40 STRATEGIC DRIVERS to tension and greater potential for confrontation and conflict. 10. Failed states are likely to exist in regions weakened by poverty and internal conflicts, which will lead to the emergence of ungoverned spaces. These ungoverned spaces, many of them increasingly urbanised, will become vulnerable to endemic criminal activity, the basing of terrorist groups, irregular activity and conflict and will add to the complexity of the international system as well as increasing the burden of maintaining integrity. 11. The risks associated with these poorly governed spaces are likely to increase and to undermine the security of rich countries. State failure and extreme poverty in peripheral regions may not pose a direct threat to the developed world but will likely undermine, over the long term, the broader requirements for the security of rich countries. 12. Humanitarian crises, both natural and human in origin, will affect the sentiments and sensibilities of media audiences. Growing pressure for intervention will be exerted by these audiences and a hyperactive, obtrusive media, operating in both physical and virtual dimensions, especially when audiences are linked to those affected by identity or interest, or where they feel threatened by potentially wider or collateral impacts. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR DEFENCE 13. Concepts - Future conflicts will involve a more complex set of actors with blurred distinctions between combatants and non-combatants in an extended and heavily populated battlespace. Irregular actors will include terrorists, insurgents, criminals, armed followings, gangs, semi-official militias and Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC). The trend for using PMSCs will continue but their growing use may lead to public and political unease with a dilution of the state’s traditional monopoly on the use of force. Liability issues are likely to be perceived to be unclear. 14. There will be an increased sponsorship of irregular activity and groups by states seeking to utilise and exploit through proxy forces. Armed criminal, terrorist or insurgent groups, trained and experienced in struggles around the world will be an enduring part of the strategic landscape which will have to be considered. 15. Transnational and locally based terrorism will continue. The casualties and the amount of damage inflicted will remain relatively low but the effect will be magnified by the adversary by reach, physical and psychological, achieved through their own brand of Information Operations. Military capabilities may be used to pre-empt these acts or to mitigate possible consequences. © sxc.hu 16. Threats such as terrorist strikes on the ‘nodes’ of globalisation (i.e. energy or transport infrastructures) and risks such as major epidemics or natural disasters will entail ripple effects affecting the security of humans and infrastructures, the economy and society at large. 17. International organised crime will grow in volume, reach and profitability, while exploiting new ventures and markets in areas of accelerating economic growth and opportunity, particularly in failed states. EU forces will require concepts to ensure coherence with other governmental agencies. 18. For the most globally integrated states there is a strong incentive to uphold application of international law in all its dimensions, including the laws of armed conflict. International law is likely to be forced to adapt to the increasing complexity of the environment within which it will be applied. However, it is unlikely, that <strong>development</strong>s in international law will keep pace with the rate of change and complexity in the nature of conflict itself. 19. Non-state actors, such as terrorist networks and also organised crime, will pose a new set of threats, which are at the same time more circumscribed and more ubiquitous than traditional military threats. More circumscribed because attacks by non-state actors are likely to be of a limited scale, short of their access to WMD. 20. Collapsing non-proliferation regimes will have a dramatic impact on the diffusion of WMD. The proliferation of CBRN weapons possession beyond the existing powers, particularly to weak and unstable states will increase risks. 21. The possession of nuclear weapons by such states, whose capacity for ensuring their safety and security may be inadequate, will increase the risk of these technologies and associated materials being incompetently handled or acquired by third parties including non-state actors such as terrorists or criminals. FUTURE TRENDS FROM THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN
IMPACT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON FUTURE CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT © sxc.hu
Change language