capability development plan - European Defence Agency - Europa

48
IMPACT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON FUTURE
CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT
Conversely, HPM weapons, including improvised HPM charges, may pose a threat to our forces, both
to C4ISR systems and to platforms. While it is a threat to our equipment rather than our troops,
widespread disruption or destruction of electronics equipment could quickly translate into a loss of
effectiveness and coherence that will lead to casualties in an operational environment. A reasonable
resistance against HPM and some redundancy of systems will therefore be desirable.
High-power laser weapons will mainly be used for ground- and sea-based air defence purposes
against ballistic missiles and aerial platforms. The attractive aspect of laser weapons in comparison to
surface-to-air missiles is that they are not dependent on a flight time to intercept. The practical range of
such weapons, if they become medium- or long-range, will depend on what power level that can be
implemented, the management of the laser beam (in terms of collimation and divergence) and if the
problems of atmospheric disturbances can be managed.
Laser weapons of somewhat lower power levels can be used to disrupt adversaries’ optical sensors in
order to disrupt their ISTAR activities and weapons use. Due to the possibility of eye injury when
directed against troops and manned platforms, there are some legal and ethical limitations to this use,
which do not apply in the case of targeting missiles and unmanned vehicles used by adversaries.
CBRN Exercise Jambes -
Belgium 2008 © EDA
Weapon systems – non-destructive and less lethal effects. As was noted above, directed energy
weapons can be used for non-destructive/less lethal as well as destructive purposes, depending on the
power level. Developments in information warfare have been covered previously.
Developments in non- or less-lethal weapons, for use against personnel or equipment, depend on the
use of several technologies, which from an S&T point of view are quite diverse and therefore need to
be separately assessed. Some of the technologies that would produce the desired effects will not be
possible to field because of legal or ethical considerations, such as the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Some of the developments are civilian and are intended for use in law enforcement where
ethical considerations also apply.
CBRNE threats and protection. With regards to threats from non-conventional effects, civilian S&T
developments may mean increased possibilities for adversaries. This will mainly affect the area of
biological weapons, due to rapid advances in biotechnology, which may lead to weapons/agents that
are very virulent, or which escape effective treatment or conventional means of early detection. While
technological advances directly related to C, R and N threats may seem slower in comparison, we
should not forget that civilian advances in production technology and computing, as well as the general
proliferation of technological knowledge may bring various kinds of non-conventional weapons and
their carriers within the reach of an increasing number of actors. However, an assessment of the future
in-theatre CBRN threat must also take the will, ambition and level of resources of adversaries into
account. Some adversaries are expected to be less constrained by ethical considerations, albeit not
every potential adversary will necessary pursue CBRN weapons even if the technology exists.
With respect to protection against CB attacks, S&T developments may provide some improvements
with respect to protection equipment, decontamination and treatment of injures but primarily, S&T
developments in the CBRNE protection area as a whole are related to detection and improved
situational awareness. Here as for other threats, large number of networked sensors will provide the
situational awareness. Also, it will be increasingly possible to perform stand-off CBE detection using
lasers and other means of detection.
The conventional and often asymmetric, threat from explosives (E) including IEDs has already been
mentioned in connection with the protection needs of vehicles and soldiers. However, in terms of
detection there are similarities between detection of many non-conventional threats and the detection
of explosives. Therefore, the E area belongs together with at least C detection from a technological
point of view, and also for E detection, increased standoff detection is expected. However, standoff
detection will have limited sensitivity with respect to detection of “encased” explosives. Also, the rate of
false alarms in CBRNE detection is likely to remain an issue, which means the situational awareness
will be enhanced rather than complete.
FUTURE TRENDS FROM THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN