Footnote 8

App. L. at 22-23 n.81). In his response on October 21, 2001, the second CSFB team member noted“P.S. We are still making $$$ at ENE but look out!” CSFBCO 005122670 (quoted in Exam. IV,App. L at 22-23 n.81).594. At this time, CSFB’s equity analysts were also privately expressing negative viewsabout Enron’s financial condition. For example, in e-mails between a CSFB equity analyst and aChase equity analyst, the CSFB analyst stated that, with respect to Enron, “all things point to thepotential for one of the biggest frauds in the history of corporate America [sic], bankruptcy is notout of the question.” Chase’s analyst responded, “bankruptcy??? [H]oly Moses….that’sHUGE!!!...wow, [CSFB’s equity analyst] has actually been right on this one.” JPMBKR-E0817342(quoted in Exam. IV, App. L at 34 n.123). And, in e-mails between these analysts on October 25,2001, the CSFB analyst boasted, “Correct me if I’m wrong, but you have been speaking to a memberof the coverage team at CSFB who has specifically told you NOT TO BUY it but to STAY AWAYfrom it all the way down from $45.” To which the Chase analyst replied, “hey, how has your ratinghelped clients??? [Y]ou’re telling me one thing but clients a different story??? a little shady if youask me….strap it on man!!! take a stand!!! afraid to lose banking business??? are you an investmentbanker or equity research analyst???” JPMBKR-E0817387 (quoted in Exam. IV, App. L at 34n.123).595. By November 2001, CSFB understood Enron’s situation completely. On the heelsof the announcement that Dynegy would acquire Enron, another CSFB equity analyst told his CSFBcolleague that “ENE just could never tell the truth…. A year from now we will talk about … Enrongreed (of a few) and fair value accounting.” CSFBCO 006090157 (quoted in Exam. IV, App. L at22-23 n.81).596. Despite their clear knowledge of the scope of Enron’s problems, CSFB’s equityanalysts continued to rate the Enron stock a “Strong Buy.” In fact, it was not until November 23,604041v1/007457-201-