Footnote 8

(a)On or about August 10, 2000, Iain Houston (Head of Structure Finance) sentan e-mail to Nicola Goss, Tom Hardy and Peter Commons regarding RBS not having any problemparticipating in ETOL based upon the verbal assurances consistently provided by senior Enron staff,most recently by Fastow to Iain Robertson and Johnny Cameron.(b)On or about August 11, 2000, Commons sent an e-mail to Hardy, Goss andHouston regarding the similarity between ETOL and Sutton Bridge in that ETOL hinges on anunderstanding with Enron that they will buy it all back.(c)On or about August 16, 2000, Aldo Ferri sent an e-mail to Goss regardingRBS’s knowledge of ETOL’s affect on Enron’s balance sheet.(d)On or about September 18, 2000, Milton, Goss and Hardy prepared a ETOLI Credit Application regarding RBS’s knowledge that such transaction was aimed to be a true saleand noting that the applicable accounting rules do not allow any formal arrangements to be madeon RBS’s required return.(e)On or about September 19, 2000, Clarke prepared an ETOL I CreditRecommendation regarding reliance placed on Enron’s verbal undertakings to make RBS whole onthe equity tranche.(f)On or about September 20, 2000, Corporate Banking and Financial Markets(CBFM) Credit Committee Minutes were prepared regarding ETOL I noting both the impact ofRBS’s participation in this deal on Enron’s significant off-balance sheet contingent liabilities andthe nature of the assurances provided.(g)On or about September 25, 2000, Sue Milton sent a memorandum toCommons and Clarke regarding RBS’s reliance on Enron to make it whole.(h)On or about September 28, 2000, a conference took place between Fastowand Iain Robertson regarding Fastow’s assurance that RBS’ renumeration would be met by Enron.604041v1/007457-502-