Garnaut Fitzgerald Review of Commonwealth-State Funding

More documents

Recommendations

Info

CHAPTER 7: Other Federations In 2001–02 transfers are expected to total CA$1 444 per capita. The most revenue-poor Province is Newfoundland, which receives more than twice the national average per capita transfer. The revenue-rich Provinces of Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario receive around CA$335 per capita below the national average. The breakdown for each Province is illustrated in Table 7.5. TABLE 7.5: Federal transfers to Canadian Provinces, 2001–02 Newfoundland Prince Edward Island Nova Scotia New Brunswick Quebec CA$ million 1 549 3 87 2 244 1 914 12 367 CA$ per capita 2 900 2 792 2 380 2 530 1 670 % of revenue 39 41 41 38 25 Ontario Manitoba Saskatchewan Alberta British Columbia CA$ million 13 128 2 369 1 358 3 388 4 535 CA$ per capita 1 108 2 061 1 336 1 107 1 108 % of revenue 20 35 23 16 20 Source: Department of Finance, Canada 2002 The Territories receive more equalisation transfers than the Provinces per capita, reflecting their limited revenue raising capacity and needs and costs arising from their remoteness and sparse populations (Ma 1997). The economic position of the Canadian Territories is hampered by location and climate, and differs greatly from that of the Australian Territories which, by contrast, have tended to grow more rapidly than Australia as a whole. In Australia, the Northern Territory is expected to have the most rapid growth of the Australian States for the foreseeable future. TABLE 7.6: Federal transfers to Territories, 2001–02 Northwest Territories Nunavut Yukon CA$ million 565 642 379 CA$ per capita 13 853 22 933 12 690 % of revenue 57 84 70 Source: Department of Finance, Canada 2002 The Canada Health and Social Transfer provides the largest Federal transfers to Provincial and Territorial Governments. It supports health care, post-secondary education, social assistance and social services programs. In 2001–02 the Canada Health and Social Transfer provided 74 per cent of all transfers to the Provinces and Territories, or CA$34.6 billion of the CA$47 billion of total Federal transfers (Department of Finance Canada 2002). This block-funded transfer gives Provinces and Territories flexibility when administering social and health programs, and when allocating funds among programs (Rayner et al. 2001). FINAL REPORT [100]
CHAPTER 7: Other Federations While the Canada Health and Social Transfer allows Provinces more control over program spending, conditions are attached. These are outlined in the Canada Health Act 1984, which regulates the public health care system and attempts to prevent discrimination in provincial social programs against recent migrants from other Provinces. Conditions are not onerous as there is no requirement to maintain a particular level of spending in an area or to achieve a particular outcome. There is no mechanism for Federal auditing beyond the legislated requirement to provide information to assist the Federal Minister of Health in determining whether conditions have been violated. In practice, it has been very difficult for the Federal Government to enforce these conditions without negotiating with the Provinces. In April 1996 the Canada Health and Social Transfer replaced the specific purpose transfers of the Established Programs Financing and the Canadian Assistance Plan programs. Uneven per capita allocations are a legacy of the previous systems. The 1998 Budget announced that previous disparities in funding would be eliminated by 2001–02 when all Provinces would receive equal per capita Canada Health and Social Transfer entitlements. Equal per capita distribution is recognised as being significantly equalising because it involves the distribution of Federal funds from Provinces with revenue raising capacities above the average to those below the average. The Canadian Equalisation Program is a constitutionally mandated unconditional block transfer program. It was established in 1996 and its objectives are specified in terms reminiscent of pre-1977 Australian fiscal equalisation objectives. Federal Equalization payments enable less prosperous provincial Governments to provide their residents with public services that are reasonably comparable to those in other Provinces, at reasonably comparable levels of taxation (Rayner et al. 2001). The equalisation formula lowers revenue differentials but does not eliminate them, and does not consider expenditure needs. The Equalisation Program embodies bottom-up equalisation; that is where revenue-poor Provinces are equalised up towards the national average. The revenue-rich Provinces are not equalised down, as is the case under a full equalisation formula, although implicit redistribution occurs because more Federal funds come from the Provinces paying proportionately more in Federal taxes. The overall effect falls well short of the extreme equalisation implemented in Australia. Canada’s equalisation program is aimed at lifting the fiscal capacity of the eight revenue-poor Provinces towards the levels of Alberta and Ontario. The revenue raising capacity of the revenue-poor Provinces is not fully equalised to the national average (Coulombe and Merette 2000). TABLE 7.7: Equalisation entitlements, 2001–2002 (CA $m) Newfoundland Prince Edward Island Nova Scotia New Brunswick Entitlement 1 074 260 1 326 1 202 Quebec Manitoba Saskatchewan British Columbia Entitlement 4 719 1 207 398 132 Source: Department of Finance, Canada 2002 FINAL REPORT [101]
Page 1 and 2:
Review of Commonwealth-State Fundin
Page 3:
Review of Commonwealth-State Fundin
Page 8 and 9:
TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 9: Equity
Page 10 and 11:
THE REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT [
Page 12 and 13:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Overall assessmen
Page 14 and 15:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Each State would
Page 16 and 17:
CHAPTER 1: Overview and Summary of
Page 18 and 19:
Page 20 and 21:
Page 22 and 23:
Page 24 and 25:
Page 26 and 27:
Page 28 and 29:
Page 30 and 31:
Page 32 and 33:
CHAPTER 2: How the System Grew: A H
Page 34 and 35:
Page 36 and 37:
Page 38 and 39:
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
CHAPTER 3: The Current System TABLE
Page 52 and 53:
CHAPTER 3: The Current System 3.3 G
Page 54 and 55:
CHAPTER 3: The Current System Natio
Page 56 and 57:
CHAPTER 3: The Current System FINAL
Page 58 and 59:
CHAPTER 4: Allocation of General Pu
Page 60 and 61: CHAPTER 4: Allocation of General Pu
Page 70 and 71: Chapter 5: Specific Purpose Payment
Page 88 and 89: CHAPTER 6: Comparative Fiscal Posit
Page 100 and 101: CHAPTER 7: Other Federations 7.2 Ve
Page 102 and 103: CHAPTER 7: Other Federations Sales
Page 104 and 105: CHAPTER 7: Other Federations The Un
Page 106 and 107: CHAPTER 7: Other Federations Popula
Page 108 and 109: CHAPTER 7: Other Federations 7.4 Co
Page 112 and 113: CHAPTER 7: Other Federations In 200
Page 114 and 115: CHAPTER 7: Other Federations In add
Page 116 and 117: CHAPTER 7: Other Federations Compar
Page 118 and 119: CHAPTER 7: Other Federations FINAL
Page 120 and 121: CHAPTER 8: Federal Policy Effects o
Page 134 and 135: CHAPTER 9: Equity Chapter 1 notes t
Page 136 and 137: CHAPTER 9: Equity Both SPPs and gen
Page 138 and 139: CHAPTER 9: Equity Table 9.3 shows t
Page 140 and 141: CHAPTER 9: Equity 9.3 Horizontal di
Page 142 and 143: CHAPTER 9: Equity Many ways to rais
Page 144 and 145: CHAPTER 10: Efficiency and Economic
Page 160 and 161:
CHAPTER 10: Efficiency and Economic
Page 162 and 163:
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
CHAPTER 11: Simplicity, Transparenc
Page 168 and 169:
Page 170 and 171:
Page 172 and 173:
Page 174 and 175:
Page 176 and 177:
Page 178 and 179:
Page 180 and 181:
Page 182 and 183:
Page 184 and 185:
CHAPTER 12: Overall Assessment and
Page 186 and 187:
Page 188 and 189:
Page 190 and 191:
Page 192 and 193:
Page 194 and 195:
Page 196 and 197:
Page 198 and 199:
Page 200 and 201:
Page 202 and 203:
CHAPTER 13: Commonwealth-State Fina
Page 204 and 205:
Page 206 and 207:
Page 208 and 209:
Page 210 and 211:
Page 212 and 213:
Page 214 and 215:
Page 216 and 217:
APPENDIX A: National Health and Age
Page 218 and 219:
APPENDIX A: National Health and Age
Page 220 and 221:
APPENDIX B: National Education and
Page 222 and 223:
Page 224 and 225:
Page 226 and 227:
APPENDIX C: National Indigenous Com
Page 228 and 229:
APPENDIX C: National Indigenous Com
Page 230 and 231:
APPENDIX D: Minimum Cost of Governm
Page 232 and 233:
Page 234 and 235:
Page 236 and 237:
APPENDIX E: Consultation • Local
Page 238 and 239:
APPENDIX E: Consultation • VICRoa
Page 240 and 241:
GLOSSARY Efficiency: allocative eff
Page 242 and 243:
GLOSSARY merit goods (health, educa
Page 244 and 245:
FINAL REPORT [234] GLOSSARY
Page 246 and 247:
BIBLIOGRAPHY Buchanan, JM 2001, Fis
Page 248 and 249:
BIBLIOGRAPHY Government of Victoria
Page 250 and 251:
BIBLIOGRAPHY Watts, RL 1999, Compar
Page 252 and 253:
INDEX E economic activity / growth
Page 254 and 255:
INDEX O other Federations Canada ·
show all

Garnaut Fitzgerald Review of Commonwealth-State Funding

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?