capability development plan - European Defence Agency - Europa

THREATS AND CHALLENGES DERIVING FROM
POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES
and tele-medicine.
33. Adversaries may use differing vaccination policies to target the part of the forces with lowest
immunisation levels.
34. The use of hijacked ships or similar weapons to EU forces to create the impression of a major
environmental incident (such as 9/11) may not be ruled out within theatre or within Europe.
35. Temporal. Adversaries will attempt to dictate where and when the integrated fight takes place. At
critical times of his choosing and preferably at a location that allows him to capitalise on his strengths
while minimising his vulnerabilities.
36. Adversaries' improved situational awareness and advanced intelligence will provide them with an
increased ability to influence the tempo of operations.
37. In very complex and rapidly evolving mission situations, the decision-making process will become
highly time-critical. An inability to provide timely mission instructions from remotely located command
may result in mission failure or in casualties to both force personnel and civilians. On future
battlefields, even lowest-ranking soldiers may be faced with complex spectrum of challenges.
38. Positional. Adversaries are likely to conduct operations from areas of moral and physical
sanctuary, e.g. command posts established within civilian hospitals.
39. Adversary targets and key sites may not be in the joint area of operations. They may develop
capabilities to engage assets even at home base (global threats) and are likely to engage EU forces,
their assets and infrastructure at home base (terrorist threat, IEDs) and by that way could try to
interfere with deployment of EU troops and assets.
40. Potential poor road infrastructure and long distances will provide the adversaries with plenty of
opportunities to try to engage EU forces by use of various means: e.g. CBRNE agents, weapons and
devices, displaced persons, virtual and false mines (incl. sea mines), and robots.
41. Operations in urban environment will be more challenging as the adversaries will have plenty of
opportunities to try to limit EU forces’ ground mobility. In addition the adversary may be less dependent
on ground mobility (e.g. use of UAVs / modern communications).
42. Adversaries will try to take benefit from hiding amongst civilian population, refugees, displaced
people, etc. and therefore identifying adversaries may be difficult. This may include the use of civilian
infrastructure to conceal military targets and thus make their engagement more difficult (collateral
damage).
43. Adversaries will try to attack, or limit access to, lines of communication/lines of supply and points
of deployment (APODs and SPODs), and may try to limit EU forces’ access to Host Nation Support
(HNS). In particular, this may apply to staging areas within third countries.
PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND CONCENTRATION
Concentration is the garnering of combat power in order to apply it at a specific time and place.
Distribution is the dispersal of forces and effort, geographically and by time, in order to achieve the
required effects - apportioning forces to achieve specific objectives. This is highly reliant upon
knowledge - intelligence and technological.
The more that is known then the faster and more confidently forces can be concentrated where and
when required. Adversaries will have access to modern combat power (i.e. 2nd generation MBT,
attack helos, 4th generation combat aircraft).
© sxc.hu
55
FUTURE TRENDS FROM THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN