Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

1997 [151] Garcia, J. L. A. (1997): Interpersonal Virtues. Whose Interests Do They Serve?, Proceedings ofthe American Catholic Philosophical Association 71, S. 31–60.2005 [152] Gardiner, Stephen M. (2005): Seneca’s Virtuous Moral Rules, in Virtue Ethics, Old and New,hrsg. von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 30–59.2005 [153] Gardiner, Stephen M. (Hrsg.) (2005): Virtue Ethics, Old and New, Ithaca.2000 [154] Garrard, Eve (2000): Slote on Virtue, Analysis 60, S. 280–84.1997 [155] Gauthier, Jeffrey A. (1997): Schiller’s Critique of Kant’s Moral Psychology: ReconcilingPractical Reason and an Ethics of Virtue, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27, S. 513–544.1977 [156] Geach, Peter (1977): The Virtues, Cambridge.1998 [157] Gert, Bernard (1998): Morality. Its Nature and Justification, New York, S. 277–309 (“Virtuesand Vices”).1985 [158] Gewirth, Alan (1985): Rights and Virtues, Review of Metaphysics 38, S. 739–62.2005 [159] Gill, Christopher (Hrsg.) (2005): Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity. Issues in Ancient and ModernEthics, Oxford.2008 [160] Goldie, Peter (2008): Virtues of Art and Human Well-Being, Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety Supplementary Volume 82, S. 179–95. 422008 [161] Gowans, Christopher W. (2008): Virtue and Nature, Social Philosophy and Policy 25, S. 28–55.2011 [162] Gowans, Christopher W. (2011): Virtue Ethics and Moral Relativism, in A Companion to Relativism,hrsg. von Steven D. Hales, Oxford, S. 391–410.1999 [163] Graeser, Andreas (1999): Philosophie und Ethik, Düsseldorf, S. 144–49.2004 [164] Graham, Gordon (2004): Eight Theories of Ethics, London, S. 53–70 (“Naturalism and VirtueTheory”).1994 [165] Greenspan, Patricia S. (1994): Guilt and Virtue, Journal of Philosophy 91, S. 57–70. 434243“What is the point of art, and why does it matter to us human beings? The answer that I will give in thispaper, following on from an earlier paper on the same subject, is that art matters because our being activelyengaged with art, either in its production or in its appreciation, is part of what it is to live well. The focus inthe paper will be on the dispositions—the virtues of art production and of art appreciation—that arenecessary for this kind of active engagement with art. To begin with, I will argue that these dispositionsreally are virtues and not mere skills. Then I will show how the virtues of art, and their exercise in artisticactivity, interweave with the other kinds of virtue which are exercised in ethical and contemplative activity.And finally, I will argue that artistic activity affords, in a special way, a certain kind of emotional sharingthat binds us together with other human beings.”“Feelings of guilt have a role to play in moral philosophy as a link between the ethics of virtue and duty.They allow for a notion of imperfect virtue as something still achievable despite serious moral lapses in thepast. They also would seem to be required by perfect virtue in response to a moral dilemma. The defense ofguilt in a case of dilemma has implications for virtue ethics insofar as it yields a distinction between anagent’s character and his record of moral action--and an asymmetrical justificatory treatment of guilt versusother-directed variants of emotional blame.”18