capability development plan - European Defence Agency - Europa
capability development plan - European Defence Agency - Europa
capability development plan - European Defence Agency - Europa
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54<br />
THREATS AND CHALLENGES DERIVING FROM<br />
POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES<br />
mission legitimacy by trying to make EU forces look partial.<br />
17. Adversaries are likely to use child soldiers and other “non-ethical” means.<br />
18. Adversaries may also try to take advantage of cultural differences and constraints (e.g. use women<br />
for protecting privacy of housing).<br />
19. Adversaries may use civilians or refugees to block or crowd port facilities, roads, and trails.<br />
20. Adversaries may use toxic substances in concentration levels that are below detection levels of<br />
fielded detectors to provoke long term health issues, which may lead to massive internal unrest and<br />
social disruption.<br />
21. Functional. Adversaries will conduct all types of information operations against the EU force in<br />
order to gain and maintain the support of local population.<br />
22. In a structured campaign dedicated to win hearts & minds of local population, adversaries may<br />
provide humanitarian aid and assistance. However, they are as likely to intimidate their own local<br />
populations. They may try to influence or to take benefit from NGOs and other IOs. By doing this,<br />
adversaries will limit the EU force's ability to win public support to crisis management activities.<br />
© EUFOR Tchad RCA<br />
23. Adversaries will attempt to find and attack critical links, nodes and vulnerabilities in an EU system<br />
of systems with the aim to level the playing field. They will try to interfere ISR capabilities that are<br />
linked directly to fires (kinetic and/or non-kinetic), and tailored operational formations and manoeuvring<br />
their units that are tasked to affect specific capabilities whose loss or degradation will significantly<br />
reduce overall blue force effectiveness.<br />
24. Adversaries’ ability to hide their activities among NGOs and local population will make CAS<br />
missions more difficult to conduct (increased risk to collateral damage). CAS in urban environment will<br />
be challenging.<br />
25. (Weapons of Mass Effect) Adversaries may seek novel ways of inflicting massive casualties and<br />
causing horrific damage. They may not be beyond using weapons of mass effect against their own<br />
people to create the perception at home and abroad that the EU is employing such weapons against<br />
civilians.<br />
26. They may not see the use of chemical weapons as an escalation of the conflict. They may try to<br />
use a variety of methods (UAVs, AC, food, water, persons and animals) to disseminate toxic, newly<br />
engineered agents, highly infectious diseases, such as smallpox, etc.<br />
27. Adversaries may use biological agents to target food and livestock (e.g. foot and mouth disease),<br />
using infected persons, vectors (e.g. food, water) and animals to disrupt operations in sites and<br />
facilities.<br />
28. Adversaries may use gene-manipulated micro-organisms which cause disease in people, <strong>plan</strong>ts or<br />
animals or cause deterioration of materiel and may seek to pollute the environment to hamper the<br />
operations<br />
29. Adversaries may use CBR substances to assassinate key decision-makers.<br />
30. Adversaries may try to use CBRNE weapons and devices, and industrial and environmental<br />
hazards with little restraint.<br />
31. Adversaries may try to circumvent CBRN defence measures by provoking false alarms up to a time<br />
when CBRN detectors are considered unreliable, and thus be switched off due to the loss of<br />
confidence.<br />
32. Adversaries may try to interfere with medical transportation chain, food and water supply chains<br />
FUTURE TRENDS FROM THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN