Literatur zur Tugendethik Bibliography on Virtue ... - Academic Room

sehene und verbesserte Ausgabe, Stuttgart 1983, S. 237–42 („Tugend“).1999 [271] McKinnon, Christine (1999): Character, Virtue Theories, and the Vices, Peterborough.1996 [272] Mason, Andrew (1996): MacIntyre on Modernity and How It Has Marginalized the Virtues, inHow Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, hrsg. von Roger Crisp, Oxford, S. 191–209.2002 [273] Mayer, Verena (2002): Tugend und Gefühl, in Die Moralität der Gefühle, hrsg. von Sabine A.Döring und Verena Mayer, Berlin, S. 125–50.2009 [274] Mayer, Verena (2009): Tugend aus negativer Freiheit. Eine universelle Begründungsstruktur fürmoralische Normen, in Moralischer Relativismus, hrsg. von Gerhard Ernst, Paderborn,S. 213–29.1984 [275] Meilaender, Gilbert (1984): The Theory and Practice of Virtue, Notre Dame, Ind.2000 [276] Merritt, Maria (2000): Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology, Ethical Theoryand Moral Practice 3, S. 365–83.2009 [277] Merritt, Maria W. (2009): Aristotelean Virtue and the Interpersonal Aspect of EthicalCharacter, Journal of Moral Philosophy 6, S. 23–49. 622003 [278] Miller, Christian B. (2003): Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics, Journal of Ethics 7, S. 365–92. 632009 [279] Miller, Christian B. (2009): Empathy, Social Psychology, and Global Helping Traits,Philosophical Studies 142, S. 247–75. 64626364“I examine the Aristotelean conception of virtuous character as firm and unchangeable, a normative idealendorsed in the currently influential, broadly Aristotelean school of thought known as ‘virtue ethics’.Drawing on central concepts of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, I offer an account of how this ideal issupposed to be realized psychologically. I then consider present-day empirical findings about relevantpsychological processes, with special attention to interpersonal processes. The empirical evidence suggeststhat over time, the same interpersonal processes that sometimes help to sustain character may also disrupt it,even among agents who have the right values in principle. Fortunately, the evidence also suggests someremedial measures. An important philosophical measure, I conclude, is for advocates of virtue ethics toaddress agents’ psychological need for a systematic decision procedure that will focus attention primarily onsubstantive ethical considerations, rather than characterological assessment.”“Several philosophers have recently claimed to have discovered a new and rather significant problem withvirtue ethics. According to them, virtue ethics generates certain expectations about the behavior of humanbeings which are subject to empirical testing. But when the relevant experimental work is done in socialpsychology, the results fall remarkably short of meeting those expectations. So, these philosophers think,despite its recent success, virtue ethics has far less to offer to contemporary ethical theory than might havebeen initially thought. I argue that there are plausible ways in which virtue ethicists can resist argumentsbased on empirical work in social psychology. In the first three sections of the paper, I reconstruct the lineof reasoning being used against virtue ethics by looking at the recent work of Gilbert Harman and JohnDoris. The remainder of the paper is then devoted both to responding to their challenge as well as to brieflysketching a positive account of character trait possession.”“The central virtue at issue in recent philosophical discussions of the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics hasbeen the virtue of compassion. Opponents of virtue ethics such as Gilbert Harman and John Doris argue that28