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Governance<br />

REMUNERATION<br />

COMMITTEE<br />

REPORT<br />

CARL SYMON<br />

CHAIRMAN OF THE REMUNERATION COMMITTEE<br />

Members<br />

Carl Symon (Chairman)<br />

Chris Grigg<br />

Nick Rose<br />

Governance<br />

The Remuneration Committee was in place throughout <strong>2014</strong> and held six<br />

meetings. All its members are independent in accordance with the provisions<br />

of the Code.<br />

The Chief Executive and the Company’s Chairman attend Committee meetings<br />

by invitation only. They do not attend where their individual remuneration is<br />

discussed and no director is involved in deciding his own remuneration.<br />

Summary of responsibilities<br />

Agreeing a policy for the remuneration of the Chairman, executive directors,<br />

members of the Executive Committee (EC), the Company Secretary and other<br />

senior executives<br />

Within the agreed policy, determining individual remuneration packages for<br />

the Chairman, executive directors and EC members<br />

Agreeing the policy on terms and conditions to be included in service<br />

agreements for the Chairman, executive directors, EC members, the Company<br />

Secretary and other senior executives, including termination payments and<br />

compensation commitments, where applicable<br />

Approving any employee share-based incentive schemes and any performance<br />

conditions to be used for such schemes<br />

Determining any share scheme performance targets<br />

The Committee’s full Terms of Reference, which are reviewed each year by<br />

the Board, are available on the Company’s website.<br />

Dear Shareholders,<br />

On behalf of the Board, I am delighted to<br />

present the Remuneration Committee’s<br />

Report for <strong>2014</strong>.<br />

We were pleased by the level of shareholder<br />

support received for our 2013 Remuneration<br />

Committee Report in our first year of <strong>report</strong>ing<br />

under the new <strong>report</strong>ing regulations. In<br />

implementing the Directors’ Remuneration<br />

Policy (the Policy), we stated that it would<br />

apply for three years with 2015 being the<br />

first year of operation. I am pleased to<br />

confirm that, for 2015, no revisions are<br />

proposed to our executive remuneration<br />

framework which would constitute a change<br />

to the Policy. However, we remain committed<br />

to continued transparency and engagement<br />

with our shareholders and have consulted<br />

with our major shareholders on proposed<br />

changes to our executive remuneration<br />

arrangements for 2015 which may be made<br />

at the discretion of the Remuneration<br />

Committee as follows:<br />

Earnings per Share (EPS) performance<br />

condition applicable to Long-Term Incentive<br />

(LTI) grants<br />

The current LTI performance metrics of<br />

5% to 11% average <strong>annual</strong> EPS growth with<br />

nil vesting at threshold were developed<br />

during a period of high-growth expectations<br />

from our shareholders commensurate with<br />

the then market opportunities. The metrics<br />

are no longer deemed appropriate given the<br />

recent changes in the market for defence<br />

companies. It is proposed to set a<br />

performance range of 3% to 7% average<br />

<strong>annual</strong> EPS growth for 2015 awards of<br />

Performance Shares under the Long-Term<br />

Incentive Plan (LTIP) as this will provide<br />

executives with an appropriately challenging<br />

and meaningful incentive to drive performance<br />

which, at the same time, delivers a level of<br />

financial performance which supports capital<br />

market expectations. Achievement of<br />

performance at the threshold level represents<br />

significant challenge due to the dependency<br />

on winning several pivotal orders.<br />

For this reason, it is proposed that there<br />

should be a level of reward equal to 25%<br />

of maximum for achievement of threshold.<br />

Average <strong>annual</strong> EPS growth of 5% will<br />

achieve 50% vesting with full vesting<br />

requiring 7% growth. Whilst not ‘straight-line’<br />

vesting (as currently), this vesting profile will<br />

provide a potential reward for the executives<br />

which reflects the unique set of market<br />

challenges which are expected in the next<br />

several years. It is intended that the revised<br />

EPS performance condition is also subject to<br />

the same ‘quality of earnings’ performance<br />

hurdle as applies to the Total Shareholder<br />

Return (TSR) condition, such that awards<br />

will not vest unless the Board is satisfied<br />

that there has been a sustained<br />

STRATEGIC REPORT GOVERNANCE<br />

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS<br />

<strong>BAE</strong> Systems<br />

Annual Report <strong>2014</strong><br />

67

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