04.02.2015 Views

Report on Mandatory Sentences - Law Reform Commission

Report on Mandatory Sentences - Law Reform Commission

Report on Mandatory Sentences - Law Reform Commission

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

This permits the court to presume, until satisfied to the c<strong>on</strong>trary, 33 that there was such an intenti<strong>on</strong> where,<br />

having regard to the quantity of the c<strong>on</strong>trolled drug or to such other matters as it c<strong>on</strong>siders relevant, it is<br />

satisfied that the c<strong>on</strong>trolled drug was not intended for immediate pers<strong>on</strong>al use.<br />

(2) Penalties<br />

(a)<br />

Presumptive Minimum Sentence of 10 Years’ Impris<strong>on</strong>ment<br />

4.26 Secti<strong>on</strong> 27(3C) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 34 provides that where a pers<strong>on</strong> is c<strong>on</strong>victed of an<br />

offence under secti<strong>on</strong> 15A or secti<strong>on</strong> 15B, the court must impose a sentence of not less than 10 years. 35<br />

Secti<strong>on</strong> 27(3C) must, however, be read in c<strong>on</strong>juncti<strong>on</strong> with secti<strong>on</strong> 27(3A), which provides that the<br />

maximum sentence for an offence under secti<strong>on</strong> 15A is life impris<strong>on</strong>ment, and secti<strong>on</strong> 27(3D), which<br />

provides that a period shorter than 10 years may be imposed where there are “excepti<strong>on</strong>al and specific<br />

circumstances” relating to the offence or the offender.<br />

4.27 The presumptive 10-year minimum should not be used as a benchmark sentence but may be a<br />

useful guide as to the gravity of the offences under secti<strong>on</strong> 15A. In The People (DPP) v Renald, 36 the<br />

applicant sought leave to appeal against a sentence of five years and argued that <strong>on</strong>ce excepti<strong>on</strong>al and<br />

specific circumstances were found to exist, the 10-year minimum became irrelevant. The Court of<br />

Criminal Appeal rejected this argument:<br />

“Even where excepti<strong>on</strong>al circumstances exist which would render the statutory minimum term of<br />

impris<strong>on</strong>ment unjust, there is no questi<strong>on</strong> of the minimum sentence being ignored... even though<br />

that sentence may not be applicable in a particular case, the very existence of a lengthy<br />

mandatory minimum sentence is an important guide to the Courts in determining the gravity of<br />

the offence and the appropriate sentence to impose for its commissi<strong>on</strong>. That is not to say that<br />

the minimum sentence is necessarily the starting point for determining the appropriate sentence.<br />

To do so would be to ignore the other material provisi<strong>on</strong>s, that is to say the maximum<br />

sentence.” 37<br />

This passage has been endorsed by the courts <strong>on</strong> a number of occasi<strong>on</strong>s. 38<br />

4.28 The Court of Criminal Appeal has also c<strong>on</strong>sidered the method by which the courts determine the<br />

sentence to be imposed in individual cases. In The People (DPP) v Duffy, 39 the applicant sought leave to<br />

appeal against a sentence of six years. In the Circuit Court, the judge had outlined the method by which<br />

he would determine the length of the sentence to be imposed. He indicated that he would first assess the<br />

length of the sentence <strong>on</strong> the assumpti<strong>on</strong> that there were no mitigating factors. He would then c<strong>on</strong>sider<br />

the various mitigating factors and reduce the sentence accordingly. If the result was a sentence which<br />

was greater than the statutory minimum, that would be the sentence which he would impose. If, <strong>on</strong> the<br />

other hand, the result was a sentence which was less than the statutory minimum, he would c<strong>on</strong>sider<br />

whether he should increase the sentence to the statutory minimum. The Court of Criminal Appeal upheld<br />

this approach and found that it was “essentially in harm<strong>on</strong>y” with the law as explained by Murphy J in<br />

Renald. It noted that other methods might be equally satisfactory provided that the sentencing judge had<br />

33<br />

34<br />

35<br />

36<br />

37<br />

38<br />

39<br />

Costello queries whether the term “satisfied to the c<strong>on</strong>trary” requires the accused to establish his or her<br />

innocence as a possibility or <strong>on</strong> the balance of probabilities. See: Irish Current <strong>Law</strong> Statutes Annotated 1999<br />

at 10-05.<br />

As amended by secti<strong>on</strong> 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007; secti<strong>on</strong> 84 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006; and<br />

secti<strong>on</strong> 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999.<br />

That the court may impose a sentence greater than 10 years has been c<strong>on</strong>firmed by the Court of Criminal<br />

Appeal. See, for example: The People (DPP) v Hogarty Court of Criminal Appeal 21 December 2001; and<br />

The People (DPP) v Gilloughly Court of Criminal Appeal 7 March 2005.<br />

The People (DPP) v Renald Court of Criminal Appeal 23 November 2001.<br />

Ibid.<br />

See: The People (DPP) v Botha [2004] 2 IR 375 at 383; and The People (DPP) v Ducque [2005] IECCA 92.<br />

The People (DPP) v Duffy Court of Criminal Appeal 21 December 2001.<br />

133

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!