ARTICLE IN PRESST. Williams et al. / International Journal of Project Management xxx (2009) xxx–xxx 7bygg (Direc<strong>to</strong>rate of Public Construction and Property).The project thus went in<strong>to</strong> a new planning phase, and in2002 Statsbygg launched a design contest for the IFI2building. The pre-project was completed in February2004, but funding had <strong>to</strong> wait for a parliamentary decision<strong>to</strong> finance and execute the project, in May 2005. The newbuilding will, according <strong>to</strong> the current schedule, be completedin 2010.The early stages of development show that issues concerningthe execution model and funding sparked somedebate, but there was no question about the need for theproject.Cost figured strongly in the 2004 QA2 analysis. Withouta <strong>to</strong>tal independent cost estimation, the quality assuranceconfirmed the project’s own cost estimates and need <strong>to</strong>budget. The corresponding uncertainty analysis of costingplaced market situation at the <strong>to</strong>p of the list of identifieduncertainty elements. Price rises in the construction marketforced an increase in the budget of the project, with fundsbeing drawn from the contingency reserve, and, subsequently,from a regular budget increase in November2007. Should the success of the QA be judged from theability <strong>to</strong> accurately predict costs, or only from the ability<strong>to</strong> identify the most important risk? The project is not yetcompleted, so the true accuracy of the cost estimateremains <strong>to</strong> be seen. The project started up roughly a yearlater than expected, in the wait for funding, and faced a<strong>to</strong>tally different market situation from that which existedwhen the decision <strong>to</strong> finance and execute the project wasmade. The uncertainty analysis had not been updated: suchanalyses cannot be regarded as relevant without continuousupdates.There is no doubt that the control focus was prevalentin the QA2 assignment. It is clear that there should be areview of cost, schedule and other key areas before thedecision <strong>to</strong> finance and execute large public projects istaken. It is observed that the subordinate agency generallydoes not oppose this, but their assessment of QAand its output in this project is that it was redundantand time/cost-consuming. The QA did not result in budgetmodification or any other decision-making changes.An interviewee from the project suggested that: ‘‘TheQA has done more <strong>to</strong> relieve the Ministry of Financethan <strong>to</strong> help Statsbygg”. However, there seems <strong>to</strong> be agood deal of consensus on how the process itself shouldbe described. Interviewees from the project organisationand the QA team described the exchange of informationas excellent and the interaction between the involved partiesas very good.On the question of QA output, it is observed that theproject organisation expected a bit more than a superficialinsight in<strong>to</strong> project documents. The QA2 cost focus isdescribed as important by interviewees from the organisation,but control of cost should also include an assessmen<strong>to</strong>f technical solutions and their cost effectiveness. Thiswould require an additional focus in the analysis, <strong>to</strong>include both control of numbers and evaluation of technicalsolutions, and would demand enhanced technical skillsfrom those responsible for conducting the analyses.3.4. UK defence case (NEADS)Information about this case came from semi-structuredinterviews, supported by a pre-supplied questionnaire, withsenior personnel involved in the project. There is obviouslylittle in the public domain about the details of the operationof this project, although it is mentioned in the 2006Defence Statistics [23].Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) is an importantdefence against an increasing range of low-level airbornethreats, e.g. helicopters, unmanned air-vehicles and cruisemissiles. In order <strong>to</strong> be both effective, and a weapon, theremust be the ability <strong>to</strong> take and fuse data from multiple sensors<strong>to</strong> form a reliable picture of the situation, identify thetarget and control of the weapon. UK defence currentlyhas two GBAD weapons in its armoury: ‘‘HVM” and‘‘Rapier” although these are <strong>to</strong> be replaced. A ‘‘futureGBAD” Integrated Project Team (IPT) was set up, followinga 1994 NATO feasibility study which suggested an £8billion solution. This seemed reasonable <strong>to</strong> the independentMoD estima<strong>to</strong>rs, based on his<strong>to</strong>ric data, and a funding linefor this amount was endorsed. This means that it wasaccepted as a programme, i.e. it appears in the long-termfunding plans, but no Gate has been gone through yet.There were two stages <strong>to</strong> the project: the air-defenceCommand, Control, Communication and Intelligence,under which UK air defence assets would be integrated,and the defensive missile and battle-space management,including sensors and data-fusion. The business case forthe first stage was prepared, with a budget of approximately$1 billion. The Initial Gate was passed in 2001,allowing an Assessment Phase, <strong>to</strong>gether with a concept secondphase. However, in 2003 there was a general fundingreduction. The Cus<strong>to</strong>mer had <strong>to</strong> cut funding: he had twoother programmes within his remit at that point, both wellforward with a lot of money committed, and one was politicallyvery sensitive. He therefore changed the £1 billion <strong>to</strong>£200 million, <strong>to</strong> give only limited situation awareness. Thisvery basic version of the first phase is now coming <strong>to</strong> theend of its second assessment phase and has a Main Gateduring March 2008, with in-service date forecast for 2010.Network Enabled Air-Space Defence and Surveillance(NEADS) was established as the remaining capability, witha limited budget. It is currently in the <strong>Concept</strong> phase, havingstarted off in Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 2006, expecting Initial Gate in2009, and a Main Gate in 2012, and having a PlanningAssumption for Service Entry of 2020. When the fundingwas cut, a cancellation charge was levied, giving the opportunityfor some industrial work, which was used <strong>to</strong> developthe missile, without the need for user-requirement, systemrequirement, capability gap analysis, a concept of employment,etc., let alone the bulk of NEADS, sensors, datafusionand communications. The budget for the conceptstage of NEADS was also cut substantially in 2003/4, butPlease cite this article in press as: Williams T et al.An investigation of governance frameworks for public projects in Norway and the UK. Int J Project Manage (2009),doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2009.04.001
ARTICLE IN PRESS8 T. Williams et al. / International Journal of Project Management xxx (2009) xxx–xxxa Technology Demonstration Programme has been placed,which is due <strong>to</strong> finish soon.From the point of the view of the MoD, the strategicneed for this capability is clear. There are two weapons thatwill be going out of service. The main drivers <strong>to</strong> decisionmakinghere, which affected the project processfundamentally, therefore appear <strong>to</strong> be threefold: theessential in-service date for the capability due <strong>to</strong> obsolescenceof current equipment, the needs of the UK industrialbase and cost restrictions. Three other drivers also comein<strong>to</strong> play: political sensitivity, opportunistic behaviourand the requirement <strong>to</strong> keep some UK sovereign aspects.In considering the impact of the MoD governanceframework on the project, there are two notable aspectsof NEADS: the organisation takes less interest than theymight because they are part of an IPT, in which the otherschemes are nearer <strong>to</strong> Gates; and the project is in its earlystages, where a project within DE&S may find it easier <strong>to</strong>minimise visibility and get the task done. The NEADS projecthas so far been governed through a mixture of internal(<strong>to</strong> the IPT) and external assurance. It has not yet undertakenany OGC Gateway reviews, and no FoundationReview was performed. It will be reviewed by an internalboard prior <strong>to</strong> submission for the Initial Gate, expectedin 2009. The NEADS project is an example of a complexdefence development scheme. It illustrates why emphasisis needed on the concept stage of such projects, as whilethere may be a clear understanding of the requirement,the best way <strong>to</strong> fulfil this requirement in a cost-constrainedenvironment is a highly complex and changing decision. Itillustrates the need for structured governance processes inthe long period leading up <strong>to</strong> the MoD Initial Gate, duringwhich the project can travel a long and circui<strong>to</strong>us path. Italso illustrates the difference between a straightforwardstatement of the governance process, and the actuality inprojects operating over a number of years within an environmen<strong>to</strong>f changing political and cost priorities.4. Analysis of cases and framework practicesThe Home Office case illustrates flexible use of a complexgovernance framework. The project does not appear<strong>to</strong> be a technical challenge, but the complicated PFI contractarrangement was a challenge <strong>to</strong> handle within thecommon framework. Important findings by the ParliamentaryAccounts Committee outside the Gateway Processillustrates the importance of the status of theframework and what organisational level is challengedby the review; this points <strong>to</strong>wards other additionalimportant governance measures. Although a politicaldecision, this case documents substantial influence byrational decision-making. The building was delivered in2005, on time and without a rise in the service charge– a success s<strong>to</strong>ry from the project perspective, and, hopefully,also from the strategic perspective. This impliesthat flexing of the framework, which at first glance mightappear rigid, can give useful benefits.NEADS is an extremely complex development and procurementproject, illustrating the need for governance inthe early phases of a system development. The case givesa practical example of why a governance framework isimportant. It also illustrates how assumptions change overtime, and the degree of change <strong>to</strong> be faced during the initiationand development of a complex defence system. Itshows the effects of political decision-making and judicioususe of the system in the actuality of the project. The caseposes a question about how long a development shouldbe allowed <strong>to</strong> continue before a formal external review iscalled for. It illustrates why governance in the early phasesis vital <strong>to</strong> project success. It is not possible <strong>to</strong> know whetherit will be a success or not from the strategic or projectperspective.In the IFI2 project the contract arrangements had a specialfocus, following discussions about the fundamentalproject concept. This focus was sparked by early directinterventions by the Ministry, based on identifying the costas being <strong>to</strong>o high. Although a political decision, this casedocuments substantial influence by rational decision-making.There are no indications that QA had a large impact,but there was clear reassurance, and thus legitimization,in having an independent review. One interesting aspectis the question about how <strong>to</strong> evaluate the performance ofa review. Is it the ability <strong>to</strong> identify the risks that is important,or <strong>to</strong> predict the exact cost? In this case, the identifiedmarket risk had considerable consequence on cost, and thebudget had <strong>to</strong> be increased. Does this imply a successfulQA2 performance or not? Does the need for an increasedbudget in such a situation deem the project a failure, giventhat the delivery will be on time and of the right quality?The Skjold case illustrates why it was important <strong>to</strong>expand the QA scheme <strong>to</strong> include QA1, introducing thevalue focus in the early stages of development. The strategicperspective, critical from the decision-making point ofview, is not present in QA2. However, it would need <strong>to</strong>be early – in this case a late QA1 may not have madeany difference: the Defence organisation’s lack of supportwas well known <strong>to</strong> the decision-makers. Ultimately, decisionswere clearly made on a political basis, taking in<strong>to</strong>account Norway’s ship-building industry. There might bea rational normative framework, but this is embedded ina society which includes influences of power and politics.Indeed, this is how it should be – it is anchored deep isthe democratic system and the governance framework.The performance of QA2 had weaknesses, since the rulesof practice had not yet been fully established. Thus, theimpact of quality assurance was lessened; reassurance wasthe benefit gained from it. The project perspective showsa well-defined, -prepared and -executed project, but it islikely <strong>to</strong> be a failure, as was publicly proclaimed by highlevel officials long before the project was started.In Table 1 some facts about the four cases are compared.This may question the choice of cases for this studyand the performance of the reviews/operation of the frameworks.All cases show deviations from the rules defined byPlease cite this article in press as: Williams T et al.An investigation of governance frameworks for public projects in Norway and the UK. Int J Project Manage (2009),doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2009.04.001
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3PrefaceThe research presented in t
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5Table of contentsPART 1 ..........
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7Summary/abstractThe work reported
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101 IntroductionProjects are increa
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collection and interpretation of th
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15normative agendas, in other words
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17world of projects. The choice of
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19Figure 3 Sources and dataThe proj
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21In line with Flyvbjerg (2006b), t
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233 Concepts and constructs of thep
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25by most BOKs and textbooks in pro
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274 Main topics covered by the rese
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294.2 Empirical indications from ex
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31Budget proposed by the Norwegian
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3330 %Difference (%) from the propo
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3520 00018 000Cost development from
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37In paper 9 (Magnussen 2009a) an a
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395 Conclusions and directions for
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41estimates must be implemented at
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43Klakegg, Ole Jonny, Terry William
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45List of government documents 11Fi
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47Part 2 - Papers1. Magnussen, Ole
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Paper 1Magnussen, Ole Morten, and K
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AbstractCost overruns and delays ar
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Cost effectiveness considerations:
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demonstrates another fundamental is
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Figure 1 The Extended Quality Assur
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Expected effects of the revised qua
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ReferencesBerg, Peder, Kilde, Halva
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International Journal of Project Ma
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O.M. Magnussen, N.O.E. Olsson / Int
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O.M. Magnussen, N.O.E. Olsson / Int
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O.M. Magnussen, N.O.E. Olsson / Int
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Paper 3Magnussen, Ole M., and Nils
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MANAGING THE FRONT-END OF PROJECTS:
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Olsson, Samset, Austeng and Lädre
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1995; Packendorff, 1995), mainly cr
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to a better way of managing the fro
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Figure 1 Basic structure of the ind
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from empirical investigations has b
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among organizations, not individual
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actors, the relationships are repro
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the network approach has been used
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established based on the views of i
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IHFJKGAELDMBCA - The focal projectB
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the NDEA. The communication strateg
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Directorate for Cultural Heritage (
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the project. The basic activity was
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assumed to be more important than o
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Another interesting observation was
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REFERENCESEngwall, Mats. 2003. No p
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Söderlund, Jonas. 2002. On the dev
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