. Those who die
or lay aside their office resign this right, power, and authority into the hands of the church, collegium, or chapter by which they
were constituted. They restore this right to its owners, so that these overseers are considered to be nothing more than
usufructuaries of it, and the collegia indeed to be its proprietors. [§ 102] Whence it is that the right of these overseers is
temporal. On the other hand, the right of the collegia is permanent and immortal to the extent that these collegia, because of
their constant succession of persons in place of those who depart, are considered to be immortal.
When we consider the office and administration of kings, we find that their nature and constitution are not unlike those of
ecclesiastical overseers. [§ 103] The right of a king consists in the faithful and diligent care and administration of the
commonwealth entrusted to him by the people. For this reason the people transfers to him as much authority and power as it
judges necessary. By the communication, sharing, and contribution of individual persons from the people, the king becomes rich
and powerful. By their counsel he becomes wise. By the aid of his subjects he excels in strength, vigor, and might. If the people
denies these to the king, he again becomes weak, poor, needy, and a private person. The king holds, uses, and enjoys these
riches—and this might, wisdom, and authority—as a usufructuary. When the king dies, or is denied the regal throne by any
legitimate means, these rights of the king, as we have said, return to the people as to their proprietor. The people then reassigns
them as it thinks wise for the good of the commonwealth. [§ 104] Therefore, the right of the king is one thing, and the right of
the people is another. The former is temporal and personal; the latter is permanent. The former is the lesser; the latter is the
greater. The former is a precarium given by contract to the commissioned king, and undertaken by him; the latter is an
incommunicable property.
[§ 105] Moreover, Barclay says that as the husband who is constituted over his wife is her superior, so the king is superior to
the commonwealth and realm. But I say that the superiority and power the husband has over his wife he derives from the
marriage. And this is only for a time and with a condition, namely, that it lasts as long as the marriage endures, that is, as long
as the marriage is not dissolved by adultery, desertion, or death. When the marriage is dissolved, every marital power he
exercises over his wife is ended. Of equal seriousness with desertion is the intolerable cruelty of a husband that makes it
impossible to live with him. Because of incurable cruelty, and its hazard to life and health, theologians concede a dissolution of
http://oll.libertyfund.org/Home3/EBook.php?recordID=0002
Page 74 of 132