Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

2007 [409] Stichter, Matt (2007): Ethical Expertise: The Skill Model of Virtue, Ethical Theory and MoralPractice 10, S. 183–94. 811979 [410] Stocker, Michael (1979): Good Intentions in Greek and Modern Moral Virtue, AustralasianJournal of Philosophy 57, S. 220–4.1994 [411] Stocker, Michael (1994): Self-Other Asymmetries and Virtue Theory, Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 54, S. 689–94. (Zu M. Slote, From Morality to Virtue)1996 [412] Stocker, Michael (1996): How Emotions Reveal Value and Help Cure the Schizophrenia ofModern Ethical Theories, in How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, hrsg. vonRoger Crisp, Oxford, S. 173–90.1997 [413] Stocker, Michael (1997): Emotional Identification, Closeness and Size: Some Contributions toVirtue Ethics, in Virtue Ethics. A Critical Reader, hrsg. von Daniel Statman,Edinburgh, S. 118–27.2003 [414] Stohr, Karen E. (2003): Moral Cacophony: When Continence is a Virtue, Journal of Ethics 7, S.339–63. 822006 [415] Stohr, Karen E. (2006): Contemporary Virtue Ethics, Philosophy Compass 1, S. 22–7.8182“Julia Annas is one of the few modern writers on virtue that has attempted to recover the ancient idea thatvirtues are similar to skills. In doing so, she is arguing for a particular account of virtue, one in which theintellectual structure of virtue is analogous to the intellectual structure of practical skills. The main benefitof this skill model of virtue is that it can ground a plausible account of the moral epistemology of virtue.This benefit, though, is only available to some accounts of virtue. Annas claims that Aristotle rejects thisskill model of virtue, and so the model of virtues as a skill that Annas endorses for the modern virtue theoryis Socratic. This paper argues that while Aristotle rejects the Socratic model of virtue as a skill, he does notreject the model of virtue as a skill altogether. Annas has mischaracterized Aristotle’s position on the skillmodel, because she has not recognized that Aristotle endorses a different account of the structure of skillthan the one put forth by Socrates. In addition, recent research on expertise provides an account of skillsvery much at odds with the description of skills offered by Annas, but similar to the account endorsed byAristotle.Contrary to Annas, not only is the skill model of virtue compatible with a neo-Aristotelian accountof virtue, but it also appears that basing a skill model of virtue on a Socratic account of virtue is likely toprove unsuccessful.”“Contemporary virtue ethicists widely accept the thesis that a virtuous agent’s feelings should be inharmony with her judgments about what she should do and that she should find virtuous action easy andpleasant. Conflict between an agent’s feelings and her actions, by contrast, is thought to indicate merecontinence – a moral deficiency. This “harmony thesis” is generally taken to be a fundamental element ofAristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that the harmony thesis, understood this way, is mistaken, because thereare occasions where a virtuous agent will find right action painful and difficult. What this means is that thegenerally accepted distinction between continence and virtue is unsupportable. This conclusion affectsseveral well-known accounts of virtuous action, including those of Philippa Foot and John McDowell. Acloser look at Aristotle, however, provides another way of distinguishing between continence and virtue,based in his categorization of goods as noble or base. I argue that virtue is exhibited when an agent’sfeelings harmonize with his correct judgments of value, while discrepancies between feelings and correctjudgments of value indicate continence. This understanding of continence and virtue enables us toaccommodate the problem cases I raise.”40