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Part D – Understanding and improving industry performance (PDF ...

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Inquiry findings<br />

è Within the market for point-to-point transport<br />

services, there are important market segments<br />

for services acquired at ranks, hailed on the<br />

street or pre-booked.<br />

è There is significant overlap in the pre-booked<br />

segment between the services offered by taxis<br />

<strong>and</strong> hire cars, but regulations limit the degree<br />

of substitutability between different kinds of<br />

point-to-point transport services.<br />

è Public transport is only weakly substitutable<br />

for taxi travel, <strong>and</strong> in some cases may<br />

even be complementary. This implies that<br />

restrictions preventing taxis <strong>and</strong> hire cars<br />

from offering route services reduces use<br />

of taxis but does not significantly increase<br />

use of public transport.<br />

è Geographic markets for services largely mirror<br />

zone restrictions, but there are some instances<br />

where zones are drawn that may not be<br />

reflective of substitution possibilities.<br />

10.1.4. The nature of competition in taxi<br />

<strong>and</strong> hire car markets<br />

Some unusual features of markets for taxi <strong>and</strong> hire<br />

car services, particularly in the rank <strong>and</strong> hail market<br />

segments, can cause problems with the operation<br />

of competition. As discussed in chapter 7, market<br />

failures can arise in the sense that competition between<br />

operators does not produce the kind of outcomes that<br />

would benefit the community generally.<br />

How some of these features have developed is unclear.<br />

Notions of ‘fairness for drivers’ <strong>and</strong> ‘market order’ are<br />

likely to have been behind some of these features. In<br />

some cases, regulation has entrenched these market<br />

behaviours, making competition less likely rather than<br />

more likely. It is important to underst<strong>and</strong> these issues if<br />

changes to regulation are to make a contribution to a<br />

more competitive <strong>and</strong> more efficient market which better<br />

services consumer’s needs.<br />

Some of these key features are:<br />

• There is a convention that customers will take the<br />

first taxi off a rank, even though by law consumers<br />

have explicit rights to choose any taxi off the rank.<br />

This means that taxi operators do not compete for<br />

customers in rank <strong>and</strong> hail situations. This means that<br />

there is simply no point in competing by offering lower<br />

fares, as this will result in no more sales. Equally, there<br />

is no point in <strong>improving</strong> quality to try <strong>and</strong> differentiate<br />

services if all that does is increase costs (because<br />

consumers are unlikely to choose a higher quality<br />

vehicle from the rank).<br />

• Rather than competing for customers, taxi<br />

operators compete for drivers. Operators must<br />

offer drivers a package of services (including<br />

a vehicle) that makes it worthwhile for drivers<br />

to drive. The intensity of this competition has<br />

sometimes been questioned, particularly when<br />

there is a large supply of available drivers but,<br />

at the present time, the inquiry has heard that<br />

competition between operators for drivers is strong.<br />

• Booking networks compete to attract bookings from<br />

customers. These bookings are distributed to vehicles<br />

using criteria related to waiting time for the driver <strong>and</strong>/<br />

or the location of the driver. Customers have only<br />

limited ability to request particular taxi operators,<br />

vehicles or drivers. 6 Again, this limits the ability of<br />

operators to compete with one another on the basis<br />

of fare or driver <strong>and</strong> vehicle quality. Any vehicle of any<br />

quality (above a regulated minimum st<strong>and</strong>ard) can get<br />

fares by simply waiting long enough or in the right spot.<br />

These market features have a profound influence on<br />

market <strong>performance</strong>. Rather than operators having<br />

incentive to build their customer base by offering<br />

better service <strong>and</strong> lower prices – as could be expected<br />

in competitive markets – taxi operators face strong<br />

incentives to ‘skimp’ on service quality. Where reducing<br />

quality saves costs, there is little disincentive to do so<br />

(again, regulation also has a role to play in preventing<br />

services falling below some minimum st<strong>and</strong>ard). This<br />

affects vehicle st<strong>and</strong>ards, but – <strong>and</strong> perhaps more<br />

importantly – it also affects the kinds of drivers to<br />

whom operators bail their vehicles. These predicted<br />

outcomes have been borne out in the inquiry’s research<br />

on consumer experiences with taxis, particularly in the<br />

metropolitan Melbourne area.<br />

6 Customers can request a wheelchair accessible taxi (WAT) (or not<br />

a WAT) or vehicles with luggage capacity. Both major metropolitan<br />

NSPs have recently introduced ‘premium’ driver services, where<br />

customers can request a particular driver or a premium vehicle for an<br />

additional fee<br />

180

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