Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

Nielsen, Why Be Moral?, Buffalo, New York 1989, S. 228–44. [Zu MacIntyre, AfterVirtue]1998 [290] Norman, Richard (1998): The Moral Philosophers. An Introduction to Ethics, 2. Aufl., Oxford,S. 197–200 (“Virtue Ethics”).1991 [291] Norton, David L. (1991): Democracy and Moral Development: A Politics of Virtue, Berkeley.1993 [292] Nussbaum, Martha (1993): Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in The Quality ofLife, hrsg. von Martha C. Nussbaum und Amartya Sen, Oxford, S. 242–70. – NichtrelativeTugenden: Ein aristotelischer Ansatz, in <strong>Tugendethik</strong>, hrsg. von Klaus PeterRippe und Peter Schaber, Stuttgart 1998, S. 114–65. – Vgl. dazu: Hurley, Susan L.(1993): Commentary on Martha Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An AristotelianApproach”, in The Quality of Life, hrsg. von Martha C. Nussbaum und Amartya Sen,Oxford, S. 270–76.1999 [293] Nussbaum, Martha (1999): Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?, Journal of Ethics 3, S. 163–201. 671996 [294] Oakley, Justin (1996): Varieties of Virtue Ethics, Ratio (New Series) 9, S. 128–52.1998 [295] Oakley, Justin (1998): A Virtue Ethics Approach, in A Companion to Bioethics, hrsg. von HelgaKuhse und Peter Singer, Oxford, S. 86–97.2001 [296] Oakley, Justin/Cocking, Dean (2001): Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles, Cambridge.1988 [297] O’Connor, David (1988): Aristotelian Justice as a Personal Virtue, in Midwest Studies inPhilosophy Vol. XIII: Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, hrsg. von Peter A.French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr. und Howard K. Wettstein, Notre Dame, S. 417–27.1999 [298] Oderberg, David S. (1999): On the Cardinality of the Cardinal Virtues, International Journal ofPhilosophical Studies 7, S. 305–22. 6867“Virtue ethics is standardly taught and discussed as a distinctive approach to the major questions of ethics, athird major position alongside Utilitarian and Kantian ethics. I argue that this taxonomy is a confusion.Both Utilitarianism and Kantianism con-tain treatments of virtue, so virtue ethics cannot possibly be aseparate approach contrasted with those approaches. There are, to be sure, quite a few contemporaryphilosophical writers about virtue who are neither Utilitarians nor Kantians; many of these find inspirationin ancient Greek theories of virtue. But even here there is little unity. Although certain concerns do unitethis disparate group (a concern for the role of motives and passions in good choice, a concern for character,and a concern for the whole course of an agent’s life), there are equally profound disagreements, especiallyconcerning the role that reason should play in ethics. One group of modern virtue-theorists, I argue, areprimarily anti-Utilitarians, concerned with the plurality of value and the susceptibility of passions to socialcultivation. These theorists want to enlarge the place of reason in ethics. They hold that reason candeliberate about ends as well as means, and that reason can modify the passions themselves. Another groupof virtue theorists are primarily anti-Kantians. They believe that reason plays too dominant a role in mostphilosophical accounts of ethics, and that a larger place should be given to sentiments and passions – whichthey typically construe in a less reason-based way than does the first group. The paper investigates thesedifferences, concluding that it is not helpful to speak of “virtue ethics,” and that we wouldbe better offcharacterizing the substantive views of each thinker – and then figuring out what we ourselves want to say.”30