Part D â Understanding and improving industry performance (PDF ...
Part D â Understanding and improving industry performance (PDF ...
Part D â Understanding and improving industry performance (PDF ...
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The inquiry considers that the arguments made by<br />
the ACCC in 1995 with respect to competition are still<br />
relevant. Generally, networks are not in a position to offer<br />
service differentiation because fares remain fixed <strong>and</strong><br />
networks cannot directly acquire more licences. Therefore,<br />
competition largely focuses on establishing a recognisable<br />
br<strong>and</strong> for consumers <strong>and</strong> on acquiring affiliated operators.<br />
It is difficult to underst<strong>and</strong> how, given the relevance of<br />
geographic considerations, there could have been limited<br />
competition for drivers <strong>and</strong> operators between West<br />
Suburban <strong>and</strong> Silver Top as their historic catchment areas<br />
for taxi operators are adjacent to one another.<br />
In 1995, the ACCC also dealt with another important<br />
argument about the efficiency of network operation <strong>and</strong><br />
whether this could justify an acquisition. The Commission<br />
noted that such efficiencies were not merger-specific;<br />
that is, in the absence of the merger, Silver Top would<br />
have had a cost advantage if it was more efficient than<br />
North Suburban <strong>and</strong> could have attracted more taxi<br />
operators without the need to acquire North Suburban.<br />
A further concerning feature of other ACCC decisions<br />
has been the reliance on regulation as a merger-specific<br />
factor that lessened concerns about competitive<br />
detriment. In Acquisition of Murrell Enterprises Pty<br />
Ltd trading as Bay City Cabs (BCC) by Silver Top Taxi<br />
Service Limited the ACCC noted that it “took into<br />
account that the regulation of the provision of taxi hire<br />
services in Geelong including pricing is the responsibility<br />
of the Victorian Taxi Directorate”. 57 It is unclear why this<br />
should be a relevant factor <strong>and</strong> it is concerning if it was<br />
a significant factor as the purpose of merger regulation<br />
is to prevent the accumulation of market power which<br />
includes, among other things, the power to set higher<br />
prices for consumers. Further, the key price at issue<br />
is not the price paid by users for taxi services or for<br />
booking services. Rather, the key price is that paid by<br />
taxi operators for NSP services. This has never been<br />
regulated by the VTD or any other statutory authority.<br />
Vertical mergers<br />
The key vertical mergers considered by the ACCC in<br />
recent times have involved Cabcharge. The particular<br />
concern that has been raised in relation to a number of<br />
acquisitions by Cabcharge is the potential for Cabcharge<br />
to protect its strong position in markets for electronic<br />
payments <strong>and</strong> processing by raising barriers to entry.<br />
The particular concern in assessing these mergers is that<br />
NSPs have an important role in determining the kinds<br />
of equipment (<strong>and</strong> particularly payments processing<br />
equipment) that are installed in a taxi.<br />
In relation to the recently cleared acquisition by<br />
Cabcharge of Yellow Cabs in Adelaide, the ACCC<br />
released a statement of issues suggesting that the<br />
acquisition was likely to cause a competition concern.<br />
This concern appeared to be driven by submissions that<br />
suggested that Cabcharge’s acquisition would reduce<br />
the size of the market for competing payment instrument<br />
providers or processors, because Cabcharge would<br />
refuse to deal with other payment instruments <strong>and</strong> would<br />
install only Cabcharge processing units. This followed<br />
an earlier attempt by Cabcharge to enter the market in<br />
Adelaide through a proposed acquisition of Suburban<br />
Taxis in 2008. In that case, Cabcharge withdrew from the<br />
acquisition before the ACCC could make a determination.<br />
The ACCC ultimately considered that the proposed<br />
acquisition of Yellow Cabs was unlikely to substantially<br />
raise barriers to entry <strong>and</strong> therefore was unlikely to<br />
substantially lessen competition in these markets. Within<br />
the context of the Adelaide metropolitan area, the ACCC<br />
considered that there would still be two independent taxi<br />
networks (each with a substantial share of affiliated taxis)<br />
that could be approached by new entrants.<br />
The ACCC’s decision in this instance is puzzling,<br />
given the context of its other enforcement actions<br />
against Cabcharge. The ACCC previously undertook<br />
actions against Cabcharge for refusing to supply – on<br />
commercial terms – services that would allow its cards to<br />
be processed by competing payments processors. 58 The<br />
inquiry underst<strong>and</strong>s that nothing has changed since the<br />
terms of the ACCC settlement were released: Cabcharge<br />
still does not provide access to any independent<br />
payments processors.<br />
In this light, it seems highly optimistic to expect that<br />
firms considering offering competing non-cash payment<br />
instruments will not be deterred by increasing vertical<br />
linkages between Cabcharge <strong>and</strong> NSPs, particularly<br />
given Cabcharge’s very high market share in the market<br />
for non-cash taxi specific payment instruments.<br />
57 ACCC (2006), Silver Top Taxi Service – proposed acquisition of<br />
Murrell Enterprises Pty Ltd, www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/<br />
itemId/764968/fromItemId/751043 accessed 3 April 2012<br />
58 See case study in section 12.4.2<br />
242