PAPERSGovernance Frameworks for PublicProject Development and EstimationOle Jonny Klakegg, <strong>Concept</strong> Research Program, Norwegian University of Scienceand Technology, <strong>NTNU</strong>, Trondheim, NorwayTerry Williams, School of Management, University of Southamp<strong>to</strong>n, Southamp<strong>to</strong>n,United KingdomOle Morten Magnussen, <strong>Concept</strong> Research Program, Norwegian University of Scienceand Technology, <strong>NTNU</strong>, Trondheim, NorwayHelene Glasspool, School of Management, University of Southamp<strong>to</strong>n, Southamp<strong>to</strong>n,United KingdomABSTRACT ■This paper investigates how the interfacebetween governance and project managementworks for public projects. It describes governanceframeworks, analyzes embeddedgovernance principles, and discusses the consequences.Based on an initial literature studygiving theoretical underpinning, a characterizationof frameworks is developed and used <strong>to</strong>investigate three public-investment-projectgovernance frameworks in Norway and theUnited Kingdom. This gives a systematic comparisonof framework scope, structure, andembedded principles, and shows the differencesbetween the frameworks and elements,despite the stated purposes being the same:increasing value for money and better use ofpublic spending. The analysis shows the frameworkshave <strong>to</strong> be politically and administrativelywell anchored. A case study particularly lookingin<strong>to</strong> cost and time illustrates how the frameworkinfluences the project through scrutiny. Theanalysis shows the governance frameworks areimportant in securing transparency and controland clarifies the role of sponsor. This work willbe useful in establishing frameworks in othercontexts and should be helpful in working withgovernance of major public projects.Project Management Journal, Vol. 39,Supplement, S27–S42© 2008 by the Project Management InstitutePublished online in Wiley InterScience(www.interscience.wiley.com)DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20058INTRODUCTION ■The governance framework, including government roles, policies, regulations,and so on, is documented <strong>to</strong> have vital importance <strong>to</strong> theplanning and management of projects (Association for ProjectManagement [APM], 2002; Berg et al., 1999; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, &Rothengatter, 2003; Miller & Lessard, 2000; Morris & Hough, 1987). Severaldeveloped countries have started a development process <strong>to</strong> strengthen theability <strong>to</strong> manage and control major public investment projects. Two examplesfocused on in this article are Norway and the United Kingdom. TheNorwegian Ministry of Finance has established a manda<strong>to</strong>ry QualityAssurance Scheme for all large public investment projects (Magnussen &Samset, 2005). This scheme is compared with its equivalents in the UnitedKingdom: a framework developed over time by the Office of GovernmentCommerce (OGC) and the new framework implemented by the Ministry ofDefence (MoD, 2007). The frameworks approach the problems of major publicinvestment projects in very different ways. The consequences of theframework approaches <strong>to</strong> the cost estimation and planning processes interms of review or control are important targets for investigation, becausethey reveal examples of practical steps <strong>to</strong> reduce cost overruns. This articlesums up some findings of a research project sponsored by the ProjectManagement Institute Research Program and the <strong>Concept</strong> ResearchProgram. The study was not completed at the time of writing this article, butat the time of presentation <strong>to</strong> the PMI Research Conference 2008, the projectis expected <strong>to</strong> be completed and the full report available.GovernanceGovernance is a term with many meanings. Its rise <strong>to</strong> prominence stemsfrom the difficulties of hierarchical coordination by firms or the state (Miller& Lessard, 2000). It covers the complex process of steering multiple coupledfirms and agencies. Classical means of governance are regulations (proscriptions/injunctionsor prescriptions/orders), economic means (sanctions orincentives) and information (advice or warnings) (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, &Vedung, 1998). Governance can be defined on many levels. Internationalgovernance has several institutions established <strong>to</strong> settle matters where severalstates are involved, such as the United Nations, World Bank,Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), WorldTrade Organization (WTO), and the European Union. This reminds us thatMarch 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj S27
PAPERSGovernance Frameworks for Public Project Development and Estimationgenerally the governing party of publicinvestment projects is not the <strong>to</strong>p of thepyramid; there is a superior purposeabove the project. Abbott and Snidal(2001) discuss the use of standards as amechanism of international governanceand show how they can play differentroles in different circumstances.They look at different governmentarrangements, varying combinations ofprivate and public governance, andvarying levels of governance (national,regional, and global). Flyvbjerg et al.(2003), investigating several internationalmega-projects, observe the same:governance is relative—the same formulawill not work everywhere. North(1990) notes, “The institutionalistapproach aims <strong>to</strong> identify the variousgovernance modes that enable coordinationof major ac<strong>to</strong>rs in society.” Eachsociety seems <strong>to</strong> develop its own architecture,and optimal solutions are hard<strong>to</strong> identify. Among many definitions forgovernance, we have chosen this one asthe best for our purpose (given uncitedin Wikipedia):the use of institutions, structures ofauthority and even collaboration <strong>to</strong>allocate resources and coordinateor control activity in society or theeconomy.For public investment projects onthe national level, the focus is publicgovernance, which has two parallelsubsystems: the political (making decisionsand giving priority, not discussedfurther here) and the administrative.Different authors define (public) governancedifferently. Traditionally the areain mind is called public administration(PA). New public management (NPM)has taken over the arena over the lasttwo decades. NPM has introducedmany of the same ways of thinking anddesigning systems in the public sec<strong>to</strong>ras is traditionally used in the privatesec<strong>to</strong>r in Europe (Pollitt & Bouckaert,2000) and Scandinavia (Bush, Johnsen,Klausen, & Vanebo, 2005). Critical literature(Christensen & Lægreid, 2001; seeKlausen in Bush et al., 2005) points outthat NPM does not fully take in<strong>to</strong> considerationthe specific public-sec<strong>to</strong>rcontext. The public sec<strong>to</strong>r is increasinglyorganized through independent publicentities, strategic leadership, and contracts;this also increases the importanceof projects in the public sec<strong>to</strong>r.Because of the NPM reforms’ shortcomings,several post-NPM reformshave been introduced <strong>to</strong> reinstate amore central political/administrativecontrol (Christensen, 2007). Governanceframeworks like the ones discussed inthis article are examples of such post-NPM reforms.Public governance is defined by theOECD (2005) as follows:“Governance” refers <strong>to</strong> the formaland informal arrangements thatdetermine how public decisionsare made and how public actions arecarried out, from the perspective ofmaintaining a country’s constitutionalvalues in the face of changingproblems, ac<strong>to</strong>rs and environments.The most common governancefield is corporate governance; “a system[that] shapes who makes investmentdecisions in corporations, what typesof investments they make, and howreturns from investments are distributed”(O’Sullivan, 2003, p. 24) or “thelaws and practices by which managersare held accountable <strong>to</strong> those who havea legitimate stake in the corporation”(Jacoby, 2005. p. 69). Corporate governancesystems are composed of threeareas: internal governance processes(structure, composition, and authorityof the board; the relationship betweenboard and management; and internalfinancial and auditing controls), thequality of the independent auditingfunctions in the national economy, andthe nature and quality of the corporatelaw and regula<strong>to</strong>ry mechanismsdesigned <strong>to</strong> shape corporate activity(Monks & Minow, 2004, referred inDe<strong>to</strong>masi, 2006). De<strong>to</strong>masi (2006)emphasizes that despite these commonelements, corporate governancesystems reflect social, political, andeconomic purposes and differ dramaticallybetween nations with regard <strong>to</strong>purpose, structure, and function.Authors like De<strong>to</strong>masi (2006),Jacoby (2005), O’Sullivan (2000), andAbbott and Snidal (2001) all discuss differencesin the governance systemsfound in different countries. Thereseem <strong>to</strong> be two important categories,the main difference being who areregarded as legitimate stakeholders:• Shareholder-value systems (UnitedStates, United Kingdom, Canada),where only shareholders are legitimatestakeholders. The U.S. “policy governance”model asks, “How can a groupof peers, on behalf of shareholders,see <strong>to</strong> it that a business achieves whatit should (normally in terms ofshareholder value) and avoids unacceptablesituations and actions?”Carver (2001) notes, “The model doesnot prescribe a certain structure, but aset of principles.”• Communitarian systems also holdnonshareholder constituencies suchas employees, banks, and the communityin general as legitimate stakeholders,in some countries by law(Germany, Norway, etc.), and in otherswith no legal requirement <strong>to</strong> do so(Japan).Clarke (2004) makes a similar distinctionbut divides the latter in<strong>to</strong>“relationship-based” systems (Europe)and “family-based” systems (AsiaPacific). Today, shareholder-value systemsseem <strong>to</strong> be dominating internationalgovernance trends, influencingcountries like France and Japan <strong>to</strong>phase out systems of cross-shareholding<strong>to</strong> make way for international andinstitutional inves<strong>to</strong>rs.When designing public investmentprojects, decision makers have <strong>to</strong> considerthe welfare of all relevant stakeholders(users, interest groups, societyin general), which seems parallel <strong>to</strong> thecommunitarian model. Our chosendefinition is useful because it allows bothshareholder-value and communitarianmodels; it also points <strong>to</strong> structuresS28 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
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3PrefaceThe research presented in t
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5Table of contentsPART 1 ..........
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7Summary/abstractThe work reported
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101 IntroductionProjects are increa
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collection and interpretation of th
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15normative agendas, in other words
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17world of projects. The choice of
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19Figure 3 Sources and dataThe proj
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21In line with Flyvbjerg (2006b), t
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233 Concepts and constructs of thep
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25by most BOKs and textbooks in pro
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274 Main topics covered by the rese
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294.2 Empirical indications from ex
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31Budget proposed by the Norwegian
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3330 %Difference (%) from the propo
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3520 00018 000Cost development from
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37In paper 9 (Magnussen 2009a) an a
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395 Conclusions and directions for
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41estimates must be implemented at
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43Klakegg, Ole Jonny, Terry William
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45List of government documents 11Fi
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47Part 2 - Papers1. Magnussen, Ole
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Paper 1Magnussen, Ole Morten, and K
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AbstractCost overruns and delays ar
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Cost effectiveness considerations:
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demonstrates another fundamental is
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Figure 1 The Extended Quality Assur
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Expected effects of the revised qua
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ReferencesBerg, Peder, Kilde, Halva
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International Journal of Project Ma
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O.M. Magnussen, N.O.E. Olsson / Int
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O.M. Magnussen, N.O.E. Olsson / Int
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O.M. Magnussen, N.O.E. Olsson / Int
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Paper 3Magnussen, Ole M., and Nils
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MANAGING THE FRONT-END OF PROJECTS:
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Olsson, Samset, Austeng and Lädre
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Results from the analysis of the de
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more fundamental assessments of pro
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Paper 10Magnussen, Ole M. 2009. Exp
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Explaining cost estimate difference
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changes and external factors. Facto
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30 %Difference (%) from the propose
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Table 2 Areas associated with expla
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agency. In this case, the observed
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ReferencesFlyvbjerg, B., Holm, M.K.