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Part D – Understanding and improving industry performance (PDF ...

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More recently in the United States, a number of cities<br />

have moved to open market arrangements while<br />

maintaining fare <strong>and</strong> quality controls (such as Indianapolis<br />

<strong>and</strong> Minneapolis). Phoenix <strong>and</strong> Washington DC also<br />

maintain open markets.<br />

9.3.2. Fare controls<br />

The experiences of other jurisdictions suggest that<br />

the relaxation of licence controls does not necessarily<br />

result in the full realisation of anticipated competitive<br />

<strong>and</strong> efficient markets. Fares do not invariably<br />

decrease if fare controls are relaxed or removed.<br />

These experiences have highlighted the need for<br />

jurisdictions to be aware of the interaction between<br />

fares <strong>and</strong> entry controls at the time of deregulation.<br />

For example, the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s deregulated its taxi <strong>industry</strong><br />

during the period 2000 to 2002. During this time, a new<br />

national maximum fare was introduced temporarily, with<br />

the intention of protecting consumers from any initial<br />

excessive price rises as a result of licence liberalisation.<br />

The Government’s expectation was that competition would<br />

increase <strong>and</strong> the maximum fare could then be removed.<br />

However, the outcome was an increase in fares – the<br />

national maximum fare was actually set relatively higher<br />

than the average fare under the previous regime <strong>and</strong> this<br />

allowed operators the freedom to charge higher fares. 8 The<br />

effect was that, while the availability of services improved<br />

with an increase in taxi numbers, fares under this scheme<br />

also increased to close to the maximum fare.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, New Zeal<strong>and</strong> allowed <strong>industry</strong><br />

participants to set their own fares when it deregulated<br />

entry <strong>and</strong> fares (see case study). However, maximum<br />

fares for each taxi organisation have to be registered with<br />

<strong>and</strong> approved by the NZTA before coming into effect.<br />

Fares are calibrated on the meter <strong>and</strong> information on<br />

fares displayed inside <strong>and</strong> outside the taxi. Early studies<br />

suggested that the effects were generally positive. These<br />

studies found that in New Zeal<strong>and</strong>’s large cities, entry<br />

increased but real fares decreased. 9 The inquiry’s view<br />

is that, broadly, the relaxation of fare controls in New<br />

Zeal<strong>and</strong> has allowed innovation <strong>and</strong> price differentiation<br />

to a degree. While a common approach to structuring<br />

fares is required, ATOs can emphasise different elements<br />

of the fare structure. The public tend to focus on the<br />

flagfall <strong>and</strong> distance rates, but the inquiry found there<br />

were significant differences in overall fares due mainly to<br />

the effect of waiting time changes.<br />

The lack of readily comparable fare information seems to<br />

be an issue in New Zeal<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Singapore adopted a similar approach to New Zeal<strong>and</strong><br />

when it deregulated fares in 1998 <strong>and</strong> maintained this<br />

position during the subsequent deregulation of licences<br />

in 2003 (see case study). Each taxi network is free to set<br />

their own fares provided that the network informs the<br />

government <strong>and</strong> the public to ensure the predictability of<br />

the fares.<br />

However, the behaviour of the market seems to suggest<br />

not as much competition on fares as this approach<br />

implies, partly due to the indirect effects of limiting<br />

licences – <strong>and</strong> thus competition – through Singapore’s<br />

private <strong>and</strong> commercial vehicle permit system <strong>and</strong><br />

minimum fleet size requirements. The current largest<br />

taxi network effectively acts as a market leader: it sets<br />

prices <strong>and</strong> the other networks generally follow. To cope<br />

with increased dem<strong>and</strong> for its services, the largest taxi<br />

network recently revised its fare structure rather than<br />

purchase new licences, which will most likely result in<br />

higher fares. 10 The Singapore example emphasises that,<br />

even where there are several taxi networks competing<br />

on a range of dimensions, competitive outcomes on<br />

fares can be tenuous. Regardless, a 2008 Singapore<br />

Government report suggested that fares in Singapore<br />

are relatively low, on a purchasing power parity basis,<br />

compared to other major cities. 11<br />

8 Ba<strong>and</strong>ers, B. <strong>and</strong> Canoy, M. (2010), ‘Ten years of taxi deregulation<br />

in the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s – the case for re-regulation <strong>and</strong> decentralisation’,<br />

European Transport Conference, Glasgow, p.3<br />

9 See for example Gaunt, Clive (1996), ‘The impact of taxi deregulation<br />

on small urban areas: some New Zeal<strong>and</strong> evidence’, Transport Policy,<br />

2(4), pp.257-262<br />

10 See ‘ComfortDelGro revises taxi fares’, 5 December 2011,<br />

accessed 29 March 2012 at www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/<br />

singaporelocalnews/view/1169537/1/.html<br />

11 Comparative prices in 2008 for a 9km journey during morning<br />

peak times were Singapore S$9.39; Hong-Kong S$12.35; London<br />

S$24.56; <strong>and</strong> New York S$14.62: Singapore L<strong>and</strong> Transport<br />

Authority (2008), L<strong>and</strong> Transport Masterplan, p.17<br />

164

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