Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

2009 [342] Russell, Daniel C. (2009): Practical Intelligence and the Virtues, Oxford. 722005 [343] Sabini, John/Silver, Maury (2005): Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued, Ethics 115, S.535–62.2005 [344] Sandler, Ronald (2005): What Makes a Character Trait a Virtue?, Journal of Value Inquiry 39,S. 383–97.1993 [345] Santas, Gerasimos X. (1993): Does Aristotle Have a Virtue Ethics?, Philosophical Inquiry 15.Wiederabgedruckt (in revidierter Version) in Virtue Ethics. A Critical Reader, hrsg.von Daniel Statman, Edinburgh 1997, S. 260–85.1990 [346] Schaller, Walter E. (1990): Are Virtues No More Than Dispositions to Obey Moral Rules?,Philosophia 20, S. 195–207.1990 [347] Schneewind, J. B. (1990): The Misfortunes of Virtue, Ethics 101, S. 42–63. Wiederabgedrucktin Virtue Ethics, hrsg. von Roger Crisp und Michael Slote, Oxford 1997, S. 178–200.1997 [348] Schuster, Josef (1997): Moralisches Können. Studien <strong>zur</strong> <strong>Tugendethik</strong>, Würzburg.2004 [349] Schuster, Josef (2004): Gefühle und ethische Tugenden, in Abwägende Vernunft. PraktischeRationalität in historischer, systematischer und religionsphilosophischer Perspektive,hrsg. von Franz-Josef Bormann und Christian Schröer, Berlin, S. 361–80.1974 [350] Seeskin, Kenneth (1974): Courage and Knowledge: A Perspective on the Socratic Paradox,72Publisher’s Description: “One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is theresurgence of interest in the virtues. In this new book, Daniel Russell explores two important hopes for suchan approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an actionright, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology.Russell argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skillsinvolved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtuesmust involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion.Likewise, Russell argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yieldsa promising picture of the psychology of virtue. This book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue ofpractical intelligence or ‘phronesis’ – an excellence of deliberating and making choices – which Russellargues is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellectcontrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues – a trend Russellargues is ultimately perilous for virtue theory. This book also takes a penetrating look at issues like the unityof the virtues, responsibility for character, and that elusive figure, ‘the virtuous person’. Written in a clearand careful manner, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues will appeal to philosophers and students alike inmoral philosophy and moral psychology.”Contents: 1. Practical Intelligence and the Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach. Part 1. Phronesis, Virtue,and Right Action. 2. Right Action for Virtue Ethics. 3. Right Action and Virtuous Motives. 4. Right Actionand ‘the Virtuous Person’. Part 2. The Enumeration Problem. 5. The Enumeration Problem. 6.Individuating the Virtues. 7. Magnificence, Generosity, and Subordination. Part 3. Situations,Dispositions, and Virtues. 8. Situations and Broad-Based Dispositions. 9. Situations and Dispositions:Examining the Evidence. 10. From Situationism to Virtue Theory. Part 4. Defending Hard VirtueTheory. 11. Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues. 12. Responsibility for Character. Works Cited. IndexLocorum. General Index.34