capability development plan - European Defence Agency - Europa

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34 STRATEGIC DRIVERS states and citizens worldwide, it will also put societies under stress. There will be those who are able to utilise the possibilities that emerge, but there will also be those who do not. 2. Geographical cleavages between successful communities and states and less successful communities characterised by high unemployment rates, low income levels, and high levels of criminality will continue to develop. 3. Many citizens within and outside EU are feeling socially and economically insecure. Increased corruption, shift in values, and the increased importance of formal and informal non-governmental institutions and social networks are likely to exaggerate this <strong>development</strong>. Modern information and communication systems will strengthen these trends. 4. Due to migration, developed countries will continue to get more heterogeneous. 5. Changes in values and personal interests of young people may make them less fit as soldiers both mentally and physically. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT, THREAT AND HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY 6. Ongoing migration streams will increase cleavages within Europe and will form a breeding ground for ethnic and religious radicalisation. 7. When disadvantaged communities develop into isolated enclaves within states, or on the level of states within the global community, failed or extremely soft extremism is likely to flourish, which may lead to violent conflicts where opponents engage in urban guerrilla warfare, terrorism and organised crime. 8. A state losing legitimacy among its citizens is problematic in several ways. Without strong legitimacy, a state may experience difficulties in sustaining its institutions including the armed forces. And at the extreme end other institutions and organizations may even challenge the state’s monopoly on violence by developing their own armed forces. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR DEFENCE 9. Concepts – Shifting values, ethnically mixed society, pressures in public spending, 24/7 media coverage over horrors of war and on the other hand missing tangible military threat may lessen public willingness to sacrifice scarce resources to defence (spending and people). Armed forces will need to justify the demand for capabilities to be developed and maintained. 10. Operational concepts may need to be adapted to allow more flexible co-operation with other actors in theatre. These actors will include Private Military Companies and other institutions responsible for “traditional” military duties (outsourcing). 11. Training – Troops will increasingly need to be able to cope with multicultural societies. That may increase need to integrate immigrants to armed forces structures in order to gain public support. On the other hand, the immigrants may have diverging cultural and educational background that will have to be taken into account in training. 12. Armed forces may become less attractive career choice. As a result people recruited to armed forces may have poorer educational background. At the same time complexity of operating environment and military tasks will continue increasing. EU forces will need to able to take appropriate action timely and in concert with other actors. 13. Equipment – Increasingly heterogeneous recruitment base will have to be taken into account when equipment is developed. 14. EU forces, down to the individual level, will have to be able to negotiate with complex situations often among civilian population. Soldiers will need to be able to minimise collateral effects and grade the force used in combat situation. DEMOGRAPHY MAJOR TRENDS 1. In the timeframe of the next twenty years the world will experience a population increase. The total population in the developed world is likely to remain broadly stable but an increase will occur in developing countries and in particular Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. 2. Population ageing will be the main demographic feature in the developed world but also in China. In contrast however, the population of the developing world will remain relatively young and the workingage population will expand. 3. Life expectancy and health care is likely to improve but there will be new challenges to face in both the developed (pollution) and developing world (epidemics, urbanisation, pollution). FUTURE TRENDS FROM THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN
STRATEGIC DRIVERS © EUFOR Tchad RCA 4. Migration movements will continue within Africa and the Middle-East but these may stay within the same geographic areas and that which does transit to the developed world may be a relatively small proportion. The control of migration will remain challenging. 5. It is likely that nearly two-thirds of world’s population will be urban dwellers and are likely to be no further than 200 kilometres from the coast. Many of the largest cities in the developed world are likely to grow more slowly than the expanding mega-cities (over 10 million) in Asia, South America and other developing countries. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT, THREAT AND HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY 6. Governments and international organisations will be challenged by demographic trends. The increasingly young population within the developing world, linked with poor economic prospects, unfilled aspirations created by global media and globalisation, and an uneven regional and local wealth distribution are likely to lead to tensions and may contribute to future conflict. This is likely to include inter-communal and inter-ethnic tensions (cf. Culture and Society). 7. Increased populations, pressures on resources and infrastructure, and a failure of authorities to cope with this growth will create an increased risk of human tragedy in vulnerable areas. This may include communicable diseases, epidemics, pollution, famine and extreme fresh-water shortages. This is likely to be made worse by the effects of climate change (cf. Environment). 8. Increased urbanisation will create and exaggerate many issues mentioned above. There may be an increase in mortality through new viruses and diseases, and a re-emergence of the old ones. Overall, urbanisation is likely to increase the need for external humanitarian assistance. 9. Enlarged levels of poverty, exacerbated by climate change, will lead to incidences of human tragedy and is likely to lead to further population displacement. This is likely to provide a breeding ground for increased organised crime as societies question their traditional civic values and responsibilities to the state and governmental organisations. This may exploit weak and corrupt governments as well as consumer markets in growing economies wherever they present themselves. Such exploitation is likely to be more aggressive. 10. Migration, legal, illegal and forced migration (through conflict and local tensions), is likely to increase and with it the opportunities for further human catastrophes. Linked to the increased populations in the developing world, the inadequate infrastructure and poor governance, this may lead to the destabilisation of existing communities and possibly even states. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR DEFENCE 11. Manpower - Member States will be faced with a serious recruitment problem as a result of the nearstatic population growth, an ageing population, diseases and direct competition with the commercial sector. This trend is likely to be exaggerated by extended full-time education and changing attitudes on single career paths and a desire for variety and flexibility. This will require the military to revaluate their manpower policies and structures, particularly with respect to retirement age, females and the employment of migrants. 12. Retention will continue to be a constant pressure on militaries. Changing social aspirations, competition for skilled manpower for the commercial sector, evolving family values and a desire to achieve a more balanced work-life ration will challenge the demands of a career in the armed forces. 13. Differentiation of gender-roles will generally diminish but tensions in traditionally male-dominated societies, such as the armed forces are likely to continue. Although a female role in combat support and other arms is likely to normalise during the period, their role in actual combat is likely to remain limited. 14. Migration may provide new possibilities for recruitment and may bring a greater ethnic and social mixture within the armed forces. However, this is likely to be accompanied by additional education and training requirements. 15. Training - The theatre of operations will become ever more complicated due to urbanisation, ethnic 35 FUTURE TRENDS FROM THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN
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