capability development plan - European Defence Agency - Europa

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THREATS AND CHALLENGES DERIVING FROM
POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES
professional fighters who form the basis for a much wider reserve base;
• Limited training beyond basic firearms techniques; limited to nonexistent tactical awareness for most
members, although higher echelons and professional cadres will have some comprehension;
• Equipment usually limited to small arms, anti-tank and occasionally limited number of anti-aircraft
missiles and ammunitions;
• Budget is limited to the above mentioned purchases, with limited resources available for large
platform procurement;
• Likely to remain focused on maintaining stocks of missiles, unguided artillery rockets and anti-tank
guided weapons;
• May train a greater number of operatives to use relatively complex weapon systems, this process will
have been undertaken with the support of sponsoring states or organisations.
Specifically, such adversaries may develop capabilities, for example:
EU NAVFOR Atalanta prevents hijacking - 4 March 2009 © German Navy
• Will increase stocks of man-portable ATGWs. These may include, for example the Metis-M (At-13)
system with its thermobaric warhead, the Konkurs (AT-5) and Kornet (AT-IX-14) anti-armour missile
systems;
• Adversaries are likely to have made the first moves into establishing some C4 capability, improving
command and control systems and procedures that allow for greater ease in conducting coordinated
operations. Data sharing between units and positions can be expected to resemble the rudimentary
elements of C4I, probably utilising primarily commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems and equipment;
• There may be a drive to enhance defensive and intelligence gathering via a process of acquiring
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) and Electronic Counter-Counter
Measures (ECCM) equipment;
• They will establish and maintain encryption in the practical methods of data gathering and input into
the network (such as forward observation of artillery fire, radio and sensor operation, etc);
• Adversaries will continue to pioneer many of the methods of Improvised Explosive Device and will
seek to obtain the materials and equipment required for the creation of IEDs with Explosively Formed
Penetrator (EFP) warheads;
• They are likely to pursue the transfer of a substantial number of advanced air defence systems, such
as Russian-made IGLA Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) and its follow-on replacement.
Additionally, they are likely to acquire of these weapons in order to deter and prevent helicopter
operations, interdict gunship and UAV strikes and to prevent the insertion of Special Forces;
• Irregular forces are likely to be familiar with the use of UAV assets;
• They are most likely to employ tactical doctrine that creates civil unrest so they are in a position of
being the ‘only choice’ in authority. Disrupting civil population and the utilisation of civilian agitation will
be a force multiplier for them when territory is taken by their enemy.
• A burden will placed upon regular forces attempting to take and hold territory containing civilian
supporters of irregular adversaries, requiring the combination of a military and civil command response.
EU forces may even be placed on the streets for law enforcement which is likely to complicate rules of
engagement and reduces the forward fighting power.
FUTURE TRENDS FROM THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN