Synthesis Report - European Commission - Europa

Synthesis Report Ex-post Evaluation of the ERDF 2000-2006
evaluation. The changes were more visible at the regional level – where the administration
of cohesion policy and domestic policy was merged - than at the national level.
• In Slovenia, suitable institutional arrangements and procedures were set up for the
management and implementation of cohesion policy. However, due to lack of staff and
experience, the system encountered some difficulties, especially at the beginning of the
period. Nevertheless, cohesion policy is reported to have been important in introducing
new forms of management and in strengthening institutional capacity, as well as
stimulating collective action for development and introducing new forms of intervention
(industrial zones and in tourism). This was achieved through:
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intensive education of personnel in Ministries and associated bodies aimed at
better planning of projects and at establishing clear and transparent means of
implementation;
closer cooperation between the Managing Authority and Ministries;
better prepared policies, clearer instructions and guidelines and increased
publication of information about the funding available.
• In Slovakia, a solid basis for the management and implementation of cohesion policy was
established over the period. However, due to limited experience, the focus was primarily
on contracting and reimbursement and less attention was paid to the qualitative aspects
of implementation. High staff turnover and deficiencies in staff development undermined
the overall effectiveness of policy. Although the establishment of the management and
implementation system had some effects, major differences in the management of
cohesion policy and in that of domestic policies remained at the end of the period.
4.2.3 Policy outcomes in Objective 2 regions
The expenditure financed by the ERDF under Objective 2 for the period 2000-2006 was, as
indicated above, very much less than under Objective 1 – only around one-fifth of the amount (at
just under EUR 19 billion up to the end of 2008). Partly because of this, funding was concentrated
on small problem areas within countries, smaller – in many cases, much smaller – than NUTS 2
regions and mostly smaller even than NUTS 3 regions. Despite this spatial concentration, the
amount of support provided in the areas assisted was considerably less than in Objective 1
regions, averaging only around 0.13% of GDP in the areas concerned.
What can reasonably be expected to have been achieved in these areas as a result of cohesion
policy is, therefore, correspondingly less than in Objective 1 regions. Nevertheless, despite the
policy aims set often being far in excess of what was feasible given the amount of financial
support provided, the evidence from the evaluation is that in many of the regions assisted, the
amount involved had a significant effect in furthering economic and social objectives. It,
therefore, acted in a number of cases both as a catalyst for the formulation of development
policies for tackling the problems confronting the regions concerned and as a means of levering
more funding to carry out a more extensive, and effective, policy.
This is reflected in the performance of regions receiving Objective 2 funding over the
programming period. As indicated in Chapter 2 above, growth of GDP per head in the regions
concerned tended to be either higher or not significantly worse in the regions concerned than in
non-assisted regions. This was especially the case in those receiving the most funding, despite
these being the ones with the biggest structural problems whether arising from being overly
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