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Part D – Understanding and improving industry performance (PDF ...

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The Reserve Bank of Australia’s review of<br />

the No-Surcharge St<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

The RBA’s Payment Systems Board is responsible<br />

for promoting the safety, efficiency <strong>and</strong><br />

competitiveness of the payments system in Australia.<br />

In 2011, the RBA’s Payment Systems Board<br />

conducted a review of card surcharging due to<br />

concern about merchants exploiting payment<br />

processing fees as a source of revenue. The Board<br />

highlighted that excessive ad valorem surcharges<br />

were common in the taxi <strong>industry</strong>, as well as for online<br />

transactions or in circumstances where consumers feel<br />

they have few alternatives to using a scheme card. The<br />

Board also noted that the merchants who impose high<br />

surcharges tend to be those with market power.<br />

Surcharges in excess of the cost of card acceptance<br />

<strong>and</strong> the blending of surcharges for different cards<br />

reduces the efficiency of the payment system by<br />

removing price signals to consumers about the<br />

relative cost of different payment methods.<br />

As a result of the review, the Board has indicated<br />

that it intends to relax the st<strong>and</strong>ards to allow<br />

schemes (Visa <strong>and</strong> Mastercard credit <strong>and</strong> Visa debit)<br />

to limit surcharges. More specifically, the Board has<br />

stated that:<br />

In light of the views expressed in consultation <strong>and</strong><br />

developments in surcharging practices in recent<br />

years, the Payments System Board considers that<br />

there is a case for varying the St<strong>and</strong>ards, by<br />

allowing the schemes to limit surcharges to a<br />

reasonable cost of acceptance, while at the same<br />

time ensuring the schemes’ rules cannot prevent<br />

full cost recovery by merchants. 30<br />

The Board specifically makes it clear in its<br />

consultation document that pressure from<br />

consumers <strong>and</strong> ‘moral suasion’ alone will not be<br />

enough to change the surcharging behaviour of<br />

merchants, particularly those with some market<br />

power. The Board believes that some merchants<br />

may “require an element of compulsion to bring<br />

surcharges into line with card acceptance costs”. 31<br />

12.5.3. Regulating the service fee<br />

While there is potential for national reforms to bring<br />

change in the future, the inquiry remains concerned<br />

about the 10 per cent surcharge currently imposed<br />

on Victorian taxi users. The fact that half of these fees<br />

overall are funnelled back to drivers, NSPs <strong>and</strong> operators<br />

strongly suggests that the 10 per cent is unnecessarily<br />

high <strong>and</strong> that there will be significant consumer benefit in<br />

lowering the charge to a level where these payments are<br />

minimal or eliminated.<br />

The inquiry is also concerned that addressing some of<br />

barriers to entry into payments processing will not be<br />

sufficient, of itself, to lower the surcharge. The weak<br />

competition between taxi operators <strong>and</strong> networks<br />

indicates that competition between processors is likely<br />

to be much fiercer to attract networks, operators <strong>and</strong><br />

drivers to use processing equipment (by offering higher<br />

rebates), rather than lowering prices to consumers.<br />

While Cabcharge provided no defence of the 10 per<br />

cent surcharge to the inquiry, the inquiry did receive<br />

representations from some other payments processors<br />

arguing that reducing the allowable service fee would<br />

cause damage to competition.<br />

CabFare told the inquiry that without access to the<br />

processing of Cabcharge br<strong>and</strong>ed cards <strong>and</strong> the MPTP,<br />

the rebate to operators <strong>and</strong> drivers is the principle<br />

competitive proposition of the third party players. Not<br />

only will a reduction in the surcharge do little to improve<br />

their market position, but CabFare argues that:<br />

Varying the service fee without access by third parties<br />

to the Cabcharge cards will result in the exit from the<br />

market of Third <strong>Part</strong>y EFTPOS providers <strong>and</strong> at a low<br />

level could result in the exit of Cabcharge <strong>and</strong> the<br />

return to a cash only transaction. 32<br />

This view was echoed by other market participants<br />

who told the inquiry that competing payment processor<br />

providers would not be able to grow market share if such<br />

rebates are not offered. 33<br />

While the inquiry acknowledges that third party<br />

EFTPOS providers rely on the surcharge to compete<br />

with Cabcharge, ultimately the inquiry finds that these<br />

competitive practices do nothing to benefit consumers.<br />

3031<br />

30 Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) (December 2011), A Variation to the<br />

Surcharging St<strong>and</strong>ards: A Consultation Document, RBA Sydney, p.1<br />

31 Ibid., p.11<br />

32 CabFare, Presentation to Taxi Industry Inquiry, 21 February 2012<br />

33 Ambassador Taxis, Taxilink <strong>and</strong> Cabways, Submission to the Taxi<br />

Industry Inquiry, SS233, p.36<br />

262

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