jp8589 WRI.qxd - World Resources Institute
jp8589 WRI.qxd - World Resources Institute
jp8589 WRI.qxd - World Resources Institute
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CHAPTER 4<br />
FOUR STEPS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INCOME<br />
■ Exclusion of women. Women make up the majority of the<br />
world’s agricultural producers, but they are usually the last to<br />
be included in land and tenure reform efforts. Traditionally,<br />
women in Africa and other parts of the developing world have<br />
only had access to land tenure through their husbands, fathers,<br />
or other male relatives. Registration of land in the name of<br />
male relatives precludes women from obtaining property rights<br />
at a time when women’s access to land for cultivation is becoming<br />
increasingly important for AIDS widows and other female<br />
heads of households (Carter 2003:49).<br />
■ Inadequate procedures for documenting communal<br />
rights. The lack of appropriate procedures for expeditious,<br />
cost-effective documentation of untitled communal property<br />
rights can compromise the effectiveness of tenure reform.<br />
For instance, the government of Bolivia enacted legislation<br />
recognizing indigenous land rights in 1996; because of<br />
complicated and costly documentation procedures, however,<br />
by 1999 only 10 percent of eligible territories had received<br />
titles (White and Martin 2002:16).<br />
■ Conditionality and other constraints to land markets.<br />
Many new tenure laws do nothing to remove constraints and<br />
limitations that have long hampered land markets in developing<br />
countries. For example, none of the recent spate of African<br />
tenure legislation removes long-standing requirements to<br />
occupy and use agricultural land in order to maintain tenure<br />
(Alden Wily and Mbaya 2001:14 ). Agricultural use may not<br />
always be the best use of ecosystems, either economically or<br />
ecologically. For example, conversion to wildlife habitat may be<br />
a better use of some lands with high tourist potential, or<br />
conversion to other commercial purposes. Flexibility in land<br />
use may increase the value of the land assets of the poor, while<br />
conditions on use reduce the economic potential of the land.<br />
Poor-Friendly Decentralization: Community-<br />
Based Natural Resource Management<br />
Improving the tenure security of the poor and their ability to<br />
exercise property rights is only one step in the legal, economic,<br />
and political empowerment of poor families. A second important<br />
step is devolving management authority over ecosystems to<br />
local institutions that are more accessible to the poor.<br />
As detailed in Chapter 3, decentralization that actually<br />
works for the poor is more the exception than the rule. It<br />
requires, at a minimum, that local institutions—whether they be<br />
official government institutions like village councils or informal<br />
institutions such as user groups, cooperatives, or watershed<br />
committees—are formed on democratic principles of representation,<br />
meaning that they are accountable to their low-income<br />
constituents. But this alone is not usually enough to overcome the<br />
structural bias against the poor in local institutions. Special<br />
efforts to include the poor are generally required. These can<br />
range from reserving gender-based or income-based slots in local<br />
institutions to insure participation; arranging for special outreach<br />
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