Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

2009 [280] Miller, Christian (2009): Social Psychology, Mood, and Helping: Mixed Results for VirtueEthics, Journal of Ethics 13, S. 145–73. 652005 [281] Millgram, Elijah (2005): Reasonably Virtuous, in Millgram, Ethics Done Right. PracticalReasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory, Cambridge, S. 133–67.1998 [282] Milo, Ronald D. (1998): Virtue, Knowledge, and Wickedness, in Virtue and Vice, hrsg. vonEllen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. und Jeffrey Paul, Cambridge, S. 196–232.1992 [283] Montague, Phillip (1992): Virtue Ethics: A Qualified Success Story, American PhilosophicalQuarterly 29. Wiederabgedruckt in Virtue Ethics. A Critical Reader, hrsg. von DanielStatman, Edinburgh 1997, S. 194–204.1998 [284] Montmarquet, James A. (1998): An Asymmetry Concerning Virtue and Vice, Canadian Journalof Philosophy 28, S. 149–59.2008 [285] Montmarquet, James A. (2008): The Voluntariness of Virtue – and Belief, Philosophy 83, S.373–90. 661990 [286] Moravcsik, Julius M. (1990): The Role of Virtue in Alternatives to Kantian and UtilitarianEthics, Philosophia 20, S. 33–48.1998 [287] Müller, Anselm Winfried (1998): Was taugt die Tugend? Elemente einer Ethik des gutenLebens. Mit einem Gespräch mit August Everding, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.1996 [288] Nida-Rümelin, Julian (1996): Theoretische und Angewandte Ethik: Paradigmen,Begründungen, Bereiche, in Angewandte Ethik. Die Bereichsethiken und ihretheoretische Fundierung. Ein Handbuch, hrsg. von Julian Nida-Rümelin, Stuttgart, S.2–85: S. 31–37 („Das tugendethische Paradigma (<strong>Tugendethik</strong>)“).1984 [289] Nielsen, Kai (1984): Critique of Pure Virtue. Animadversions on a Virtue-Based Ethic, in Virtueand Medicine, hrsg. von E. E. Shelp, Dordrecht, S. 133–49. Wiederabgedruckt in6566experimental results from social psychology concerning helping behavior are best explained not byappealing to so-called ‘global’ character traits like compassion, but rather by appealing to externalsituational forces or, at best, to highly individualized ‘local’ character traits. In response, a number ofphilosophers have argued that virtue ethics can accommodate the empirical results in question. My ownview is that neither side of this debate is looking in the right direction. For there is an impressive array ofevidence from the social psychology literature which suggests that many people do possess one or morerobust global character traits pertaining to helping others in need. But at the same time, such traits arenoticeably different from a traditional virtue like compassion.”“I first summarize the central issues in the debate about the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics, and thenexamine the role that social psychologists claim positive and negative mood have in influencingcompassionate helping behavior. I argue that this psychological research is compatible with the claim thatmany people might instantiate certain character traits after all which allow them to help others in a widevariety of circumstances. Unfortunately for the virtue ethicist, however, it turns out that these helping traitsfall well short of exhibiting certain central features of compassion.”“This paper examines the relative voluntariness of three types of virtue: ‘epistemic’ virtues like openmindedness;‘motivational’ virtues like courage, and more robustly ‘moral’ virtues like justice. A somewhatnovel conception of the voluntariness of belief is offered in terms of the limited, but quite real, voluntarinessof certain epistemic virtues.”29