Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

1996 [166] Griffin, James (1996): Value Judgement. Improving Our Ethical Beliefs, Oxford, S. 112–16(“Virtue Ethics”).1998 [167] Griffin, James (1998): Virtue Ethics and Environs, in Virtue and Vice, hrsg. von Ellen FrankelPaul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. und Jeffrey Paul, Cambridge, S. 56–70.2007 [168] Hacker-Wright, John (2007): Moral Status in Virtue Ethics, Philosophy 82, S. 449–73. 442010 [169] Hacker-Wright, John (2010): Virtue Ethics without Right Action: Anscombe, Foot, and ContemporaryVirtue Ethics, Journal of Value Inquiry 44, S. 209–24.2005 [170] Hanafin, John/Coady, C. A. (Hrsg.) (2005): Unity, Separateness and Conflict in the Virtues,Aldershot.1999 [171] Harman, Gilbert (1999): Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology. Virtue Ethics and theFundamental Attribution Error, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, S. 315–31.Wiederabgedruckt in Harman, Explaining Value and Other Essays in MoralPhilosophy, Oxford 2000, S. 165–78. – Vgl. dazu [23], [243], [399].2000 [172] Harman, Gilbert (2000): The Nonexistence of Character Traits, Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety 100, S. 223–26. – Zu [23].2003 [173] Harman, Gilbert (2003): No Character or Personality, Business Ethics Quarterly 13, S. 87–94. –Zu [395].2009 [174] Harman, Gilbert (2009): Skepticism about Character Traits, Journal of Ethics 13, S. 235–42. 452005 [175] Harris, George W. (2005): The Virtues, Perfectionist Goods, and Pessimism, in Virtue Ethics,Old and New, hrsg. von Stephen M. Gardiner, Ithaca, S. 193–210.1995 [176] Harrison, Jonathan (1995): Is Virtue in the Interest of the Stronger? or the Prevarications ofPlato, in ders., Ethical Essays Vol. III: New Essays, Aldershot, S. 220–44.4445(http://romulus.umd.edu/ARHU/Depts/Philosophy/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/g&vabs.html)“My contention is that virtue ethics offers an important critique of traditional philosophical conceptions ofmoral status as well as an alternative view of important moral issues held to depend on moral status. I arguethat the scope of entities that deserve consideration depends on our conception of the demands of virtueslike justice; which entities deserve consideration emerges from a moral view of a world shaped by thatconception. The deepest disputes about moral status depend on conflicting conceptions of justice. I advocatea conception of the virtue of justice that can account for the cases that pose problems for the legalistic viewsof moral status and discuss what ideal moral debate looks like on this view.”“The first part of this article discusses recent skepticism about character traits. The second describes variousforms of virtue ethics as reactions to such skepticism. The philosopher J.-P. Sartre argued in the 1940s thatcharacter traits are pretenses, a view that the sociologist E. Goffman elaborated in the 1950s. Since thensocial psychologists have shown that attributions of character traits tend to be inaccurate through theignoring of situational factors. (Personality psychology has tended to concentrate on people’s conceptions ofpersonality and character rather than on the accuracy of these conceptions). Similarly, the political theoristR. Hardin has argued for situational explanations of bloody social disputes in the former Yugoslavia and inAfrica, rather than explanations in terms of ethnic hatred for example. A version of virtue ethics mightidentify virtues as characteristics of acts rather than character traits, as traits consisting in actual regularitiesin behavior, or as robust dispositions that would manifest themselves also in counterfactual situations.”19