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nature of these transactions and/or any links between them is still limited, any lackof disclosure by Enron of their material aspects would have been yet another flagrantviolation of Enron’s duty and responsibility to provide Standard & Poor’s withcomplete, timely and reliable information.Testimony of Ronald Barone, the PSI Hearings [hereinafter “Barone Testimony”], July 23, 2002 at32. Pamela Stumpp likewise testified on behalf of Moody’s, albeit more bluntly: “Moody’s did nothave any knowledge, prior to Enron’s bankruptcy, of the existence of Enron’s prepaid forward andrelated swap transactions.” Stumpp Testimony at 29. When Senator Joseph Lieberman asked whyMoody’s did not detect the transactions, Ms. Stump stated: “[C]andidly, these transactions weredisguised loans, and it was very difficult, and it would be very difficult from a simple examinationof a company’s financial statements to detect them. . . . [I]n this case it was a clear effort at hidingwhat was really debt from ourselves as well as other investors.” Id. at 43.194. Enron obtained more than $8 billion in financing from just Citigroup and Chase overthe six years before bankruptcy. Other financial institutions – including CSFB, Barclays, TorontoDominion, and RBC – also participated in prepays.195. Enron prepay transactions were also Enron’s single largest source of cash during thefour years before bankruptcy. Typically, the prepay transactions closed at the end of a financialquarter, and had a striking impact on Enron’s financial statements. For example, in 2000 Enron’stotal operating cash flows were $4.779 billion, of which prepay transactions generated $1.527 billion(or 32%). In 1999, Enron total operating cash flows were $1.228 billion, of which prepaytransactions supplied $1.231 billion gross.196. Had the Enron prepays been reported as debt, Enron’s debt to total capital ratio wouldhave been dramatically different in 1999 and 2000. In 1999, treating the Enron prepay amounts asdebt would have increased Enron’s debt by 31% and changed Enron’s debt to capital ratio from38.5% to 45%. In 2000, treating the Enron prepay amounts as debt would have increased Enron’s604041v1/007457-53-