capability development plan - European Defence Agency - Europa

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THREATS AND CHALLENGES DERIVING FROM
POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES
Workshop B
The above is considered as a plausible, but not predictive, summary of a possible generic threat
assessment to inform Workshop C. It is based upon the output of the successful Strand B Workshop B
but repackages it (as set out below) in an attempt to better assist and benefit the participants of
Workshop C. Providing a more flexible focus was the main objective. Although re-packaged it is
considered as a faithful representation of the outcome of the workshops proceedings. Annex A is
structured by possible Principles of War in the Information Age. Readers should try not to focus on the
format but instead consider how these issues could shape future potential capability trends and
characteristics in the 2025 timeframe. Annex B tries to provide broad indications of specific capability
trends for potential regular and irregular adversaries. Again it is trying to paint of picture for the
participants of Workshop C and should be read in that context.
PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE
Knowledge concerns the information and intelligence we have about ourselves and the adversary.
Ignorance is the converse of knowledge - either because we do not know, cannot know or choose not
to find out. The balance of knowledge and ignorance has dominated warfighting throughout history and
will continue in the Information Age. Today, the principle of knowledge can be based upon the
proposition that given time and resource, we can know everything about our adversaries but as conflict
is competitive, to collect, fuse and analyse the whole plethora of information may not be time, or cost
efficient.
Therefore, to achieve a balance between knowledge and ignorance forces must consider the issue of
economy. Ignorant adversaries must resort to massing, having to confront their enemy’s strengths in
contests of attrition rather than manoeuvre and dislocate. Ignorant forces must react and not capitalise
on opportunity, spending considerable time and resource on protection and security rather than
seeking positive activity in order to achieve their objectives. But the ability to attain knowledge only
exists as a system of systems. It is not built upon computers, communications, ISR sensors, networks
or focused training. It is all these things and much more - welded together by agreed and coherent
doctrine.
1. Globalisation and the technological revolution will enable adversaries to dramatically improve their
situational awareness. They will have access to the latest technological solutions and applications,
which is likely to make it possible for them to gain information superiority momentarily, either by time,
function or position.
2. Identification of Friend or Foe will be more challenging. Reliable target data and target identification
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will become more difficult due to the adversary use of advanced solutions (modern technology /
deception means), unconventional modus operandi, a lack of discrimination between military and nonmilitary
activities.
3. In this information struggle, information assurance and verifying that one's own information is reliable
will be essential.
4. An increase in confused battle space may be predicted, which may lead to losses caused by
'Friendly Fires'. The risk for EU forces being targeted inadvertently will increase in interpositioning
missions where the potential for misidentification of EU units by conflicting parties is likely to be high.
5. Within different cultural environments, HUMINT will remain a key challenge for expeditionary
operations. The adversaries 'playing at home' will create a natural and absolute advantage for them.
This will include gaining intelligence on their logistic footprint and tracking their supply pipeline. This is
likely to be small in most cases and therefore is likely to become a more serious issue.
6. Adversaries may have versatile operational/organisational structures but will be able to create their
own network structures, even conduct their form of network enabled warfare. It will be a challenge to
prevent adversaries from collecting, processing and distributing intelligence.
7. Their communications are likely to be both varied, and flexible, with considerable redundancy in
FUTURE TRENDS FROM THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN