Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76, S. 310–32. 162003 [52] Birnbacher, Dieter (2003): Analytische Einführung in die Ethik, Berlin, S. 203–6 („<strong>Tugendethik</strong>“).1994 [53] Blum, Lawrence A. (1994): Virtue and Community, in ders., Moral Perception andParticularity, Cambridge, S. 144–69.1996 [54] Blum, Lawrence A. (1996): Community and Virtue, in How Should One Live? Essays on theVirtues, hrsg. von Roger Crisp, Oxford, S. 231–50.1996 [55] Bond, E. J. (1996): Ethics and Human Well-being. An Introduction to Moral Philosophy,Oxford, S. 135–64.2001 [56] Borchers, Dagmar (2001): Die neue <strong>Tugendethik</strong> – Schritt <strong>zur</strong>ück im Zorn?, Paderborn.2008 [57] Borchers, Dagmar (2008): Moralische Exzellenz – Einführung in die <strong>Tugendethik</strong>, inGrundkurs Ethik. Band 1: Grundlagen, hrsg. von Johannes S. Ach, Kurt Bayertz undLudwig Siep, Paderborn, S. 33–48.2005 [58] Bradely, Ben (2005): Virtue Consequentialism, Utilitas 17, S. 282–98. 172004 [59] Brady, Michael (2004): Against Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, Philosophical Papers 33, S. 1–10. 18161718“In recent years, there has been considerable debate in the literature concerning the existence of moralcharacter. One lesson we should take away from these debates is that the concept of character, and the roleit plays in guiding our actions, is far more complex than most of us initially took it to be. Just as GilbertHarman, for example, makes a serious mistake in insisting, plain and simply, that there is no such thing ascharacter, defenders of character also make a mistake to the extent that they imply there is no problemraised by the psychological literature for either the concept of character or the nature of character-basedethics. My hope for this paper is to avoid both of these mistakes by first, exploring exactly what is theconcept of character that is so firmly rooted in our philosophical and everyday thinking; and second,exploring the implications of the psychological literature for this appropriately understood concept ofcharacter. In so doing, I will come to a resolution that vindicates the existence of character, while at thesame time calls attention to the real and serious problem suggested by the psychological evidence. This, wewill see, is a problem of moral motivation.”“Virtue consequentialism has been held by many prominent philosophers, but has never been properlyformulated. I criticize Julia Driver’s formulation of virtue consequentialism and offer an alternative. Imaintain that according to the best version of virtue consequentialism, attributions of virtue are reallydisguised comparisons between two character traits, and the consequences of a trait in non-actualcircumstances may affect its actual status as a virtue or vice. Such a view best enables the consequentialist toaccount for moral luck, unexemplified virtues, and virtues and vices involving the prevention of goodnessand badness.”“Agent-based virtue ethics is a unitary normative theory according to which the moral status of actions isentirely dependent upon the moral status of an agent’s motives and character traits. One of the problems anysuch approach faces is to capture the common-sense distinction between an agent’s doing the right thing,and her doing it for the right (or wrong) reason. In this paper I argue that agent-based virtue ethicsultimately fails to capture this kind of fine-grained distinction, and to this extent ought to be rejected. Ifocus first on Michael Slote’s agent-based theory, according to which the moral status of actions dependsupon an agent’s actual motives, and argue that this leads to a paradox. I then consider whether the8