Synthesis Report - European Commission - Europa
Synthesis Report - European Commission - Europa
Synthesis Report - European Commission - Europa
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Ex-post Evaluation of the ERDF 2000-2006<br />
<strong>Synthesis</strong> <strong>Report</strong><br />
These include, in particular, spill-overs into other policy areas of the key principles involved –<br />
programming over a medium-to-long time horizon, partnership (involving stakeholders in the<br />
design and implementation of policy), transparency, monitoring and evaluation.<br />
The spill-overs tended to be greatest where commitment to increasing the effectiveness of<br />
policies was strongest among decision makers and where the scale of funding was large in<br />
relation to national budgets.<br />
Nevertheless, while the programming principle was firmly established, infrastructure projects,<br />
particularly for the environment though also for transport, were in many cases, not adequately<br />
integrated into an overall regional development strategy. The result was that they were less<br />
effective than they might have been in furthering the strategy concerned and in pursuing more<br />
than one objective at the same time.<br />
A particular challenge is posed by the typically long duration of infrastructure projects, especially<br />
those for transport, which often extend beyond the time span of a single programming period.<br />
This, in many cases, is combined with long lead times because of the need for careful design of<br />
the project, obtaining planning approval, purchasing the land required and so on, as well as with<br />
a high level of uncertainty about the costs involved at various stages of the project. In addition,<br />
the bureaucratic procedures surrounding such projects, which vary markedly between countries<br />
in their complexity and the time needed to complete them, add a further element of uncertainty<br />
and potential delay.<br />
The resulting difficulty in determining the expenditure profile of large-scale infrastructure<br />
projects led in a number of countries to funding being concentrated on smaller projects where<br />
commitments could more easily be translated into spending within a reasonable period of time,<br />
with less risk of infringing the n+2 rule (see below). These projects, however, tended to be less<br />
important for development.<br />
In certain cases, funding was shifted to projects which had already been completed, or were in<br />
the process of so being, and had been financed from other sources. Accordingly, while the<br />
funding provided was spent in the same broad policy area as initially planned, it was not spent on<br />
new investment as such. The key issue this raises is whether the strategy initially agreed, and on<br />
which the funding provided was predicated, was implemented in practice. This question could not<br />
be answered during the evaluation.<br />
A related feature to emerge from the evaluation was the tendency in a number of countries for<br />
expenditure to have built up only slowly over the programming period and to have been<br />
concentrated at the very end of the time allowed for spending to take place – in the years 2006-<br />
2008. This might reflect a particularly careful selection of projects to fund or, alternatively,<br />
excessively long administrative procedures, implying significant costs to those undertaking the<br />
projects. It also raises a question about the criteria applied to selecting projects towards the end<br />
of the period when a large proportion of the funds have to be spent relatively quickly. It equally<br />
implies an adverse effect on the implementation of programmes in the following programming<br />
period, given the likely preoccupation of the authorities with spending the remaining funding<br />
from the previous period. Indeed, the evidence is that a number of Member States have effectively<br />
shifted the programming period by two years, so that spending the funds available does not<br />
really begin seriously until two years have already elapsed.<br />
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