y the Chief of Defence Materiel, headof the supplying organization (calledDE&S), following the McKane report(MoD, 2006) and the unifying of theprocurement and logistics agencies.This enables the other espoused goal ofthe framework: <strong>to</strong> manage the MoDsprojects as a single portfolio <strong>to</strong> get thebest capability for the MoD as a whole.In Norway, major investment projectsinvolve big money and tend <strong>to</strong>draw much attention. The triggeringincident in Norway was a series ofunsuccessful major projects during the1980s–90s. Repeated project overspendturned in<strong>to</strong> a political problem. DeputySecretary General of the Ministry ofFinance Peder Berg led a governmentcommittee investigating a number ofproject cases and the report documentedthe problems (Berg et al., 1999).The Ministry of Finance initiated thedevelopment of an obliga<strong>to</strong>ry qualityassurance (QA) scheme in 2000. Thegoal was <strong>to</strong> ensure improved quality atentry in large public projects. It was abot<strong>to</strong>m-up process within the ministry,with Peder Berg as a driving force.It was important <strong>to</strong> achieve anchoringat a high level within the Ministry.The decision <strong>to</strong> introduce this governanceframework was made by theprime minister’s office. For both the firstand second generation of the QAregime, the intention was <strong>to</strong> establish asystem where politics and administrationis well divided, with the interplaybetween these two sides well unders<strong>to</strong>od.Our interviewee said: “From anadministrative point of view, theimportant thing is <strong>to</strong> make sure there isalways a basis for decision addressingall relevant sides of the issues involved,and an independent assessment confirmingits professional quality. Theintended effect of such a system is <strong>to</strong>make the state able <strong>to</strong> choose the rightprojects and execute them well.”Compared <strong>to</strong> the U.K. frameworks, theNorwegian one is new. It should, therefore,be expected <strong>to</strong> represent the latestdevelopments in project managementand project governance. Compared <strong>to</strong>the United Kingdom, the experiencestill has <strong>to</strong> be considered as limited,and there is no accompanying “comprehensive<strong>to</strong>olbox” like PRINCE2 TM .The three initiatives seem <strong>to</strong> havebeen prompted by similar developments:uncertainty due <strong>to</strong> repeatedfailures of major projects and changesin market; lack of success in publicinvestment projects; strong individualcontributions <strong>to</strong> put focus on theimportance of public investment projects;and support at a high politicallevel <strong>to</strong> act. Better use of public fundsmay be said <strong>to</strong> be the aim in both countries.The OGC and Norwegian initiativesare anchored at the <strong>to</strong>p political leveland organized under the Ministry ofFinance. The process, however, wasgenuinely different. In Norway, the initiatingprocess was bot<strong>to</strong>m-up, as wasthe implementation of the improvementand following learning processes.In the United Kingdom, both processeswere <strong>to</strong>p-down, as was the implementationof the management system(the <strong>to</strong>olbox attached <strong>to</strong> the governanceframework).Developing and Implementing theFrameworkThe U.K. OGC Gateway Reviews derivedfrom the 1999 Gershon Report, and thePeer Review concept originated fromthe “Successful IT” report in 2000.Additional features were introduced in2004. A later Gershon review (2004) says:“Looking forward, the OGC is committed<strong>to</strong> achieving £3 billion in value formoney gains in the 3 years <strong>to</strong> 2005–06, ofwhich around one half will come fromthe Gateway Review process, whichrequires independent assessment ofprojects and programs at key points intheir life cycles.” John Healey, financialsecretary <strong>to</strong> the Treasury (HM Treasury,2007), also points <strong>to</strong> the delivery of “over£8 billion of efficiency savings from publicprocurement.” The OGC is currentlyreforming, becoming a smaller, morefocused organization, reducing staff byalmost half and introducing new challenges.The OGC currently works by influenceand recommendation; its recommendationsare not mandated. This isthe traditional UK civil service culture.The OGC does not consider individualproject reports once they have reportedon them; rather, they look for systemictrends. Reports on a particular projectgo only <strong>to</strong> the sponsor (the personknown in PRINCE2 TM as the “SeniorResponsible Owner,” or SRO) and theOGC—so in that sense governance of aproject is limited. Responsibility forprojects is divided between the OGC,the department, and other bodies, suchas the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit(for critical projects) and the NationalAudit Office (NAO; for audit purposes).This may give differences in governanceacross sec<strong>to</strong>rs but, hopefully,equally good governance across sec<strong>to</strong>rs.There are a substantial number ofpeople involved in implementing theframework, many of them giving advice<strong>to</strong> users of the <strong>to</strong>ols and methodsattached <strong>to</strong> the framework itself.In Norway, it is stated by the government(prime minister’s office) thatbetter projects and better execution ofinvestment projects is a political goal.When QA2 was introduced in 2000 (firstgeneration of the framework), it introducedmanda<strong>to</strong>ry external assessmen<strong>to</strong>f projects before the financing decisionby Parliament. The Norwegianframework is manda<strong>to</strong>ry for all majorprojects with an expected cost of morethan NOK 500 million/£42 millionfinanced by the state (excluding oil andgas). External assessments are performedby consultant companies undera framework contract with the Ministryof Finance. While QA2 had the expectedeffect, experience through 2000–2004exposed a need <strong>to</strong> do something atan earlier stage. Some of the projectsbefore Parliament were not matureenough. In 2005, QA1 was introduced(second generation of the framework),and current framework contracts arevalid through 2008 with an additionaloption. QA1 was by far the more difficultarrangement <strong>to</strong> define and develop.2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj S33
PAPERSGovernance Frameworks for Public Project Development and EstimationThe same entity is responsible for theframework for all sec<strong>to</strong>rs (with fewexceptions), expected <strong>to</strong> give the samegovernance across sec<strong>to</strong>rs. This wasimplemented without organizationalchanges. Anchoring is the key <strong>to</strong> thisoperation. The <strong>to</strong>p management andleaders of the Ministry of Financeappreciate the benefit of this arrangementand give support <strong>to</strong> lower organizationallevels.There are many similarities, butalso differences between the UnitedKingdom and Norway here:• In the United Kingdom, the OGCframework goals are more explicit,administratively focused, and measuredin terms of money. In Norway,there are more clearly politicallyanchored goals, but not specifying theexpected effect of implementation.• The Norwegian framework is manda<strong>to</strong>ry,forced upon agencies/projects(control aspect: <strong>to</strong>p-down), while theU.K. OGC framework works byinfluence or recommendation. TheMoD framework, being in a singledepartment, is manda<strong>to</strong>ry, imposed<strong>to</strong>p-down.• The Norwegian framework is a bot<strong>to</strong>mupprocess of learning from cases—transferring experience <strong>to</strong> other sec<strong>to</strong>rsby coordination and building “thenew profession.” The U.K. OGC framework<strong>to</strong> some extent is a <strong>to</strong>p-downintroduction of a common “qualitysystem.” The Centers of Excellencerepresent the “new profession” aspectin the United Kingdom.• Both Norway and the United Kingdom(OGC) have established a suppor<strong>to</strong>rganization looking for systemictrends: in the United Kingdom as apermanent public administrationentity and in Norway as an externalresearch program. The MoD reportson systemic trends at a <strong>to</strong>p level.• The United Kingdom (OGC) looksonly at systemic trends; Norway andthe MoD also look at single cases.• Norway has a centralized coordinationarena in the project managementforum (ministries, agencies, QAconsultants, and researchers meeting<strong>to</strong> discuss principles and practices),while the OGC has established distributed“Centers of Excellence” (the MoDis already a single, organized entity).• The Norwegian development processappears more step-by-step, whereasthe OGC was straight <strong>to</strong> full scope. TheMoD was a development of structuredreorganization of existing agencies.The two countries seem <strong>to</strong> havechosen different strategies: Norwaybreaking with tradition and introducinga manda<strong>to</strong>ry new arrangement, and theUnited Kingdom building on traditionand improving current processes,through influence.Structure of the FrameworksIn the United Kingdom, the chief elementsof the OGC framework are theGateway Reviews. Later came categorizationand Mission Critical Projects,then Centers of Excellence, and nowalso the Project Initiation Process. Theprivate-sec<strong>to</strong>r engagement comes fromthe use of private-sec<strong>to</strong>r-experiencedconsultants who have been individuallyaccredited by the OGC for Gateways.The six Gateways are well defined. Theyare standardized and documentation isavailable. Gateways 1 <strong>to</strong> 5 are at projectlevel:• Gateway Review 0: Strategic management(several times where appropriate)• Gateway Review 1: Business justification• Gateway Review 2: Procurementstrategy• Gateway Review 3: Investment decision• Gateway Review 4: Readiness forservice• Gateway Review 5: Benefits realizationGateways look at the ministeriallevel all the way down <strong>to</strong> suppliers.Parliament/government level is undertakenby mechanisms outside thisstudy (committees, NAO, etc.). It is possiblethat gateways “rarely come upwith any surprises,” tending <strong>to</strong> highlightthings the team already knows.Independent reviewers also look atsuppliers, as they have relevantexperience.Projects are assessed as <strong>to</strong> criticality,based on the following criteria: highpolitical significance, riskiness of theprogram, and the cost (this is actually alower-level criterion). The <strong>to</strong>p level ofcriticality is the “Top 20” mission-criticalprojects (reported <strong>to</strong> the PrimeMinister’s office, and the OGC sits onthe project board of these projects).The next level is “high-criticality” projects;for these, Gateway reviews have <strong>to</strong>use senior people or even all independents.Then there are “medium-criticality”projects, for which departments cancall on the OGC for help if there isresource available. “Low-criticalityprojects” are reviewed within departments.Criticality assessment is completedby a department then betweenthe OGC and Permanent Secretaries; themission-critical list is also decidedbetween the head of the OGC and thePrime Minister. It may be that the levelof external input could decrease due <strong>to</strong>cost considerations. A further elementis the development of small Centers ofExcellence, bringing “best practice” <strong>to</strong>the department, acting as a liaisonpoint within a department for the OGCand reporting directly <strong>to</strong> the PermanentSecretary. The OGC measures theeffect of its efforts and publishes resultsfrequently, stated in terms of moneysaved (according <strong>to</strong> procedures laiddown by the National Audit Office).The U.K. MoD system works on fourdifferent types of projects, a key onebeing equipment and support. Eachtype has a (different) categorization—for example, A–D; for Equipment &Support, based on cost. This gives anoverall risk portfolio. There are only twogates: the first (Initial Gate) <strong>to</strong> releasefunds for assessment, and the second(Main Gate) <strong>to</strong> release funds for themain project. Categories A&B go, at thetwo gates, <strong>to</strong> the Investment AppraisalBoard via two routes simultaneously,from the advocate of the project (theSRO) and via “independent” scrutinyS34 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
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3PrefaceThe research presented in t
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5Table of contentsPART 1 ..........
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7Summary/abstractThe work reported
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101 IntroductionProjects are increa
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collection and interpretation of th
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15normative agendas, in other words
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17world of projects. The choice of
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19Figure 3 Sources and dataThe proj
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21In line with Flyvbjerg (2006b), t
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233 Concepts and constructs of thep
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25by most BOKs and textbooks in pro
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274 Main topics covered by the rese
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294.2 Empirical indications from ex
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31Budget proposed by the Norwegian
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3330 %Difference (%) from the propo
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3520 00018 000Cost development from
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37In paper 9 (Magnussen 2009a) an a
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395 Conclusions and directions for
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41estimates must be implemented at
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43Klakegg, Ole Jonny, Terry William
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45List of government documents 11Fi
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47Part 2 - Papers1. Magnussen, Ole
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Paper 1Magnussen, Ole Morten, and K
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AbstractCost overruns and delays ar
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Cost effectiveness considerations:
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demonstrates another fundamental is
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Figure 1 The Extended Quality Assur
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Expected effects of the revised qua
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ReferencesBerg, Peder, Kilde, Halva
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International Journal of Project Ma
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O.M. Magnussen, N.O.E. Olsson / Int
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O.M. Magnussen, N.O.E. Olsson / Int
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O.M. Magnussen, N.O.E. Olsson / Int
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Paper 3Magnussen, Ole M., and Nils
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MANAGING THE FRONT-END OF PROJECTS:
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Olsson, Samset, Austeng and Lädre
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1995; Packendorff, 1995), mainly cr
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to a better way of managing the fro
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Figure 1 Basic structure of the ind
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- Page 103 and 104: REFERENCESEngwall, Mats. 2003. No p
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- Page 115: Paper 5Olsson, Nils O. E., and Ole
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- Page 154 and 155: ARTICLE IN PRESST. Williams et al.
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- Page 158 and 159: ARTICLE IN PRESST. Williams et al.
- Page 160 and 161: ARTICLE IN PRESST. Williams et al.
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Explaining cost estimate difference
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changes and external factors. Facto
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30 %Difference (%) from the propose
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Table 2 Areas associated with expla
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agency. In this case, the observed
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ReferencesFlyvbjerg, B., Holm, M.K.