Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

Theory and Moral Practice 8, S. 387–409. 492000 [217] Jansen, Lynn A. (2000): The Virtues in Their Place: Virtue Ethics in Medicine, TheoreticalMedicine 21, S. 261–76.1998 [218] Jeffries, Vincent (1998): Virtue and the Altruistic Personality, Sociological Perspectives 41, S.151–166.1997 [219] Jensen, Steven J. (1997): Goods of Consequences and Goods of Virtue, Proceedings of theAmerican Catholic Philosophical Association 71, S. 179–87.2003 [220] Johnson, Robert N. (2003): Virtue and Right, Ethics 113, S. 810–34. – Dazu: [269], [442].1998 [221] Kagan, Shelly (1998): Normative Ethics, Boulder, S. 204–12 (“Virtues”).2004 [222] Kamtekar, Rachana (2004): Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character,Ethics 114, S. 458–91.2010 [223] Kamtekar, Rachana (2010): Comments on Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence inbeing for the Good, Philosophical Studies 148, S. 147–58. – Zu [3]. Dazu: [5].2002 [224] Kawall, Jason (2002): Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers, Philosophical Studies 109, S. 197–222. 502009 [225] Kawall, Jason (2009): In Defense of the Primacy of Virtues, Journal of Ethics and SocialPhilosophy 3, Nr. 2, S. 1–21, http://www.jesp.org/. 51495051“Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see”what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitationand habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feelthe demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theoriesthat adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism - which John McDowell criticizes forillicitly “borrow[ing] the epistemological credentials” of perception. In this paper, I suggest that the mostpromising way for virtue ethics to use perceptual metaphors innocuously is by adopting a skill model ofvirtue, on which the virtues are modeled on forms of practical know-how. Yet I contend that this model isdouble-edged for virtue ethics. The skill model belies some central ambitions and dogmas of the traditionalview, especially its most idealized claims about virtue and the virtuous. While this may be a cost that itschampions are unprepared to pay, I suggest that virtue ethics would do well to embrace a more realisticmoral psychology and a correspondingly less sublime conception of virtue.”“Virtue theorists in ethics often embrace the following characterization of right action: An action is right iffa virtuous agent would perform that action in like circumstances. Zagzebski offers a parallel virtue-basedaccount of epistemically justified belief. Such proposals are severely flawed because virtuous agents inadverse circumstances, or through lack of knowledge can perform poorly. I propose an alternative virtuebasedaccount according to which an action is right (a belief is justified) for an agent in a given situation iffan unimpaired, fully-informed virtuous observer would deem the action to be right (the belief to bejustified).”“In this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics whichmaintain that moral properties such rightness and goodness (and their corresponding concepts) are to beexplained and understood in terms of the virtues or the virtuous. The objections all rest on a strongly-heldintuition that the virtues (and the virtuous) simply must be derivative in some way from either right actionsor good states of affairs. My goal is to articulate several distinct, though related, objections grounded in this23