Footnote 8

(5) CSFB abandoned Enron.590. Beginning no later than 1999, CSFB knew the Insiders were using SPEs tomanipulate Enron’s financial statements. As CSFB equity analysts who studied Enron understood,for those not intimately involved in the SPEs, Enron’s financial statements were “clear as mud.”CSFBCO 005255148 (quoted in Exam. IV, App. L at 22).591. On August 27, 2001, CSFB met with Enron officers, including Fastow, to discussProject Cleaver. Project Cleaver examined the possible split of Enron into two separate companies:one regulated, one not. CSFB prepared a presentation for the meeting that included publiclyavailable data only. Based upon that data, CSFB valued Enron’s debt – on and off-balance sheet– at $6.4 billion.592. At the meeting, Fastow disclosed to CSFB that Enron’s debt was actually either$30 billion or $36 billion. CSFBCO 005725129 (cited in Exam. IV, App. L at 26). After themeeting, CSFB began evaluating Enron’s financial statements more closely. CSFB also beganmonitoring its Enron exposure frequently, and took active steps to decrease it. CSFBCO000553330-CSFBCO 000553333, CSFBCO 005157362, and CSFBCO 005422943 (cited in Exam.IV, App. L at 28). For example, on September 19, 2001, CSFB reduced Enron’s $500-$650 millionnet credit ceiling to $300 million by canceling unused lines of credit, buying credit protection, andrefusing to renew maturing loans. CSFBCO 005157362, CSFBCO 005422943 (cited in Exam. IV,App. L at 28). CSFB’s internal efforts to reduce its Enron exposure paid off. By December 5, 2001,CSFB’s net credit exposure was down to approximately $156.5 million.593. In the months leading to Enron’s bankruptcy, CSFB internally recognized Enron’spoor financial condition. For instance, in e-mails between two of CSFB’s Enron deal teammembers, one, in light of Enron’s “latest travails,” recounted the other’s “ominous warnings 2 yearsago that the ‘house of cards’ may some day collapse.” CSFBCO 005122908 (quoted in Exam. IV,604041v1/007457-200-