Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

2007 [134] Everitt, Nicholas (2007): Some Problems with Virtue Theory, Philosophy 82, S. 275–99. 372009 [135] Eylon, Yuval (2009): Virtue and Continence, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12, S. 137–51. 381980 [136] Fleming, Arthur (1980): Reviewing the Virtues, Ethics 90, S. 587–95.2006 [137] Fleming, Diana (2006): The Character of Virtue: Answering the Situationist Challenge toVirtue Ethics, Ratio 19, S. 24–42. 39373839“Virtue ethics (VE for short) is currently so widely embraced that different versions of the theory can nowbe distinguished. Some of these are mapped out in Statman’s useful introduction to his collection. There areenough of these versions to constitute a family, and consequently what they share is a family resemblancerather than agreement to a defining set of necessary and sufficient conditions. What I propose to do,therefore, is to criticise one of the main versions of VE. Rosalind Hursthouse is the main proponent of theversion which I will criticise. I choose her as a spokesperson, not because her version of VE is especiallyweak. On the contrary, it is because she is one of the leading protagonists of VE, and because her writingsprovide a lucid, powerful and elegant exposition of VE that her version of the theory is an appropriate objectof scrutiny.”“John McDowell argued that the virtuous person (VP) knows no temptation: her perception of a situationsilences all competing motivations – be it fear in the face of danger or a strong desire. The VP cannotrecognize any reason to act non-virtuously as a reason, and is never inclined to act non-virtuously. Thisview rests on the requirement that the VP rationally respond, and not merely react, to the environment – itrests on the requirement that the relation between the VP and the world (ethical requirements) must rule outthe possibility that the VP is a brain in a vat. I will argue that the opposite is true: virtue requires asensitivity to temptation. The VP, as such, must be able to recognize reasons for performing non-virtuousactions as reasons, and be inclined to perform them. She must find nothing human alien. This is so becausethe VP must possess the ability to understand non-virtuous agents, and understanding necessarily involvesvulnerability to temptation. Otherwise, it will be argued, the VP views the actions of others as determinedfrom outside the space of reasons. But the VP, like any other person, must have the ability to view theactions of others as rational responses to the environment, not only as reactions to it. Put differently, theVP’s view of others must rule out the possibility that they are brains in a vat – the possibility that theiractions are merely caused, rather than justified, by the facts. Finally, it will be suggested that an amendedconception of the VP can meet both requirements: view others as rationally responsive to the world, withoutrelinquishing its relation to the facts.”“Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics makes essential reference to the notion of a stable, robust character-trait. Italso claims to be constrained by at least a minimal degree of psychological realism. Recent developments inempirical psychology have drawn into question the evidence for the existence of such robust traits, arguingthat it rests on what has been called a ‘undamental attribution error’. Virtue ethics has thus seemingly beenmade vulnerable to criticisms that it is essentially dependent on an erroneous, folk-psychological, notion ofcharacter and, so, must either abandon their characteristic notion of virtue or forego any pretensions topsychological realism.I develop a two-pronged response to this objection. First, I argue that there is reason to question much of theempirical evidence and that such evidence as does exist can easily be accommodated by virtue ethics. Next, Iargue that even if we allow that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical theories does sometimes presuppose astronger conception of character-traits than is warranted by the evidence, this does not significantlyundermine the virtue ethicist’s project.”16