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thing. However, we cannot in the documentation state this linkage or we run afoul of the Auditors.”RBC NY 0100079 (quoted in ENA Exam. at 115).683. The Insiders accounted for the total Can$294.8 million from the RBC-funded andToronto Dominion-funded portions of the prepay as funds flow from operations, rather than fromfinancing, and did not record the amount on Enron’s balance sheet as debt. This was no surprise toRBC, who knew the Insiders’ accounting for Alberta would be inconsistent with the transaction’seconomic substance. RBC described the Insiders’ original request for Alberta as a request for an“off-balance sheet structure.” RBC NY 0083145 (quoted in ENA Exam. at 108). RBC understoodthe accounting principles applicable to structures such as Alberta. see RBC NY 0100132 (quotedin ENA Exam. at 115), and yet RBC knew the Insiders would account for Alberta as price riskmanagement, not as debt. In an early version of the Alberta structure that was not eventually used,RBC noted the structure’s desired effect was “to permit Enron Canada to treat the financing as acommercial sales contract and not as debt on its balance sheet.” RBCNY0078750-754 (quoted inENA Exam. at 109).684. RBC profited for itself by structuring and financing Alberta, receiving Can$500,000fees for the transaction. In addition, RBC’s performance in Alberta persuaded the Insiders to giveRBC access to other lucrative Enron deals. In a meeting in October 2000 with Fastow, Glisan, andothers, Fastow and Glisan told RBC’s structured finance team that RBC would be invited toparticipate in a future structured finance venture because of Alberta (as well as because of RBC’sprogress in obtaining credit approval for its loan to LJM2). RBC NY 0013003 (quoted in ENAExam. at 118).(3) Hawaii.685. RBC participated as a $20 million lender in the Hawaii FAS 140 financing. CIBC’srole as lead lender in Hawaii is described at paragraphs 522 through 526. RBC was reluctant to604041v1/007457-237-