Report on Mandatory Sentences - Law Reform Commission
Report on Mandatory Sentences - Law Reform Commission
Report on Mandatory Sentences - Law Reform Commission
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c<strong>on</strong>siders that the seriousness of the offence is “excepti<strong>on</strong>ally high”, the starting point is a “whole life<br />
tariff”. 45 This starting point may <strong>on</strong>ly apply in respect of an offender who was at least 21 years of age<br />
when he or she committed the offence. 46<br />
3.24 If the court c<strong>on</strong>siders that the seriousness of the offence is “particularly high”, the starting point is<br />
30 years. 47 This starting point may <strong>on</strong>ly apply where the offender was at least 18 years of age when he<br />
or she committed the offence. If the case does not fall within either of the preceding provisi<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
paragraph 5A of Schedule 21 (discussed below in R v Kelly) provides that the starting point is 25 years if<br />
the offender took a knife or other weap<strong>on</strong> to the scene intending to commit any offence (or to have it<br />
available to use as a weap<strong>on</strong>) and then used that knife or other weap<strong>on</strong> in committing the murder. This<br />
starting point <strong>on</strong>ly applies, however, where the offender was at least 18 years of age when he or she<br />
committed the offence. 48 For every other case, where the offender was aged 18 years or over at the time<br />
of the offence, the starting point is 15 years. 49 Where the offender is under 18 years of age, the starting<br />
point is 12 years. 50 Schedule 21 also sets out the factors which tend to aggravate or mitigate the durati<strong>on</strong><br />
of the minimum term. 51<br />
3.25 Paragraph 5A of Schedule 21 of the 2003 Act was c<strong>on</strong>sidered in R v Kelly, 52 in which the English<br />
Court of Appeal heard 7 cases where all of the defendants had been c<strong>on</strong>victed of murder involving a<br />
knife. The primary issue in the cases was whether the offender “took the knife or other weap<strong>on</strong> to the<br />
scene” within the meaning of paragraph 5A.<br />
3.26 The defendants in the first three cases and the first defendant in the fourth case c<strong>on</strong>tended that<br />
paragraph 5A should not have been applied. In the first case, K took a knife from the kitchen, went<br />
upstairs to the bathroom and broke down the door to get to the victim. He then stabbed him. In the<br />
sec<strong>on</strong>d case, the victim banged <strong>on</strong> B’s fr<strong>on</strong>t door and threatened him. B picked up two knives, went out<br />
of the house and stabbed the victim who was standing <strong>on</strong> the pavement. S, the defendant in the third<br />
case (the appeal), lived in a bedsit above a factory. He took a knife from the upstairs kitchen in his own<br />
premises and went downstairs into the working area of the factory. He walked through an open door, a<br />
distance of some 50 metres, and killed the victim. In the fourth case, to the knowledge of all, <strong>on</strong>e knife<br />
was taken to the scene by R and a sec<strong>on</strong>d knife, which was also used, was taken by H from a kitchen<br />
drawer and carried to where the victim lay in a bedroom, where he was killed. The Crown accepted that<br />
the sec<strong>on</strong>d knife had not been “taken to the scene”. H submitted that it was unfair to infer from the<br />
evidence that he was party to a joint enterprise whereby some<strong>on</strong>e else had brought the first knife to the<br />
house and that taking a knife from <strong>on</strong>e part of the house to the bedroom was not, of itself, sufficient to<br />
bring the c<strong>on</strong>duct within paragraph 5A.<br />
3.27 The English Court of Appeal held that the seriousness of an offence falling within paragraph 5A<br />
was “normally” marginally lower than “particularly high”. Paragraph 5A thus required flexibility of<br />
approach. Schedule 21 did not create a stepped sentencing regime with fixed dividing lines between the<br />
specified categories. Paragraphs 4(1) and 5(1) identified not the ultimate decisi<strong>on</strong> but the “appropriate<br />
starting point”, and paragraphs 4(2) and 5(2) specified the cases of murder which would “normally,” but<br />
not inevitably, trigger a finding of excepti<strong>on</strong>al or particularly high seriousness. It was also plain from the<br />
structure of paragraph 5A, particularly by reference to paragraph 5(2)(b) (“a murder involving the use of a<br />
firearm or explosive”), that it was not the legislative intenti<strong>on</strong> that every murder involving the use of a knife<br />
45<br />
46<br />
47<br />
48<br />
49<br />
50<br />
51<br />
52<br />
Paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.<br />
Paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.<br />
Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.<br />
Paragraph 5A(1) - Paragraph 5A(2) of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, inserted by the Criminal<br />
Justice Act 2003 (<strong>Mandatory</strong> Life Sentence: Determinati<strong>on</strong> of Minimum Term) Order 2010.<br />
Paragraph 6 of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.<br />
Paragraph 7 of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.<br />
Paragraph 8 to paragraph 11 of Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.<br />
R v Kelly [2011] 4 All ER 687.<br />
110