Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

1997 [104] Crisp, Roger/Slote, Michael (Hrsg.) (1997): Virtue Ethics, Oxford.1999 [105] Cullity, Garrett (1999): Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice2, S. 277–94.1994 [106] Darwall, Stephen (1994): From Morality to Virtue and Back?, Philosophy andPhenomenological Research 54, S. 695–701. (Zu M. Slote, From Morality to Virtue)2002 [107] Darwall, Stephen (Hrsg.) (2002): Virtue Ethics, Oxford.2003 [108] Das, Ramon (2003): Virtue Ethics and Right Action, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, S.324–39. 341988 [109] Davis, Michael (1988): Civic Virtue, Corruption, and the Structure of Moral Theories, inMidwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII: Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, hrsg.von Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr. und Howard K. Wettstein, Notre Dame,S. 352–66.1994 [110] DeMarco, Joseph P. (1994): A Coherence Theory in Ethics, Amsterdam, Atlanta, S. 54–60.1996 [111] DeMarco, Joseph P. (1996): Moral Theory. A Contemporary Overview, Boston, S. 93–106.1975 [112] Dent, N. J. H. (1975): The Moral Psychology of the Virtues, Cambridge.1991 [113] Den Uyl, Douglas J. (1991): The Virtue of Prudence, New York.2000 [114] DePaul, Michael (2000): Character Traits, Virtues, and Vices: Are There None?, in Proceedingsof the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 9: Philosophy of Mind, hrsg. vonBernard Elevitch, Bowling Green.2003 [115] DePaul, Michael/Zagzebski, Linda (Hrsg.) (2003): Intellectual Virtue – Perspectives fromEthics and Epistemology, Oxford.2002 [116] Devettere, Raymond J. (2002): Introduction to Virtue Ethics. Insights of the Ancient Greeks,Washington, D. C.1998 [117] Doris, John M. (1998): Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics, Nous 32, S. 504–30. – Vgl. dazu[399], [475].2002 [118] Doris, John M. (2002): Lack of Character. Personality and Moral Behavior, Cambridge. – Vgl.dazu [15], [22], [278], [343], [397], [461], [476].2005 [119] Doris, John M. (2005): Précis of Lack of Character, Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 71, S. 632–35.34“In this paper I evaluate some recent virtue-ethical accounts of right action [Hursthouse 1999; Slote 2001;Swanton 2001]. I argue that all are vulnerable to what I call the insularity objection: evaluating actionrequires attention to worldly consequences external to the agent, whereas virtue ethics is primarilyconcerned with evaluating an agent’s inner states. More specifically, I argue that insofar as these accountsare successful in meeting the insularity objection they invite the circularity objection: they end up relyingupon putatively virtue-ethical considerations that themselves depend on unexplained judgments ofrightness. Such accounts thus face a dilemma that is characteristic of virtue-ethical accounts of right action.They avoid the insularity objection only at the cost of inviting the circularity objection: they becomeintuitively plausible roughly to the extent that they lose their distinctively virtue-ethical character.”14