Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

2009 [226] Kawall, Jason (2009): Virtue Theory, Ideal Observers, and the Supererogatory, PhilosophicalStudies 146, S. 179–96. 521996 [227] Keefer, Matthew Wilks (1996): The Inseparability of Morality and Well-being: The Duty/VirtueDebate Revisited, Journal of Moral Education 25, S. 277–90.2007 [228] Keller, Simon (2007): Virtue ethics is self-effacing, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85, S.221–31. 531997 [229] Kelly, Eugene (1997): Revisiting Max Scheler’s Formalism in Ethics: Virtue-Based Ethics andMoral Rules in the Non-Formal Ethics of Value, Journal of Value Inquiry 31, S. 381–97.2002 [230] Kersting, Wolfgang (2002): Kritik der Gleichheit. Über die Grenzen der Gerechtigkeit und derMoral, Weilerswist, S. 217–54 („Zur Geschichte der Tugend“).2000 [231] Kihlbom, Ulrik (2000): Guidance and Justification in Particularistic Ethics, Bioethics 14, S.287–309. 541983 [232] Kilcullen, John (1983): Utilitarianism and Virtue, Ethics 93, S. 451–66.1997 [233] Koehn, Daryl (1997): Virtue Ethics, in The Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business525354intuition, and to argue that virtue ethicists have ample resources to respond to these worries. Theexplanatory primacy of the virtuous over the right or the good emerges as a distinct and viable position.”“I argue that recent virtue theories (including those of Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton) face importantinitial difficulties in accommodating the supererogatory. In particular, I consider several potentialcharacterizations of the supererogatory modeled upon these familiar virtue theories (and their accounts ofrightness) and argue that they fail to provide an adequate account of supererogation. In the second half ofthe paper I sketch an alternative virtue-based characterization of supererogation, one that is grounded in theattitudes of virtuous ideal observers, and that avoids the concerns raised in the first part of the paper.”“An ethical theory is self-effacing if it tells us that sometimes, we should not be motivated by theconsiderations that justify our acts. In his influential paper ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’[1976], Michael Stocker argues that consequentialist and deontological ethical theories must be selfeffacing,if they are to be at all plausible. Stocker’s argument is often taken to provide a reason to give upconsequentialism and deontology in favour of virtue ethics. I argue that this assessment is a mistake. Virtueethics is self-effacing in just the same way as are the theories that Stocker attacks. Or, at the very least: ifthere is a way for virtue ethics to avoid self-effacement then there are ways for its rivals to avoid selfeffacementtoo. Therefore, considerations of self-effacement provide no reason to prefer virtue ethics to itsmajor rivals.”“This paper argues that, contrary to a common line of criticism followed by scholars such as Helga Kuhse, aparticularistic version of virtue ethics properly elaborated, can provide sound moral guidance and asatisfactory account for moral justification of our opinions regarding, for instance, health care practice. Inthe first part of the paper, three criteria for comparing normative theories with respect to action-guidingpower are outlined, and it is argued that the presented particularistic version of virtue ethics actually canprovide more guidance than the universalistic theories favoured by Kuhse and others. In the second part ofthe paper it is claimed that universalist normative theories have serious problems accounting for the rolethat moral principles are supposed to play in the justification, of moral opinions, whereas the presentversion of virtue ethics accommodates a plausible alternative idea of justification without invoking moralprinciples or eschewing objectivity.”24