Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

Southern Journal of Philosophy 14, S. 511–21.2007 [351] Setiya, Kieran (2007): Reasons without Rationalism, Princeton. 731991 [352] Seung, T. K. (Hrsg.) (1991): The Nature of Virtue Ethics: its Political Relevance. A ConferenceHonoring Edmund L. Pincoffs, Social Theory and Practice 17 (2), S. 137–344.1999 [353] Shaw, William H. (1999): Contemporary Ethics. Taking Account of Utilitarianism, Oxford, S.252–61.1992 [354] Sher, George (1992): Knowing about Virtue, in Virtue (Nomos 34), hrsg. von John W.Chapman und William A. Galston, New York, S. 91–116.1988 [355] Sherman, Nancy (1988): Common Sense and Uncommon Virtue, in Midwest Studies inPhilosophy Vol. XIII: Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, hrsg. von Peter A.French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr. und Howard K. Wettstein, Notre Dame, S. 97–114.1989 [356] Sherman, Nancy (1989): The Fabric of Character. Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue, Oxford.1993 [357] Sherman, Nancy (1993): The Virtues of Common Pursuit, Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 53, S. 277–99.1997 [358] Sherman, Nancy (1997): Kantian Virtue: Priggish or Passional?, in Reclaiming the History ofEthics. Essays for John Rawls, hrsg. von Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman undChristine M. Korsgaard, Cambridge, S. 270–96.1997 [359] Sherman, Nancy (1997): Making a Necessity of Virtue. Aristotle and Kant on Virtue,Cambridge.1997 [360] Sherman, Nancy (2005): The Look and Feel of Virtue, in Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity. Issuesin Ancient and Modern Ethics, hrsg. von Christopher Gill, Oxford, S. 59–82.73“Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question “Why should I be moral?” and by doubts about therational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubtsrest on a mistake. The “should” of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character,including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues makeone sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason,Setiya argues that the only alternative to this “virtue theory” is a form of ethical rationalism in whichreasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethicalrationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act “under the guise of the good,” or it relies on dubiousviews about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true:we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without beinggood. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, "Reasons withoutRationalism" is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy ofmind.”Contents: Preface ix – Introduction 1 – 1. “Squeezing the Good into the Right through the Tubes ofImperfection” 7 – 2. The Relevance of Action Theory 14 – PART ONE: Explaining Action 21 – 1. A Puzzleabout Intention 23 – 2. The Belief-Desire Model 28 – 3. Acting for Reasons 39 – 4. Solving the Puzzle 48 –5. A Causal Theory of Action? 56 – 6. Against the Guise of the Good 59 – PART TWO: Why VirtueMatters to the Study of Practical Reason 68 – 1. Character and Practical Thought 70 – 2. An Argument forthe Virtue Theory 79 – 3. Practical Reason and the Guise of the Good 86 – 4. Motivation and Desire 99 – 5.Self-Knowledge as the Aim of Action 107 – Conclusion 116 – <strong>Bibliography</strong> 121 – Index 129.35