jp8589 WRI.qxd - World Resources Institute
jp8589 WRI.qxd - World Resources Institute
jp8589 WRI.qxd - World Resources Institute
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CHAPTER 4<br />
FOUR STEPS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INCOME<br />
ownership and management. Many nations have made<br />
significant progress in crafting new forestry, wildlife, and<br />
fishery laws that specifically sanction local management<br />
regimes. In South Africa, for example, the 1998 Marine<br />
Living <strong>Resources</strong> Act included a provision recognizing the<br />
legitimacy of managing local fisheries for subsistence use<br />
(<strong>WRI</strong> et al. 2003:180). In Africa alone, more than 30<br />
countries have passed new forest laws since 1990 that<br />
mandate varying levels of decentralization and new opportunities<br />
for local participation in management (Shyamsundar<br />
et al. 2004:20). However, interpreting these laws and establishing<br />
the limits of local management authority are ongoing<br />
challenges that demand continued state attention and experimentation.<br />
This includes not only the details about<br />
technical management itself, but also such institutional<br />
questions as the structure of local management committees.<br />
The state, for instance, may play a progressive role by<br />
encouraging gender balance on such committees.<br />
2. Granting resource tenure. As stated earlier, tenure is a<br />
central requirement for real access and control of resources.<br />
As it defines the parameters of local control, perhaps the<br />
state’s most important contribution is to clearly establish the<br />
resource rights of communities in a legally unambiguous<br />
manner. This allows communities to make firm management<br />
plans and financial commitments without fear of disenfranchisement.<br />
It gives them the legal basis to seek redress through<br />
the courts if they feel their resource rights have been violated.<br />
This access to redress is essential to the exercise of true<br />
authority, and lack of this right is a frequent bugaboo of local<br />
management efforts.<br />
3. Requiring community consent. One way that the state<br />
can safeguard local community management rights is to<br />
insist on a requirement of free, prior, and informed consent<br />
(FPIC) by the community whenever large-scale economic<br />
projects like mining, energy extraction, or major timber<br />
harvests are proposed nearby. Planning for such projects<br />
often excludes effective community participation and<br />
conflicts with local priorities. FPIC is both a principle and<br />
a process that some governments and international institutions<br />
are beginning to incorporate into their policies. As a<br />
principle, FPIC is the right of local communities and<br />
indigenous peoples to participate meaningfully, through<br />
consent procedures, in decisions about how the land they<br />
occupy and the natural resources they depend on are to be<br />
utilized. As a process, FPIC enables rural communities—<br />
who are often politically weak—to present their concerns<br />
to those proposing large-scale projects, whether they are<br />
from the government or the private sector. Its intent is to<br />
promote equal bargaining power among all parties and<br />
shield communities from coercion, threat, or manipulation.<br />
Without this shield, experience shows that poor communities<br />
often lose control of local resources. (See Box 3.3.)<br />
CO-MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCES IN SAMOA<br />
In 1995 the Fisheries Division of Samoa developed a co-management<br />
policy for the nation’s small-scale coastal fisheries. It began to work with<br />
fishing communities to develop Village Fisheries Management Plans,<br />
providing villages with any technical assistance they needed to develop<br />
the plans. Provided the rules proposed in the management plans were<br />
consistent with national law, the government would help the communities<br />
make them legally binding by issuing them as by-laws. Once approved,<br />
the by-laws were disseminated via radio.<br />
Within the first two years of implementing the co-management policy, the<br />
Fisheries Division had helped 44 communities adopt Fisheries<br />
Management Plans. These plans all contained elements of sound ecosystem<br />
management. For example, all of the plans banned the use of<br />
dynamite (a destructive fishing practice), 86 percent established local<br />
marine protected areas, and 75 percent set mesh size limits on fishing<br />
nets to reduce the accidental capture of juvenile fish. The government<br />
implemented the program gradually, providing extension services to<br />
roughly 10 new villages per year. Extension officers would first meet with<br />
the community; if it was interested, the officers would convene a community<br />
assembly to negotiate the co-management arrangement, including<br />
the various duties and obligations of the state and the community.<br />
Satisfaction with the program was generally high. An internal review in<br />
2000 found that 86 percent of the villages were implementing management<br />
plans at or above average competency (King and Fa’asili<br />
1999:138-140; <strong>World</strong> Bank 2004:42)<br />
COMMUNITY-BASED FISHERY MANAGEMENT IN SAMOA<br />
Management Technique<br />
% of Villages Adopting<br />
Banning the use of chemicals and dynamite to kill fish 100<br />
Banning the use of traditional plant-derived fish poisons 100<br />
Establishing small protected areas in which fishing is banned 86<br />
Enforcement of limits on the size of mesh nets 75<br />
Banning the dumping of rubbish in lagoon waters 71<br />
Placing controls or limits on the number of fish fences or traps