Republic of Montenegro: Public Expenditure and ... - Vlada Crne Gore
Republic of Montenegro: Public Expenditure and ... - Vlada Crne Gore
Republic of Montenegro: Public Expenditure and ... - Vlada Crne Gore
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Executive Summary<br />
ix<br />
Monitoring <strong>and</strong> Controlling Fiscal Risks beyond the National Budget<br />
25. Finally, there is a need for Montenegrin authorities monitor a comprehensive<br />
picture <strong>of</strong> fiscal activities in the broader public sector. The current coverage <strong>of</strong> the fiscal<br />
accounts includes extra-budgetary funds <strong>and</strong> partial information on local government, but<br />
excludes the SOE sector. Furthermore, all local government liabilities are not reported in the<br />
public sector debt statistics. As such, they do not provide an adequate basis for formulating fiscal<br />
policy <strong>and</strong> identifying fiscal risks.<br />
26. Going forward, the Government may want to:<br />
• Strengthen oversight over local governments <strong>and</strong> SOEs. There are 67 SOEs in<br />
<strong>Montenegro</strong>, 15 <strong>of</strong> which are owned by the central government. The MoF lacks<br />
centralized information on the SOE sector, <strong>and</strong> gathers only partial information on local<br />
governments (i.e., excluding their extra-budgetary activities). It does not sanction delays<br />
or inadequate reporting from local governments. Thus, if the financial position <strong>of</strong> local<br />
governments or SOEs were to weaken unexpectedly, the state government could find<br />
itself in a situation where it is asked to provide financial support without adequate<br />
information.<br />
• Set up a unit within the MoF to monitor the operations <strong>and</strong> financial activities <strong>of</strong> local<br />
governments <strong>and</strong> SOEs. The unit should collect <strong>and</strong> compile quarterly statements on<br />
consolidated municipal government accounts (including extra-budgetary activities), <strong>and</strong><br />
liabilities (including arrears <strong>and</strong> overdrafts). The unit should also create a database on<br />
SOEs, collect <strong>and</strong> compile quarterly information on SOE liabilities including arrears, <strong>and</strong><br />
receive the income statements from the electricity company, ElektroPrivreda <strong>Crne</strong> <strong>Gore</strong><br />
(EPCG).<br />
• Exp<strong>and</strong> the coverage <strong>of</strong> fiscal <strong>and</strong> debt statistics by: (i) including all local government<br />
liabilities in the public sector debt data, with the liabilities <strong>of</strong> SOEs that are not<br />
guaranteed by the government <strong>and</strong> arrears marked as a memor<strong>and</strong>um item; (ii) including<br />
local government extra-budgetary activities in the operations <strong>of</strong> general government; <strong>and</strong><br />
(iii) adding the operating balance <strong>of</strong> EPCG in the fiscal tables as a memor<strong>and</strong>um item. A<br />
wider coverage <strong>of</strong> fiscal operations to include that <strong>of</strong> SOEs is not recommended in the<br />
short run, in light <strong>of</strong> the other priorities.<br />
• Develop an institutional framework for private sector participation in infrastructure<br />
(PPI). While local governments intend to foster PPI, there is currently an absence <strong>of</strong><br />
adequate legal or institutional mechanisms to develop these local projects in an orderly<br />
fashion. To prevent the emergence <strong>of</strong> fiscal risks related to these contracts, the<br />
government should develop a sound legal <strong>and</strong> institutional framework for PPI (see<br />
above). Furthermore, it should build state <strong>and</strong> local government capacities to h<strong>and</strong>le PPI<br />
projects, including assessing value-for-money <strong>and</strong> fiscal risks. Over the medium term,<br />
when PPI contracts become effective, the government should monitor these activities<br />
through its municipal reporting mechanisms.