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244. The Southampton transaction ultimately benefitted Fastow and Kopper, both ofwhom were principals in the transaction. Each received $4.5 million. Exam. II, App. L at 34;Powers Report at 92. In his plea allocution, Kopper admitted the Southampton transaction wasfraudulent in that Enron was told CSFB and RBS were selling their LJM1 Swap Sub interests for$10 million and $20 million, respectively. In reality, RBS sold its interest for $1 million. Theremaining $19 million was split between Fastow, Kopper, three other Enron employees, an LJM2employee, and three RBS bankers. Plea Allocution dated August 21, 2002, United States v. Kopper,Cr. No. H-02-0560 (S.D. Tex.); see also Superseding Indictment dated April 29, 2003, United Statesv. Fastow, et al., Cr. No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex.).(4) In 1999, the Bank Defendants aided Fastow and Kopper byknowingly participating in and supporting LJM2.245. From its inception, LJM2 was intended to be a large private equity fund – muchlarger, for example, than LJM1. When Fastow conceived the idea of LJM2, he took it to Enron’sFinance Committee and Board. Fastow explained that he intended to raise $200 million or morefrom institutional investors to create a private investment partnership that could readily purchaseassets from Enron. Fastow explained that he would be the owner of LJM2 Capital Management,LP – LJM2’s general partner. Fastow explained that Enron would benefit from his involvementbecause LJM2 could purchase assets Enron wanted to sell more quickly and with lower transactioncosts than outsiders. On October 11, 1999, the Enron Finance Committee and Board of Directorsapproved the formation of LJM2.246. With the assistance of one Bank Defendant – Merrill Lynch – Fastow solicitedinvestments in LJM2 from other Bank Defendants. Merrill Lynch authored a private placementmemorandum that emphasized Fastow’s position as Enron’s CFO, and explained that Fastow,604041v1/007457-69-