Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

S. 165–79.2003 [391] Solomon, David (2003): Virtue Ethics: Radical or Routine? in Intellectual Virtue – Perspectivesfrom Ethics and Epistemology, hrsg. von Micheal DePaul und Linda Zagzebski,Oxford, S. 57–80.1988 [392] Solomon, Robert C. (1988): The Virtue of Love, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII:Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, hrsg. von Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling,Jr. und Howard K. Wettstein, Notre Dame, S. 12–31.1992 [393] Solomon, Robert C. (1992): Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach toBusiness Ethics, in Virtue Ethics. A Critical Reader, hrsg. von Daniel Statman,Edinburgh 1997, S. 205–26.1998 [394] Solomon, Robert C. (1998): The Virtues of a Passionate Life: Erotic Love and “the Will toPower”, in Virtue and Vice, hrsg. von Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. undJeffrey Paul, Cambridge, S. 91–118.2003 [395] Solomon, Robert C. (2003): Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business,Business Ethics Quarterly 13, S. 43–62. – Dazu: [173].2005 [396] Solomon, Robert C. (2005): Erotic Love as a Moral Virtue, in Virtue Ethics, Old and New, hrsg.von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 81–100.2005 [397] Solomon, Robert C. (2005): “What’s Character Got to Do with It?”, Philosophy andPhenomenological Research 71, S. 648–55. – Zu [118]. Vgl. dazu: [120].1992 [398] Spohn, William C. (1992): The Return of Virtue Ethics, Theological Studies 53, S. 60–75.2002 [399] Sreenivasan, Gopal (2002): Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution, Mind 111,S. 47–68. 76 – Zu [117], [171]. Vgl. dazu: [475].2008 [400] Sreenivasan, Gopal (2008): Character and Consistency: Still More Errors, Mind 117, S. 603–12. 77 – Zu [475].7677“This paper examines the implications of certain social psychological experiments for moral theory –specifically, for virtue theory. Gilbert Harman and John Doris have recently argued that the empiricalevidence offered by ‘situationism’ demonstrates that there is no such thing as a character trait. I dispute thisconclusion. My discussion focuses on the proper interpretation of the experimental data – the datathemselves I grant for the sake of argument. I develop three criticisms of the anti-trait position. Of these, thecentral criticism concerns three respects in which the experimental situations employed to test someone’scharacter trait are inadequate to the task. First, they do not take account of the subject’s own construal of thesituation. Second, they include behaviour that is only marginally relevant to the trait in question. Third,they disregard the normative character of the responses in which virtue theory is interested. Given theseinadequacies in situationism’s operationalized conception of a ‘character trait’, I argue that situationismdoes not really address the proposition that people have ‘character traits’, properly understood. A fortiori,the social psychological evidence does not refute that proposition. I also adduce some limited experimentalevidence in favour of character traits and distil two lessons we can nevertheless learn from situationism.”“This paper continues a debate among philosophers concerning the implications of situationist experimentsin social psychology for the theory of virtue. In a previous paper (2002), I argued among other things thatthe sort of character trait problematized by Hartshorne and May’s (1928) famous study of honesty is not theright sort to trouble the theory of virtue. Webber (2006) criticizes my argument, alleging that it founders on38