establish relevant objectives. Relevance is a prerequisite for sustainability, as the example above illustrates– willingness <strong>to</strong> pay is strongly linked <strong>to</strong> the extent that benefits exceed costs for the users.Table 1 highlights some of the key problems encountered in major projects and measures introduced bythe quality assurance regime <strong>to</strong> address these problems. It can be seen that the QA1 is designed <strong>to</strong> coverthe aspects that contribute <strong>to</strong> project success in an overall perspective, while QA2 is a control mechanismof the basic assumptions underlying the project before the final appropriation.In this paper we have shown that research reveals fundamental problems connected <strong>to</strong> projects, especiallythe large and complex ones. Much effort has been on the occurrence and causes of cost overrun. This isnatural seen in the perspective that cost overruns represent a waste of resources that is directly andimmediately linked <strong>to</strong> the project. The traditional response has been <strong>to</strong> use considerable resources <strong>to</strong>better control and management of the implementation phase.The control and management of projects are of course fac<strong>to</strong>rs determining project success in anoperational perspective, but we argue that a focus on the initial phases is even more important.Guided by an example we demonstrate compliance <strong>to</strong> schedule, budget, and technical requirements are ofsecondary importance if the project does not perform well in terms of feasibility and long-term effects.These overall issues are determined in the initial phases of the project where focus should be put on theneeds it is meant <strong>to</strong> satisfy and the different approaches <strong>to</strong> fulfill those needs. This was the backgroundfor introducing a quality assurance scheme <strong>to</strong> secure sound choice of concept. It is a supplementperformed by external project management specialists <strong>to</strong> the political decision process and is supposed <strong>to</strong>bring independent analyses of the different alternatives and ultimately an advice on what alternative is best<strong>to</strong> achieve the given objectives. Some experiences have been gained but there are many questions thatneed <strong>to</strong> be answered <strong>to</strong> get a picture of the effect of this initiative on long-term feasibility and profitabilityof public projects.10
ReferencesBerg, Peder, Kilde, Halvard S. and Asbjörn Rolstadås. 2003. Large Norwegian Governemental Projects.Any Lessons Learnt? Paper presented at NORDNET 2003 - International Project ManagementConference, Oslo, Norway, September 24-26.Flyvbjerg, Bent, Holm, Mette S. and Søren Buhl. 2002.”Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects.Error or lie?” Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(3), 279-295.Flyvbjerg, Bent., Holm, Mette K.S. and Søren Buhl. 2004.”What causes cost overrun in Transportinfrastructure projects?” Transport Reviews, 24(1), 3-18.Kaasen, Knut, Aslaksen, Iulie, Bergseth, Stig, Grønner, Erik, Hervik, Arild, Moe, Bjarne and Atle Tranøy.1999. NOU 1999:11 Analyse av investeringsutviklingen på kontinentalsokkelen (Available only inNorwegian. Translated title: Analysis of the investment development on the Norwegian continental shelf).Oslo, Norway: Government Administration Services.Miller, Roger og Donald R. Lessard. 2000. The Strategic Management of Large Engineering Projects: ShapingInstitutions, Risks and Governance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.Morris, P.W.G. and G.H. Hough. 1991. The Ana<strong>to</strong>my of Major Projects. A Study of the Reality of ProjectManagement. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.Nijkamp, Peter and Barry Ubbels. 1998. How Reliable are Estimates of Infrastructure Costs? A ComparativeAnalysis. Serie Research Memoranda. Research Memorandum 1998-29. [Online] Amsterdam, VrijeUniversiteit. Available from URL: . [Accessed 2004 Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 20].Odeck, James. 2004. “Cost overruns in road construction – what are their sizes and determinants?”Transport Policy, 11(1), 43-53.Olsson, Nils, Austeng, Kjell, Samset, Knut and Ola Lädre. 2004. “Ensuring Quality-at-Entry: Challengesin Front-end Management of Projects.” Project Perspectives, 27 (1), 36-40.Samset, Knut. 1998. Project management in a high-uncertainty situation. Uncertainty, risk and project management ininternational development projects. PhD diss., Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim,Norway.Samset, Knut. 2003. Project Evaluation. Making Investments Succeed. Trondheim, Norway: Tapir AcademicPress.Solheim, Hege Gry, Dammen, Erik, Skaldebö, Håvard O., Myking, Eystein, Krogh Svendsen, Elisabethand Paul Torgersen. 2004. Konseptutvikling og evaluering i s<strong>to</strong>re statlige investeringsprosjekter. <strong>Concept</strong>rapport nr 1060.(Available only in norwegian. Translated title: <strong>Concept</strong> development and evaluation in large public investment projects.<strong>Concept</strong> report no 1060). Trondheim, Norway: The <strong>Concept</strong> program.The Office of the Audi<strong>to</strong>r General. 2002. Dokument nr. 3:3 (2002-2003) Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse avplanlegging og oppfølging av s<strong>to</strong>re veganlegg i Statens vegvesen (Available only in norwegian. Translatedtitle: The Office of the Audi<strong>to</strong>r General’s investigation of the planning and moni<strong>to</strong>ring of large roadconstruction projects under the National Public Roads Administration). Oslo, Norway: The Office of theAudi<strong>to</strong>r General.World Bank. 1996. Evaluation results 1994. The international Bank for Reconstruction and Development.Washing<strong>to</strong>n D.C.11
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3PrefaceThe research presented in t
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5Table of contentsPART 1 ..........
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7Summary/abstractThe work reported
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- Page 41 and 42: 43Klakegg, Ole Jonny, Terry William
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Reproduced with permission of the c
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Paper 5Olsson, Nils O. E., and Ole
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PAPERSGovernance Frameworks for Pub
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supporting setting of and achieving
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The study proceeded as follows:•
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y the Chief of Defence Materiel, he
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(within MoD but independent of thep
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Norway U.K. (MoD) U.K. (OGC)Charact
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from the external consultants was s
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governance. International StudiesRe
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Paper 7Williams, Terry, Ole Jonny K
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The development of the frameworksUK
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notable characteristic of the Norwe
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Office to the National Audit Office
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highly complex and changing decisio
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ARTICLE IN PRESSAvailable online at
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ARTICLE IN PRESST. Williams et al.
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ARTICLE IN PRESST. Williams et al.
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ARTICLE IN PRESST. Williams et al.
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ARTICLE IN PRESST. Williams et al.
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ARTICLE IN PRESST. Williams et al.
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Paper submitted to the Internationa
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One constraint is that actual costs
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In other words, the QA scheme is a
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author, there apparently are no stu
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20,0 %15,0 %10,0 %5,0 %0,0 %P50 est
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The pre-eminent result is that the
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Results from the analysis of the de
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more fundamental assessments of pro
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Paper 10Magnussen, Ole M. 2009. Exp
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Explaining cost estimate difference
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changes and external factors. Facto
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30 %Difference (%) from the propose
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Table 2 Areas associated with expla
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agency. In this case, the observed
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ReferencesFlyvbjerg, B., Holm, M.K.