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Part D – Understanding and improving industry performance (PDF ...

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Case study<br />

Authorisations granted by the ACCC to taxi networks to require use of the Cabcharge<br />

payment system<br />

On 25 February 1986, the Trade Practices Commission (predecessor to the ACCC) granted authorisation to De<br />

Luxe Red & Yellow Cabs in Sydney to provide radio booking services on the condition that taxi operators <strong>and</strong><br />

drivers accept the taxi hiring account system (Cabcharge) <strong>and</strong> display the decals of that system.<br />

At the time, the Cabcharge Account System covered the acceptance of most major credit cards <strong>and</strong> vouchers.<br />

The Commission agreed that consumers should not be misled as to the availability of credit card services <strong>and</strong><br />

that it was in the public’s interest for De Luxe to require that all taxis offer the Cabcharge payment system to<br />

passengers. Between 1986 <strong>and</strong> 1994, 11 other taxi companies/cooperatives in New South Wales, Victoria <strong>and</strong><br />

South Australia (many linked to Cabcharge) were granted authorisation for similar conduct to De Luxe.<br />

Most, if not all, of the networks who had authorisation put in place incentive schemes to encourage operators to<br />

process card transactions through Cabcharge in preference to other providers.<br />

In 2004, the ACCC commenced the process for revocation of the authorisations on the basis that there may no<br />

longer be any public benefit in continuing them because credit card payment had become such a universally<br />

accepted form of payment <strong>and</strong> it was in the taxi drivers’ interest to process most cards. However, the ACCC<br />

decided that the small public benefit generated by the authorised conduct marginally outweighed the negligible<br />

public detriments <strong>and</strong> chose not to revoke the authorisations.<br />

Mr Michael Jools, President of the New South Wales Taxi Drivers Association, was dissatisfied with this decision<br />

<strong>and</strong> applied to the Australian Competition Tribunal under s101(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 for a review of<br />

the decision. The Tribunal considered further whether the authorisations would continue to make new entry <strong>and</strong><br />

competition less likely than would otherwise be the case. They considered that with the authorisations in place,<br />

the opportunities for a new market participant would be severely reduced. However, without the authorisations,<br />

there would be very little incentive for Cabcharge to permit its credit cards to be used in other systems. Further,<br />

Cabcharge did not need the authorisations in force to encourage taxi networks to take up their system.<br />

The Tribunal found that the potential benefit in sustaining the authorisations could not be said to amount to a<br />

sufficiently certain benefit <strong>and</strong> the authorisations were revoked in June 2006.<br />

The interconnectivity between the NSPs <strong>and</strong> Cabcharge<br />

means that potential entrants have to negotiate<br />

individually with taxi operators or drivers for the supply of<br />

competing non-cash payment systems. Negotiation with<br />

many thous<strong>and</strong>s of individual taxi operators <strong>and</strong> drivers<br />

is highly inefficient <strong>and</strong> takes time. The inquiry has also<br />

been told that operators who are affiliated to NSPs with<br />

links to Cabcharge are hesitant to install Cabcharge’s<br />

competitors’ payment systems as they fear being<br />

penalised either directly through the booking network or<br />

indirectly by losing assigned licences that are effectively<br />

under Cabcharge’s control.<br />

12.4.3. Market <strong>performance</strong><br />

The surcharge <strong>and</strong> the behaviour of payment<br />

processing providers<br />

The market characteristics described above have led to the<br />

10 per cent surcharge on electronic payments becoming<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ard practice for all payment systems providers.<br />

It is important to underst<strong>and</strong> the reasons why this charge<br />

remains so high – that is, so far above the merchant<br />

service fees that are levied on payments processors.<br />

The inquiry underst<strong>and</strong>s that a significant factor in<br />

maintaining the surcharge is that portions of the surcharge<br />

are directed to NSPs – <strong>and</strong>, in some instances, to<br />

operators <strong>and</strong> drivers – as incentive payments for the use<br />

of particular payment processing systems.<br />

The Gange Corporation told the inquiry that under Silver<br />

Top Taxis’ commercial arrangement with Cabcharge,<br />

Silver Top Taxis are entitled to a service fee of 2.5 per cent<br />

on all transactions it processes on behalf of the relevant<br />

operator. Beyond a certain threshold, a further two per<br />

cent rebate on Cabcharge transactions is also provided<br />

by Cabcharge to Silver Top Taxis, which is passed through<br />

to the taxi operator <strong>and</strong> not retained by Silver Top Taxis.<br />

So, in total, up to 4.5 per cent is offered by Cabcharge as<br />

incentive payments. 20<br />

20 Gange Corporation, Op. Cit., p. 7<br />

258

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